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ABSTRACT 
The present study examines the representation and composition of meaning in scalar 
implicatures. Scalar implicature is the phenomenon whereby the use of a less informative term 
(e.g., some) is inferred to mean the negation of a more informative term (e.g., to mean not all). 
The experiments reported here investigate how the processing of the implicature-based aspect of 
meaning (e.g., the interpretation of some as meaning not all) differs from other types of meaning 
processing, and how that aspect of meaning is initially realized. 
The first three experiments measure event-related potentials (ERPs) to examine whether 
inferential pragmatic aspects of meaning are processed using different mechanisms than lexical 
or combinatorial semantic aspects of meaning, and whether inferential aspects of meaning can be 
realized rapidly. Participants read infelicitous quantifiers for which the semantic meaning (at 
least one of) was correct with respect to the context but the pragmatic meaning (not all of) was 
not, compared to quantifiers for which the semantic meaning was inconsistent with the context 
and no additional pragmatic meaning is available. Across experiments, quantifiers that were 
pragmatically inconsistent but not semantically inconsistent with the context elicited a broadly 
distributed, sustained negative component. This sustained negativity contrasts with the N400 
effect typically elicited by nouns that are incongruent with their context, suggesting that the 
recognition of scalar implicature errors elicits a qualitatively different ERP signature than the 
recognition of lexico-semantic errors. The effect was also distinct from the ERP response elicited 
by quantifiers that were semantically inconsistent with a context. The sustained negativity may 
reflect cancellation of the pragmatic inference and retrieval of the semantic meaning. This 
process was also found to be independent from lexico-semantic processing: the N400 elicited by 
lexico-semantic violations was not modulated by the presence of a pragmatic inconsistency. 
These findings suggest there is a dissociation between the mechanisms for processing 
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combinatorial semantic meaning and those for inference-based pragmatic meaning, that 
inferential pragmatic meaning can be realized rapidly, and that the computation of meaning 
involves continuous negotiation between different aspects of meaning. 
The next set of experiments examined how scalar implicature-based meanings are 
realized initially. Default processing accounts assume that the interpretation of some of as 
meaning not all of is realized easily and automatically (regardless of context), whereas 
context-driven processing accounts assume that it is realized effortfully and only in certain 
contexts. In two experiments, participants' self-paced reading times were recorded as they read 
vignettes in which the context did or did not bias the participants to make a scalar inference (to 
interpret some of as meaning not all of). The reading times in the first experiment suggested that 
the realization of the inference was influenced by the context: reading times to a target word later 
in the vignette were facilitated in contexts in which the scalar inference should be realized but 
not in contexts where it should not be realized. Importantly, however, reading times did not 
provide evidence for processing cost at the time the inference is realized, contrary to the 
predictions of context-driven processing accounts. The results raise the question of why 
inferencing occurs only in certain contexts if it does not involve extra processing effort. In the 
subsequent experiment, reading times suggested that the inference may not have been realized 
when participants engaged in a secondary task that increased processing load. These results, 
together with the results of other recent experiments, suggest that inferencing may be effortless 
in certain contexts but effortful with other contexts, and not computed at all in still other contexts, 
depending on the strength of the bias created by the context. These findings may all be 
accountable for under a recently-proposed constraint-based processing model of scalar 
implicature. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Comprehending language involves composing meaning out of multiple units: the 
meaning of a sentence like "The cat sat on the mat" is composed out of the meanings of the 
individual words in the sentence and the relationships between these words. Units of meaning 
may also come from outside the sentence. For instance, based strictly on its words and grammar 
the sentence "Can you pass the salt?" is a question about someone's abilities, but someone 
hearing that sentence at the dinner table would interpret it instead as a request to give the salt to 
the speaker. This interpretation is based on an inference about the speaker's intentions (Grice, 
1975): the person uttering that sentence probably is not questioning the hearer's abilities but 
probably does care about having the salt, and thus the hearer infers what the speaker meant, even 
though that meaning is not included in the literal semantics of the sentence that was uttered. In 
short, comprehension of even simple utterances involves integration of different aspects of 
meaning coming from both within the utterance and from expectations about other people's 
intentions. 
Language users perform this sort of integration ubiquitously and without apparent effort 
(Van Berkum, 2009). Thus, to understand language comprehension, we must also understand 
how multiple aspects of meaning are realized, compared, and combined or rejected during 
processing. People are rarely consciously aware of how they are composing meaning as language 
is unfolding; therefore, these processes can usually only be measured via implicit online 
measures that are sensitive to cognitive processes taking place prior to and independently of 
overt responses or decisions. Furthermore, meaning is composed rapidly (there is little delay 
between hearing a sentence like "Can you pass the salt?" and understanding what the appropriate 
response is, and only in exceptional circumstances do people engaged in conversation need to 
stop and think before understanding the meaning of a simple sentence) and incrementally 
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(comprehenders do not wait until the end of a sentence to start putting together the meanings of 
words and inferring speaker meaning). Therefore, the cognitive processes underlying meaning 
composition must be investigated using methods with high temporal resolution that can reveal 
these processes as a sentence is unfolding—and precisely where and when in a sentence these 
processes occur—rather than methods that only consider how the sentence is ultimately 
interpreted. The studies presented in this dissertation use implicit, online measures of this type to 
investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying inference and meaning composition, focusing 
on a particular linguistic phenomenon, scalar implicature.  
 
1.1. SCALAR IMPLICATURE: LINGUISTIC THEORY 
Scalar implicature refers to the interpretation of a weak (less informative) term as 
meaning that a stronger (more informative) term does not hold.
1
 Consider, for instance, the 
exchange in (1): 
1) A. Are all of the students in your department hardworking? 
B. Some of them are. 
In this context, because speaker B chose not to say "All of them are", a hearer often interprets the 
utterance some of them are as meaning not all of them are. This interpretation is considered 
"scalar" because the quantifiers some of and all of are assumed to occupy a lexical scale, <some, 
all>, in which both express the same sort of information (the quantity of elements in some set 
have some property, such as being hardworking), but all of is the "stronger" element of the scale 
in that it makes a stronger, more informative claim—there are fewer possible scenarios in which 
                                                 
 
1
 Throughout this dissertation, both the terms scalar implicature and scalar inference will be used to refer to the 
phenomenon being discussed. The term scalar implicature will be used to refer to the act on the speaker's/utterer's 
part (e.g., when discussing how a comprehender "comprehends a scalar implicature"), and scalar inference will be 
used to refer to the act on the comprehender's part (e.g., when discussing how a comprehender "makes a scalar 
inference" or "realizes a scalar inference"). 
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all of the X can be true (Noveck & Sperber, 2007; Levinson, 2000; Grice, 1975; Horn, 1972). 
Other kinds of linguistic expressions are also thought to occupy lexical scales—e.g., coordinators 
(X or Y may be interpreted as meaning not [X and Y] because of the lexical scale <or, and>), 
adjectives (warm may be interpreted as not scalding because of a lexical scale such as <warm, 
hot, scalding>, etc.), and more—although different expressions and different scales differ in the 
strength of the scalar implicature they invoke (Doran, Baker, McNabb, Larson, & Ward, 2012; 
Doran, Ward, Larson, McNabb, & Baker, 2009).  
According to Gricean accounts of scalar implicature, the interpretation due to scalar 
inference—i.e., the interpretation of some of as meaning not all of—is a pragmatic meaning 
based on an inferential enrichment process, and is not part of the inherent semantics of the 
quantifier some of (Noveck & Sperber, 2007; Grice, 1975; Horn, 1972). The pragmatic 
interpretation arises based on a hearer's expectation that a cooperative speaker will use the most 
informative expression possible—i.e., if all of were true, then the speaker would have said all of 
rather than the less informative expression some of. Thus, when the speaker chooses not to use 
the stronger expression, the hearer infers that the stronger expression must not be true—i.e., that 
some of must mean not all of. 
Crucial to the notion of scalar implicature, a term like some of has a semantic 
interpretation that is separate from the inference-based, pragmatic interpretation. The semantic 
interpretation of some of, for example, is the existential (at least one of) used in logic and 
syllogistic reasoning (Newstead, 1988). In other words, under the semantic interpretation of the 
expression, the possible scenarios in which all of the X are Y is true are a subset of the possible 
scenarios in which some of the X are Y is true (because if all of the students are hardworking, 
then any random group of "some of them" must also be hardworking). Under the pragmatic 
interpretation, on the other hand, the set of possible scenarios in which all of the X are Y is true is 
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disjoint from the set of possible scenarios in which some of the X are Y is true (since some of 
means not all of under this interpretation, some of and all of cannot be true in the same scenario). 
A common argument for the distinction between the pragmatic and semantic interpretation is the 
defeasibility (or cancellability) argument: the pragmatic interpretation can be cancelled or 
revised (as in (2a) below) without resulting in a nonsensical sentence (Doran et al., 2012; 
Rullman & You, 2006), whereas the semantic meaning cannot (as in (2b)): 
2) a. Some of the students in this department are hardworking. In fact, all of them are. 
b. Some of the students in this department are hardworking. #In fact, none of them are. 
Thus, the not all of interpretation of some of is thought to be an inference, and the at least one of 
interpretation to be an entailment. In (2a), the inference not all of the students in this department 
are hardworking is explicitly cancelled by the following sentence, which specifies that all of the 
students are; while this cancels the inference, it does not result in a contradiction, indicating that 
the comprehender must be able to re-interpret some of semantically as meaning at least one (and 
possibly all). In (2b), the second sentence instead cancels the entailment at least one of the 
students in this department is hardworking, resulting in a contradiction. (See, however, Meibauer, 
2012, for a review of challenges to the defeasibility argument.) The pragmatic interpretation is 
also known as the upper-bounded interpretation (because it asserts that the upper bound all of, 
the largest possible set of Xs that are Y, is not true), and the semantic interpretation as the 
lower-bounded interpretation (because it asserts that the lower bound none of, the smallest 
possible set of Xs that are Y, is not true; at least one of could be rephrased as not none of). 
 A related piece of evidence for the distinction between pragmatic and semantic 
interpretations comes from cases in which the inference is not cancelled by a later utterance, but 
seems to not arise at all in a particular context, as in (3) (adapted from Levinson, 2000): 
3) A. Was there any evidence against them? 
B. Yes, some of their documents were forgeries. 
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It is generally assumed (Katsos & Cummins, 2010: 285; Levinson, 2000: 51) that B's utterance in 
this example is not interpreted as meaning it is not the case that all of their documents were 
forgeries, since that information is not relevant to A's question. Again, this is taken as evidence 
that the inference-based not all of interpretation is separate from the semantics of some of. Other 
contextual and linguistic factors that contribute to whether some of is interpreted semantically 
include the presence or absence of lexical alternatives in the context (the inference may be 
inhibited when numbers like two and three were possible alternatives to some of in the context; 
Degen & Tanenhaus, 2011; Huang, Hahn, & Snedeker, 2010), the syntactic form of the 
expression itself (i.e., partitive some of is interpreted pragmatically more often than some; Degen 
& Tanenhaus, 2011), prosody (contrastive stress on some makes the inference more likely, as 
does reduction of some of into summa; Degen & Tanenhaus, submitted; Grodner, Klein, Carbary, 
& Tanenhaus, 2010), and syntactic position/information structure (in Greek, the quantifier 
corresponding to some of is more likely to be interpreted pragmatically when it is in 
sentence-initial subject position, which is associated with given/old information; Breheny, 
Katsos, & Williams, 2006). Whether these examples of previous context inhibiting a pragmatic 
interpretation are actually different from the earlier example of later context cancelling a 
pragmatic interpretation remains an open question; some psycholinguistic accounts of 
inferencing argue that in all of these examples the pragmatic inference is realized automatically 
at first, but cancelled before the comprehender is aware of it. This question will be discussed in 
the following section, and forms the basis for the experiments discussed in Chapter 3. 
Since scalar implicatures introduce a dissociation between semantic and pragmatic 
meaning, since their realization can be manipulated with minimal changes in context (as will be 
shown in Chapter 3), and since a comprehender's interpretation of an expression like some of can 
be tested using implicit online methods, scalar implicatures offer an ideal test case for examining 
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the relationship between semantics and pragmatics in the dynamics of sentence comprehension. 
It is not universally accepted, however, that the "pragmatic" interpretation of scalar expressions 
like some of is actually pragmatic. The grammatical view
2
 of scalar implicatures (Chierchia, Fox, 
& Spector, 2012; Chierchia, 2004; for more reviews and discussion, see Geurts & van Tiel, to 
appear; Chemla & Spector, 2011; Ippolito, 2011; and Geurts & Pouscoulous, 2009; inter alia) 
holds that they do not arise from a pragmatic inference, but rather that they arise as part of 
semantic composition via the insertion of an "exhaustification" operator (similar to a covert 
version of only, changing some of into only some of). The operator is inserted in contexts where 
its insertion would lead to a stronger (more informative) expression. This view has been argued 
based on the fact that the realization of scalar implicature interacts with the scope of other 
semantic operators such as polarity items. Under such a view, scalar implicature is a semantic 
rather than a pragmatic, inference-based phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is still the case that the 
upper-bounded not all of interpretation of some of seems to have a different status than the 
lower-bounded at least one of interpretation. Whether this difference is a difference between 
pragmatic and semantic meaning, or a difference between different types of semantic meaning, is 
an important question, but will not be addressed in this dissertation. The questions that will be 
raised in the following sections—questions of whether the two types of meaning are processed 
differently, and how the upper-bounded meaning is realized—are questions that are pertinent to 
developing and adjudicating between psycholinguistic models of meaning realization regardless 
of whether we take the upper-bounded meaning to be semantic or pragmatic in nature. 
                                                 
 
2
 This is also sometimes referred to as a localist view, as opposed to globalist theories which assume the inference 
is a pragmatic phenomenon (like the view first described in this section). 
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It should be noted that, even when some of is given the upper-bound or lower-bound 
interpretation, it is not the case that all values are equally acceptable—that is to say, in a situation 
where a comprehender interprets some of as meaning not all, the comprehender may still believe 
the quantifier is less acceptable for describing a situation in which four out of six elements in a 
set (for example) meet some condition than a situation in which two out of six elements meet 
that condition (see Degen & Tanenhaus, 2011; inter alia). The interpretation of a quantifier like 
some of can be characterized in terms of fuzzy set theory, such that possible values (i.e., sizes of 
subsets that may be referred to by the quantifier) are not always wholly within or outside the 
meaning of the quantifier, but rather may be partially within the meaning of the quantifier 
(Newstead, 1988). In fuzzy set theory, the extent to which a given value fits within the range of 
the quantifier is indicated by the quantifier's membership function, the output of which is a value 
between 0 and 1. For example, in a set of 13 items (such as those tested by Degen & Tanenhaus, 
2011), a subset consisting of 5 items may be definitely within the range that could be described 
by some of (and receive a value of 1 from the membership function), whereas an empty subset 
consisting of 0 items may be definitely outside the range (and receive a value of 0), whereas a 
subset consisting of all 13 items may receive an intermediate value from the membership 
function. Furthermore, the range of values which may be felicitously described using some of can 
be shifted by numerous aspects the context, including set size, expectations, and the presence of 
alternative quantifiers in the context; for reviews, see Newstead (1988), Noveck and Sperber 
(2007), and Degen and Tanenhaus (2011). This dissertation will focus specifically on the 
processes involved in introducing the not all upper bound in the interpretation. It remains an 
empirical question whether those processes are the same as processes that modify other aspects 
of the range of acceptable values (the membership function) for some of. 
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1.2. SCALAR IMPLICATURE: PSYCHOLINGUISTIC MODELS 
The literature and arguments reviewed above strongly suggest that scalar expressions like 
some of have two different interpretations and that these interpretations enjoy a different status in 
terms of their defeasibility. A major question remaining is how are these different meanings 
processed, and how is the upper-bounded, "pragmatic" meaning realized by comprehenders 
during online language process? Several psycholinguistic accounts (none of which have been 
computationally implemented, to my knowledge) have been proposed in response to this 
question. These can be broadly described as context-driven, default, and constraint-driven 
accounts, although each of these classes of accounts can be formalized into various different 
models (see, e.g., Bott, Bailey, & Grodner, 2012, for several possible types of default models). 
Context-driven models. As described in the previous section, the realization of a scalar 
inference (i.e., the interpretation of some of as meaning not all of) is thought to involve an extra 
process beyond that of realizing the expression's semantic meaning—the comprehender must 
realize that the speaker had other, stronger expressions available to her, and must make the 
inference that if the speaker did not use one of those expressions then she must have meant to 
indicate that they were not true. Context-driven models of scalar inferencing assume that these 
operations require processing effort. The context-driven accounts are based on Relevance Theory 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995) and adopt one of its central tenets: that the parser does not undergo 
cognitively costly operations unless it has something to gain (in terms of the specificity of the 
information communicated) by doing so. Thus, the assumption that inferencing requires effort 
leads to two related predictions. First, context-driven models predict that a scalar inference will 
only be realized in contexts where the upper-bounded interpretation (e.g., not all of) is relevant to 
the discourse—hence the name "context-driven". Secondly, they predict that the upper-bounded 
interpretation will be realized after the lower-bounded, semantic interpretation—it will be 
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delayed by at least as much time as it takes the parser to determine whether the context is one in 
which the inference is worthwhile, plus the amount of time it takes to actually realize the 
inference.  
Context-driven models, like default models, are "theories of linguistic representation and 
not of language processing" (Huang & Snedeker, 2009: 408), and thus their predictions are not 
explicit about all aspects of processing, such as how long it takes the parser to conduct the 
Gricean reasoning described in the previous section or precisely what processing components are 
taxed by inferencing. Nevertheless, their predictions are still quite different than those of default 
models, described below. 
Default models. These models, also referred to as neo-Gricean models, instead assume 
that realizing certain kinds of inferences
3
 is rapid and cost-free. Such models, which are due 
mainly to Levinson (2000; see also Gadzar, 1979, and Horn, 1984), are based on the idea that the 
enriched interpretation of a term like some of is the preferred and more commonly used meaning 
in natural language. Because they are so often used, the language parser is argued to have 
developed heuristics to facilitate rapid communication. Any time a scalar expression like some of 
is uttered, the upper-bounded meaning is evoked without regard to the linguistic and discourse 
context; the linguistic form of the quantifier itself is sufficient to evoke the inference. If the 
inference is then shown to be contextually inappropriate or unnecessary, it may be cancelled 
(Levinson, 2000). Thus, whereas context-driven accounts predict that the inference will become 
available only if the context supports it, default accounts predict that the inference will become 
                                                 
 
3
 Specifically, Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs), as opposed to Particularized Conversational 
Implicatures (PCIs). In these accounts, the inference evoked by some of is a GCI. As the present dissertation only 
discusses GCIs like some of, Grice's proposed distinction between GCIs and PCIs is beyond the scope of the present 
work, and in fact Relevance theory does not accept that there even is such a distinction. For further discussion of the 
GCI/PCI distinction see Levinson (2000), Katsos & Cummins (2010) and Breheny and colleagues (in press), among 
others. 
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available unless the context does not support it. Even in cases where the context does not support 
the inference, default accounts predict that the inference will be realized briefly and then 
cancelled, whereas context-driven accounts predict that the inference will not be realized at all. 
Levinson does not make specific predictions about the amount of time that the inference 
cancellation process takes (and by extension, the amount the inference would remain temporarily 
available during processing) or the processing costs of such a process. In their review, Katsos 
and Cummins (2010) assume that this cancellation procedure should require processing time and 
resources. 
Constraint-based model. A recent proposal by Degen and Tanenhaus (2011, submitted) 
follows constraint-based accounts of syntactic and semantic comprehension (e.g., Trueswell, 
Tanenhaus, & Garnsey, 1994) in assuming that the parser evaluates all available information as 
early as possible and uses this information to facilitate or inhibit the scalar inference. Thus, 
unlike the previous accounts which assume multiple stages (either a first stage in which semantic 
meaning is used before context has been evaluated, as in context-driven models, or a first stage 
in which generalized conversational implicatures are realized automatically, as in default 
models), this model proposes that all information influences scalar inference realization 
immediately. Thus, in situations where numerous constraints that have already been processed 
(such as discourse and semantic context) to facilitate a scalar inference, the inference may be 
realized rapidly and effortlessly; in situations where few constraints facilitate the inference, or 
where constraints actively discourage it, the inference may be realized slowly and effortfully or 
not at all. This constraint based account might be considered a special case of context-driven 
accounts, given that it assumes scalar inference is dependent on context; it differs from those 
accounts, however, in that it does not predict scalar inference realization to always be slow and 
effortful. 
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The grammatical account of scalar inference proposed by Chierchia and colleagues 
(Chierchia et al., 2012; Chierchia, 2004) is sometimes treated as a separate account from those 
described above. It is assumed by Katsos and Cummins (2010) and Huang and Snedeker (2009) 
to make processing predictions that are similar to those in Levinson's (2000) default account. In 
particular, the grammatical account assumes that scalar inferences are realized by default (at least 
in the right entailment contexts) as a result of the linguistic form of the expression. The 
derivation of the inference, however, is thought to take place through a series of semantic 
operations, the psychological nature of which are not known. Thus, it is not necessarily clear 
what the processing predictions of such a model should be (see Panizza, Huang, Chierchia, & 
Snedeker, 2011, for further discussion). 
 
1.3. THE STRUCTURE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
The experiments described in the rest of this dissertation use neurolinguistic and 
psycholinguistic methods to investigate aspects of scalar implicature processing discussed above. 
The first series of experiments examines whether event-related brain potentials (ERPs) provide 
evidence for a difference between inference-based quantifier processing and semantic quantifier 
processing. Data from three experiments shows that violations of inference-based meaning yield 
different ERPs than violations of semantic meaning and that these two processes may be 
functionally independent. The second series of experiments tests the models described above by 
using a self-paced reading task to examine whether the realization of inference-based meaning 
entails a processing cost and is sensitive to context. Results suggest that inferencing is indeed 
context-sensitive but that it does not evoke a directly observable processing cost, which raises 
challenges for the traditional accounts of scalar inference processing described above. 
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CHAPTER 2: ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF INFERENTIAL 
VERSUS SEMANTIC PROCESSING 
2.1. INTRODUCTION4 
As described in the previous chapter, the comprehension of scalar implicatures involves 
processing multiple aspects of meaning: a lower-bounded meaning which is semantically 
inherent to the expression, and an upper-bounded meaning which may be realized through 
additional pragmatic or semantic processes. A number of recent psycholinguistic studies have 
investigated the speed at which pragmatic readings of scalar terms become available, the costs 
engendered by inferencing, and the role of context in scalar implicature processing (see, e.g., 
Noveck & Posada, 2003; Bott & Noveck, 2004; Feeney, Scafton, Duckworth, & Handley, 2004; 
Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Chevallier, Noveck, Nazir, 
Bott, Lanzetti, & Sperber, 2008; Degen, 2009; Dieussaert, Verkerk, Gillard, & Schaeken, 2011; 
Bott et al., 2012; Hartshorne & Snedeker, submitted). Many of these studies have used speeded 
verification or self-paced reading tasks. Response times in such tasks, however, may reflect not 
only processing related to implicature generation but also controlled decision-making 
components (Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Nieuwland et al., 2010; Tavano, 2010). This leaves open 
the question of what occurs before an overt response (or decision to move to the next word) is 
made, and how implicature processing unfolds over time. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate 
these questions using a methodology that both provides fine-grained temporal resolution and 
allows the researcher to track different processing stages prior to overt responses. 
                                                 
 
4
 Portions of this chapter are adapted from Politzer-Ahles, Fiorentino, Jiang, & Zhou (2013) and from 
Politzer-Ahles, Jiang, Fiorentino, & Zhou (2012). 
13 
 
One such methodology is event-related potentials (ERPs). In addition to offering high 
temporal resolution, ERPs have the potential to probe the extent to which the neural mechanisms 
of scalar implicature processing differ from those of other aspects of meaning composition, since 
ERP components may differ in terms of topography, polarity, and morphology, as well as latency 
(see, e.g., Kutas et al.,2006). This makes ERPs a particularly useful tool for investigating the 
interplay between these different aspects of meaning. 
 
2.1.1. Context and pragmatics in ERP studies 
Many previous neurolinguistic studies examining pragmatic meaning have focused on 
real-world plausibility (e.g., Kuperberg et al. 2000; Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 
2004; Filik & Leuthold, 2008), rather than aspects of meaning based on inferential 
pragmatics—i.e., meaning based on assumptions about the intentions of the speaker who makes 
an utterance and the context in which she utters it. The experiments reported in this chapter aim 
to investigate how the brain realizes linguistically-motivated distinctions between different 
aspects of meaning (semantically inherent meanings versus enriched meanings that are generated 
through additional pragmatic or semantic processes) and how these aspects of meaning are 
composed online. 
It is well known that information from the wider discourse and pragmatic context is used 
rapidly during sentence comprehension to make words easier or more difficult to integrate into 
the utterance meaning (Hagoort & Van Berkum, 2007; Van Berkum, 2009). Pragmatic and 
discursive information can guide comprehenders' predictions about upcoming words and thus, in 
ERP studies, produce modulations in the N400, a negative-going ERP component emerging 
between about 200 and 500 ms after the presentation of a word and showing a greater amplitude 
to words that are less expected and more difficult to retrieve or integrate (Kutas & Federmeier, 
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2000; Lau, Phillips, & Poeppel, 2008; Pylkkänen, Brennan, & Bemis, 2011). Previous studies 
have shown that discourse context can override semantic constraints, making semantically 
appropriate but discursively inappropriate words elicit an increased N400, an effect normally 
elicited by semantically anomalous words (Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2006; Filik & Leuthold, 
2008). Language-external variables like the hearer's personal values or the speaker's gender, age, 
or class can make words easier or more difficult to retrieve from memory and integrate into a 
sentence and thus influence the N400 (Van Berkum, 2009) and brain activation in the medial 
prefrontal cortex (Tesink et al., 2009). N400-like ERP responses to pronouns are affected by the 
social status of their antecedents (Jiang et al., 2011) and gender stereotypes held by the 
comprehender (Osterhout, Bersick, & McLaughlin, 1997). Pragmatic information can also play a 
role in semantic composition: there is evidence that negatives are not always rapidly integrated 
into the meaning of infelicitous sentences such as "A robin is not a bird" (Fischler, Bloom, 
Childer, Roucos, & Perry, 1983; Wiswede, Koranyi, Müller, Langner, & Rothermund, in press; 
but see Urbach & Kutas, 2010) but that they are when pragmatic context makes the sentence 
felicitous (Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). 
In contrast to these studies examining how pragmatic context influences retrieval and 
integration of a later word in the sentence, comparatively few have probed for ERP activity 
directly related to pragmatic inferencing or tested whether this activity is qualitatively distinct 
from that elicited by semantic retrieval and integration. Pragmatic inferencing may elicit 
sustained negativities rather than N400s. A sustained negativity known as the Nref, which begins 
at a latency of about 300ms in response to words with multiple or ambiguous referents as 
compared to words with unique referents (Van Berkum, Koornneef, Otten, & Nieuwland, 2007), 
has been suggested to be related to computationally costly inference-making (Van Berkum, 
2009). This hypothesis remains to be tested empirically. Crucially, similar sustained negativities 
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have been observed for sentences in which the reader must re-compute a discourse model about 
whether or not an action was completed (Baggio, van Lambalgen, & Hagoort, 2008) or revise a 
discursive inference that turns out to be incorrect (Pijnacker, Geurts, van Lambalgen, Buitelaar, 
& Hagoort, 2011), although in the latter study the negativity had a more centro-parietal 
distribution.  
 
2.1.2. ERP studies of scalar inference 
To date, only three ERP studies have investigated scalar implicature processing in 
particular. These studies (Noveck & Posada, 2003; Nieuwland, Ditman, & Kuperberg, 2010; 
Hunt, Politzer-Ahles, Gibson, Minai, & Fiorentino, 2013) have all examined N400 responses 
downstream of the scalar expression. These are briefly summarized below. 
Noveck and Posada (2003) measured ERPs while participants read and judged 
underinformative sentences such as "Some dogs have ears." Such sentences are correct under a 
lower-bounded interpretation (there do exist dogs that have ears) but incorrect under an 
upper-bounded interpretation (it is not the case that "not all dogs have ears"). ERP responses to 
these sentences were compared to responses to true, informative sentences (e.g., "Some gardens 
have trees") and false sentences (e.g., "Some toads have churches"). At the sentence-final critical 
word which determines the truth, falsehood, or underinformativeness of the sentence, the 
investigators found a decreased N400 for underinformative sentences relative to true sentences. 
The interpretation of this finding is complicated, however, by between-item differences in 
lexico-semantic relatedness between subjects and objects in their materials (i.e., the nature of the 
relationship between "dogs" and "ears", or other subject-object pairs used in the other 
underinformative sentences, is not the same as the nature of the relationship between "gardens" 
and "ears", or other subject-object pairs used in other true sentences), the fact that critical words 
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were not matched for any lexical properties (e.g., frequency), and the possible effect of global 
wrap-up processes that occur at the end of a sentence (for a review of these concerns, see 
Nieuwland et al., 2010; for a discussion of sentence wrap-up effects, see Hagoort, 2003). 
A later study by Nieuwland, Ditman, and Kuperberg (2010, Experiment 1) tested similar 
sentences, using critical words that were matched for length and frequency and not presented in 
sentence-final position. Examples of their stimuli are "Some people have pets, which require 
good care" (true and informative), and "Some people have lungs, which require good care" 
(underinformative). They also had participants read the sentences passively rather than make 
judgments, as they were concerned that a judgment task such as that used by Noveck and Posada 
(2003) could elicit decision-related components which would mask other effects in the N400 
time window. In this experiment, the authors found that participants with high pragmatic ability 
(as measured by performance on the communication subscale of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
questionnaire) showed a greater N400 for underinformative than informative critical words. 
These results suggest that scalar implicatures can guide expectations about upcoming linguistic 
input and can override lexico-semantic influences on the N400. Interestingly, in a separate 
experiment, when the critical words were temporarily underinformative but were followed by 
restricting relative clauses that made the sentences informative (e.g., "Some gangs have members 
that are really violent"), the N400 effect was not observed, suggesting that the lack of truly 
underinformative sentences in the global experimental context modulated participants' brain 
responses to temporary ambiguity.
5
 
                                                 
 
5
 Note that this is a different claim than the claim in Section 1.1 that various contextual factors influence whether or 
not a scalar inference is realized. In this experiment the suggestion is not that the global experimental context made 
participants not realize the inference, but rather that it made the interpretation of the sentence remain informative 
even when the inference was realized. 
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While this experiment controlled many of the potentially problematic factors that were in 
Noveck and Posada's (2003) experiment, some systematic differences between the 
underinformative and control sentences remained. Particularly, direct objects in 
underinformative sentences tended to have a closer semantic relationship to the subjects than did 
the direct objects in control sentences (compare "Some gangs have members" versus "Some 
gangs have initiations"). Indeed, the participants with low pragmatic ability tended not to show 
an increased N400 in response to underinformative critical words, but a decreased one. The 
authors suggest that whereas the high-ability participants were focusing on the overall meaning 
of the sentence, the low-ability participants were strategically focusing on the lexical 
relationships between words. 
A later collaborative study in our laboratory (Hunt, Politzer-Ahles, Gibson, Minai, and 
Fiorentino, 2013) tested the effect of underinformativeness separately from the influence of 
lexico-semantic relations. This study used a picture-sentence verification design, in which the 
truth, falsehood, or underinformativeness of each sentence was based not on real-world 
knowledge (as was the case for the previous studies) but on the set of items present in a picture 
presented before the sentence. This made it possible to use identical sentences for all conditions, 
and manipulate the preceding picture rather than the sentence, thus controlling the 
lexico-semantic relations within each sentence. This study, like that of Nieuwland and colleagues 
(2010), found an increased N400 for underinformative critical words, confirming that the 
upper-bounded interpretation of some of was realized online and influenced the access and/or 
integration of later words in the sentence. 
These studies have provided many insights into how scalar implicatures affect online 
processing as measured by ERPs. However, some open questions remain regarding the time 
course and neural instantiation of scalar implicature processing. These studies, like the other 
18 
 
N400 studies summarized above, tested whether scalar implicatures can influence the processing 
of later words in the sentence after the scalar implicature has been computed. As acknowledged 
by Nieuwland and colleagues, the results of these studies do not "directly reflect full-fledged, 
online pragmatic inferencing, but rather ... reflect the semantic processing consequences of 
earlier and relatively implicit pragmatic inferencing" (Nieuwland et al., 2010, p. 341). Because 
violations in the previous studies only became detectable on words well downstream of the 
quantifier, these studies cannot make strong claims about how and when the scalar inference is 
realized. It remains to be seen what pattern of effects may be elicited by processing the scalar 
implicature itself; this is the question explored in the present study. The three experiments 
reported in this chapter further investigate scalar implicature processing using a design that 
dissociates semantic and pragmatic aspects of meaning and examines how each is processed. 
Importantly, these experiments examine the processing of scalar inferencing at the quantifier 
itself, rather than at later words in the sentence.  
 
2.1.3. The present studies 
The present studies, which were conducted in Mandarin Chinese, adopt a 
picture-sentence verification design (Wu & Tan, 2009; Tavano, 2010) to compare the neural 
responses to pragmatically underinformative versus informative sentences that are identical in 
lexico-semantic content. On each trial a participant is presented with a picture, followed by a 
sentence that correctly, incorrectly, or underinformatively describes it. Following a picture in 
which some of the characters are engaging in one activity and others in another (e.g., girls sitting 
on blankets or on chairs; the upper left portion of Figure 1), a sentence such as "Some of the girls 
are sitting on blankets" is acceptable, whereas the same sentence is underinformative if it follows 
a picture in which all of the characters are engaging in the same activity (upper right portion of 
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Figure 1). This design provides a strict control of the context in which the sentence is interpreted, 
keeping lexico-semantic content identical across conditions. Furthermore, inconsistency becomes 
detectable at the quantifier itself, making it possible to directly examine the response to 
underinformative quantifiers rather than the downstream effects of expectations generated by 
pragmatic inferencing. 
The experiments reported here were conducted in Mandarin Chinese, whereas previous 
online studies of scalar implicature have all used western languages. The characteristics of 
Mandarin scalar implicature, however, are not different from those of English (see Chi, 2000; 
Xie, 2003; Tsai, 2004; Rullman & You, 2006; Wu & Tan, 2009). The critical scalar quantifier in 
Figure 1. Sample pictures and sentences used in Experiment 1. Upper portion: 
some of sentences preceded by pictures that render them correct (left) or 
pragmatically incorrect (right). Lower portion: all of sentences preceded by 
pictures that render them semantically incorrect (left) or correct (right). 
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the present experiment is yǒu de (有的), which is partitive (Xie, 2003; Tsai, 2004) and has a 
strongly pragmatic interpretation (Wu and Tan's (2009) adult participants reported a pragmatic 
interpretation of yǒu de in 89% of trials). It is roughly equivalent in meaning to the English 
partitive some of, which robustly elicits a pragmatic interpretation (Grodner et al., 2010; Degen 
& Tanenhaus, 2011).  
Experiment 1 tested a factorial manipulation of picture type (in Some-type pictures, some 
characters are engaging in one activity and some in another, whereas in All-type pictures all 
characters are engaging in the same activity) and the quantifier used in the sentence (some 
of—yǒu de 有的—versus all of—suǒyǒu de 所有的); see Figure 1 for example pictures and 
sentences. When used in a sentence following an All-type picture, the quantifier some of is 
semantically consistent but pragmatically inconsistent with the picture; when used in a sentence 
following a Some-type picture, the quantifier all of is semantically inconsistent with the picture 
(the inconsistency is due to the inherent semantics of all, not due to a pragmatically-enriched 
meaning).
6
 Thus, the experiment has a 2 (Quantifier) × 2 (Consistency) design. Crucially, both 
inconsistent conditions are compared with lexically matched controls: some of following a 
Some-type picture formed the control for the inconsistent some of condition, and all of following 
an All-type picture formed the control for the inconsistent all of condition. In this design, after 
seeing a picture the participant can form an expectation about the upcoming quantifier—in other 
words, she can verbally pre-encode the sets as Some-type or All-type sets (Huang, Hahn, & 
                                                 
 
6
 Note that, at the position of the quantifier, participants could not be certain whether the inconsistent all of 
sentences were consistent or not with the picture. For instance, if a picture showed some girls sitting on chairs and 
some sitting on blankets, a sentence beginning "All of…" could be felicitously continued as "All of the girls are 
wearing hats" or "All of the chairs have girls sitting on them". A similar possibility exists for the some of sentences; 
for instance, a picture showing a group of girls all sitting on chairs could be felicitously continued as "Some of the 
girls are happy". None of these sentence types was included in the experiment; mismatches between picture and 
quantifier always led to sentences that were ultimately inconsistent. 
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Snedeker, 2010; Hartshorne & Snedeker, submitted). Thus, both inconsistent some of and 
inconsistent all of are words that are unexpected in their context. Including the all of conditions 
makes it possible to examine the pragmatically inconsistent some of condition for effects that are 
unique to pragmatic processing, above and beyond the effect of seeing an unexpected word. 
Experiment 2 tests whether inferential processes involved in comprehending an 
underinformative sentence interact with lexico-semantic processes, by factorially manipulating 
the presence or absence of a pragmatic violation early in the sentence with the presence or 
absence of a lexico-semantic violation on a content word later in the sentence. This is done by 
using the same picture-sentence verification design as in Experiment 1, and additionally 
manipulating the lexical consistency between the picture and the sentence: lexically inconsistent 
sentences have objects (downstream of the quantifier) that do not match any of the objects 
portrayed in the preceding picture. Thus, Experiment 2 has a 2 (Pragmatic Consistency) × 2 
(Lexical Consistency) design, in which sentences are lexically identical across conditions but the 
pictures preceding the sentences vary. 
Experiment 3 is a replication of Experiment 1 using auditory stimulus presentation rather 
than visual. Furthermore, in Experiment 3 additional measures of participants' pragmatic abilities 
and sensitivity to scalar implicature were collected, in order to examine potential individual 
variation in ERP responses to pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers. 
 
2.2. EXPERIMENT ONE 
 
2.2.1. Methods 
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2.2.1.1. Participants 
Data were collected from 23 right-handed Mandarin native speakers (10 females, age 
range 18-27, mean 20.8) from mainland China who were students at the University of Kansas. 
Four of these participants were excluded from the statistical analysis because of excessive 
artifacts in their recordings. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were 
right-handed according to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All participants 
provided their informed consent and received payment, and all methods for the study were 
approved by the Human Subjects Committee of Lawrence at the University of Kansas. 
 
2.2.1.2. Materials7 
One hundred sixty sets of picture arrays were created for the critical trials (see Figure 1 
for an example set). Each picture array included three to five actors or items. In the All-type 
picture array from each set, all of the actors were interacting with identical objects (for instance, 
four girls were all sitting on blankets, or five baskets were all holding pumpkins). In the 
Some-type picture array from each set, a subset of the actors was interacting with one type of 
object, and the rest were interacting with a different type of object (for instance, some girls were 
sitting on blankets and some on sofas, or some baskets were holding pumpkins and some holding 
bananas). The placement of the actors within the image and the relative locations of actors with 
different items in the Some-type pictures were allowed to vary randomly across sets. All picture 
arrays were black-and-white cartoons or line drawings, sized 1024 × 768 pixels, and with 
minimally complex backgrounds. Care was taken to limit pictures to those portraying plausible 
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 A full list of the pictures and sentences used in this and the following ERP experiments (Experiments 2 and 3) is 
available on request. 
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events. The base materials for the pictures were taken from freely available clipart from two 
published databases (Bonin, Peereman, Malardier, Méot, & Chalard., 2003; Szekely et al., 2004) 
and Google Images, and further edited using Adobe Photoshop, the GNU Image Manipulation 
Program, and Microsoft Paint by two paid graphic arts students from Peking University and the 
author.  
 For each set of picture arrays, some of and all of sentences were written to match the All- 
and Some-type arrays (see Figure 1). Each sentence began with "图片里" ("in this picture"), 
followed by a subject quantified by either "有的" (yǒu de, some of), or "所有的" (suǒyǒu de, all 
of), followed by a verb and aspect marker, object, and an additional phrase to separate the object 
from the end of the sentence. Verbs in the critical sentences were marked for progressive, 
perfective, or prospective aspect. All of sentences included the mandatory adverbial都 dōu before 
the verb (see Li & Thompson, 1981; Jiang et al., 2009). The sentences were written with the help 
of a paid linguistics student from Peking University who was a native speaker of Mandarin. 
 Additionally, 148 picture-sentence pairs were created for use as fillers. The filler picture 
arrays met the same criteria as the critical trials, except that some of them depicted intransitive 
events. Thirty-seven of these fillers were Some-type pictures paired with matching, felicitous 
some of sentences, and thirty-seven were All-type pictures paired with matching, correct all of 
sentences. The other seventy-four pictures were paired with sentences that had appropriate 
quantifiers but either an object that did not match any of the objects in the picture of a verb that 
did not match the activity shown. Several of these included verbs that yielded semantically 
anomalous sentences (e.g., "all the scientists are planting squirrels"), whereas most had verbs that 
were semantically plausible but not congruous with the picture (e.g., "all the boys are going for a 
walk with their classmates", after a picture in which all the boys are wrestling with their 
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classmates). The filler sentences all included quantifiers that were not used in the critical 
sentences but were similar in meaning to all of or some of, or classifier phrases in place of 
quantifiers. None of the filler sentences used numbers in the place of quantifiers (for discussion 
of how the presence/absence of numbers and quantifiers in the experimental context may affect 
the perception of scalar implicature, see Degen, 2009; Grodner et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2010; 
and references therein). The set of fillers with mismatching pictures and sentences was included 
to distract participants from the quantifier manipulation in the critical sentences, and the 
remaining matching fillers were included to maintain a proportion of acceptable sentences of at 
least 50% during the experiment, assuming that pragmatically infelicitous stimuli are judged as 
unacceptable. 
 
2.2.1.3. Procedure 
Participants were seated in a dimly-lit room about 1 meter in front of a 41-cm CRT 
monitor. Stimuli were presented at the center of the screen using the Presentation software 
package (Neurobehavioral Systems). Each trial began with a fixation point presented for 500 ms, 
followed by a picture which remained on the screen for 4000 ms. The picture was followed by a 
fixation point of random duration (between 500 and 1500 ms), after which the sentence was 
presented region by region using the serial visual presentation paradigm. Regions were presented 
using a variable presentation procedure (see, e.g., Nieuwland et al., 2010), whereby each region 
was presented at a base duration of 425 ms per region, plus 80 ms for each character more than 3 
in the region; because the critical quantifiers were all three characters or less, their presentation 
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durations do not differ across conditions. The interstimulus interval was 400 ms for all regions.
8
 
Twenty percent of trials were followed by comprehension questions or acceptability judgments 
(see below), which were presented on the screen for 5000 ms or until the participant's response. 
Each trial was followed by a blank screen for 1500 ms before the start of the next trial. The 
experiment was divided into six blocks of approximately 50 sentences each, and participants 
were given short breaks between the blocks. Participants were instructed not to blink during the 
presentation of the sentences. 
 Participants performed a mixture of acceptability judgments and comprehension 
questions. On ten percent of trials, after the sentence ended, a question that probed information 
about the picture and was irrelevant to the sentence was presented (e.g., after the sentence "In 
this picture, some of the girls are sitting on blankets", the comprehension question "Are the girls 
wearing swimsuits?" appeared). In an additional ten percent of trials, the sentence was followed 
instead by an acceptability judgment (the question "对不对," "Is that correct?"). Participants 
were not given explicit instructions about what criteria to consider in judging the sentences, 
unless they asked for clarification; if they asked, they were instructed to judge, based on their 
own intuition, whether the sentence was consistent with the picture and described it appropriately. 
The experimenter stressed that some sentences had no right or wrong answer and that the 
experiment was meant to measure the participant's own language intuitions. The comprehension 
questions were included to prevent participants from being able to adopt a strategy of only 
paying attention to the quantifiers and the number of objects in a picture, and the acceptability 
                                                 
 
8
 An 800-ms stimulus onset asynchrony (400-ms word presentation, 400-ms interstimulus interval) has been found 
to be natural and comfortable for Chinese readers in previous studies (e.g., Jiang et al., 2009), but the regions used in 
the present study tended to be longer than the regions used in those studies, and pilot participants reported the 
variable presentation rate described above to be the most comfortable. 
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judgments were included to ensure that participants pay attention to the sentence rather than just 
try to remember the picture. Acceptability judgment prompts were allotted to six of the forty 
pragmatically infelicitous sentences for each participant, making it possible to determine whether 
participants accepted or rejected these sentences when making an explicit judgment. Participants 
responded to both the comprehension questions and acceptability judgment prompts using the 
left and right buttons on a mouse. 
 The experimental sentences were divided into four lists according to a Latin square 
design, such that every sentence appeared once in each condition across lists but no sentence or 
picture was repeated within a list. The item order in the list was fully randomized for each 
participant. The first block of the experiment was preceded by a practice block of seven trials 
which followed the same presentation procedure as the main experiment but did not include any 
quantifier-related violations. The practice sentences included some sentences with existential 
quantifiers (e.g., "图片里有。。。," "in the picture there are") and some without quantifiers (e.g. 
"图片里的小狗," "the dogs in the picture are…"). Feedback was given for behavioral responses 
in the practice block, but not in the main experiment. The recording itself took 70 to 80 minutes. 
 
2.2.1.4. Data acquisition and analysis 
The EEG was continuously recorded using an elastic electrode cap (Electro-Cap 
International, Inc.) containing 32 Ag/AgCl scalp electrodes organized in a modified 10-20 layout 
(midline: FPZ, FZ, FCZ, CZ, CPZ, PZ, OZ; lateral: FP1/2, F7/8, F3/4, FT7/8, FC3/4, T3/4, C3/4, 
TP7/8, CP3/4, T5/6, P3/4, O1/2). Polygraphic electrodes were placed at the left and right outer 
canthi for monitoring horizontal eye movements, above and below each eye for monitoring 
blinks, and on the left and right mastoids. The left mastoid served as a reference during data 
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acquisition and AFz served as the ground. Impedances for scalp electrodes and mastoids were 
kept below 5 kΩ. The recordings were amplified by a Neuroscan Synamps2 amplifier 
(Compumedics Neuroscan, Inc.) with a bandpass of 0.01 to 200 Hz, and digitized at a sampling 
rate of 1000 Hz. 
The continuous EEG was re-referenced to the average of both mastoids and segmented 
into epochs from 1000 ms before to 2000 ms after the presentation of the critical word. Based on 
visual inspection, trials containing excessive muscle artifact or alpha activity within the epoch of 
200 ms before to 1200 ms after the onset of the stimulus were excluded from the analysis. 
Following artifact rejection, the data were demeaned using the mean amplitude of each epoch 
(Groppe et al., 2009), and an independent components (ICA) decomposition algorithm (Makeig 
et al., 1996) was applied to remove ocular artifacts. After artifact correction, the EEG was 
visually inspected again to remove trials in which any artifact remained. A total of 18.8% of 
trials was rejected in this way (18.9% of pragmatically inconsistent some of trials; 16.2% of 
correct some of trials; 20% of semantically inconsistent all of trials; and 20.1% of consistent all 
of trials); a repeated measures ANOVA revealed that marginally more some of than all of trials 
were kept in the analysis (F(1,18) = 3.49, p = .078) and that there was no significant effect of 
consistency or interaction between quantifier or consistency in terms of trials kept (ps > .16). 
Participants with fewer than 25 trials remaining for any condition after artifact rejection were 
excluded from the analysis. Subsequently, data epochs were baseline-corrected using a 200-ms 
pre-stimulus baseline and averaged to calculate ERPs. 
Time windows for analysis were chosen based on visual inspection of the data, and mean 
ERP voltage amplitudes were compared using repeated measures ANOVAs involving the factors 
Consistency (consistent, inconsistent), Quantifier (some of, all of), and the topographical factor 
Region. Midline and lateral regions were analyzed separately. For the lateral ANOVA, regions 
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were defined by averaging within the following electrode groups: left anterior (F7, F3, FC3), left 
central (T3, C3, CP3), left posterior (T5, P3, O1), right anterior (F4, F8, FC4), right central (C4, 
T4, CP4), and right posterior (P4, T6, OZ). For the midline ANOVA, regions were defined as 
follows: anterior (FZ, FCZ), central (CZ, CPZ), and posterior (PZ, OZ). The Huynh-Feldt 
correction was applied to F-tests with more than one degree of freedom in the numerator. 
 
2.2.2. Results 
 
2.2.2.1. Behavioral results 
Participants responded both to comprehension questions irrelevant to the interpretation of 
the quantifier and to acceptability judgment prompts during the course of the experiment. 
Behavioral data from one participant were lost due to a data logging error, leaving eighteen 
participants for the behavioral data analysis. In the comprehension task, mean accuracy rates 
were 86.1% for the pragmatically infelicitous condition (some of sentence following an All-type 
picture), 77.5% for consistent "some", 82.8% for semantically inconsistent (all of sentence 
following a Some-type picture), and 78.2% for consistent "all". A repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed no significant differences in mean accuracy across conditions (F(3, 51) < 1). 
 Acceptability judgments on the pragmatically underinformative sentences have no correct 
or incorrect answer, given that participants can interpret such sentences semantically or 
pragmatically. Across participants, 39.8% of pragmatically underinformative sentences were 
judged as correct, indicating a semantic judgment; in comparison, only 19.6% of semantically 
inconsistent sentences were judged as correct. The difference was significant by participants 
(t(17) = -4.47, p < .001), indicating that participants accepted pragmatically infelicitous 
sentences more often than semantically inconsistent sentences. As for the remaining conditions, 
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which do have clear expected judgments, mean accuracy rates were 78.7% for the consistent 
"some" condition, 80.4% for the semantically inconsistent condition, and 85.5% for the 
consistent "all" condition. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant differences 
across conditions (F(2, 34) < 1). 
Several previous studies have distinguished between pragmatic and semantic responders 
(Noveck & Posada, 2003; Bott & Noveck, 2004; Tavano, 2010; Hunt et al., 2013). Thus, 
participants were divided into groups using the following criteria: participants who made 5 or 
more semantic responses (1 or fewer pragmatic responses—each participant judged 6 
underinformative sentences, see section 4.1.3) to the underinformative trials were classified as 
semantic responders, those who made 5 or more pragmatic responses (1 or fewer semantic 
responses) were classified as pragmatic responders, and those who made 2 to 4 semantic 
responses (no more than 4 responses of a given type) were classified as inconsistent responders. 
Five participants met the criteria to be considered semantic responders, while two were 
pragmatic responders and eleven inconsistent; there were not enough consistent responders to 
form participant groups for the ERP analysis.
9
 There was a greater number of inconsistent 
responders in the present study than in some previous studies (Noveck & Posada, 2003; Tavano, 
2010), which is consistent with Feeney and colleagues (2004), who found that participants 
tended to respond inconsistently to underinformative sentences when the variety of stimulus 
conditions is large (see Section 2.2.1.2 for more information about the conditions included in the 
present experiment).  
                                                 
 
9
 Using slightly more lax criteria (4 or more semantic responses for semantic responders, 4 or more pragmatic 
responses [2 or fewer semantic responses] for pragmatic responders, and 3 semantic [3 pragmatic] responses for 
inconsistent responders), 8 responders were classified as semantic responders, 3 as pragmatic, and 7 as inconsistent.  
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2.2.2.2. ERP results 
 Visual inspection of the waveforms (Figure 2 and Figure 3) suggests that semantically 
inconsistent all of elicited a less negative ERP than consistent all of from about 200 to 500 ms in 
the anterior and central regions, whereas pragmatically inconsistent some of elicited a sustained 
negative ERP compared to consistent some of in the right posterior regions. Thus, ANOVAs 
were conducted on the mean ERP amplitudes for the 200-500 ms and 500-1000 ms time 
windows; the omnibus ANOVA results are shown in Table 1.  
 
2.2.2.2.1. 200-500 ms 
Figure 2. Effect of pragmatic inconsistency in Experiment 1. Upper portion: 
Grand average ERPs (a 30 Hz low-pass filter was applied for plotting) at nine 
scalp regions. Lower portion: Topographic maps formed by subtracting the 
correct some of condition from the pragmatically incorrect condition over two 
time windows. 
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 The ANOVA revealed a significant interaction of Consistency and Region.
10
 The 
interaction was resolved by testing the effect of Consistency at each region. Both types of 
inconsistent quantifier elicited significantly more positive ERPs than controls in the left anterior 
region (F(1,18) = 4.52, p = .048), marginally more positive in the midline anterior (F(1,18) = 
3.91, p = .063) and left central (F(1,18) = 3.21, p = .090) regions, and marginally more negative 
ERPs in the right posterior region (F(1,18) = 4.08, p = .059); the simple effect of consistency did 
not reach significance in any other region (ps > .143).
11
 
                                                 
 
10
 There were also effects of Quantifier by Region in this time window and of Quantifier in the later time window. 
These, however, are not of theoretical interest since they involve direct comparison between different words, and 
thus are not discussed here. The significant main effects of Region are also not discussed since they do not reveal 
differences based on the experimental manipulation. 
11
 Visual inspection of the waveforms and topographic plots (Figure 2 and Figure 3) suggests that the posterior 
negativity revealed in the Consistency by Region interaction was due to the pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers, 
whereas the anterior positivity was present in both conditions—i.e., that semantically inconsistent quantifiers 
Figure 3. Effect of semantic inconsistency in Experiment 1. Upper portion: Grand average ERPs 
(a 30 Hz low-pass filter was applied for plotting) at nine scalp regions. Lower portion: 
Topographic maps formed by subtracting the correct all of condition from the semantically 
inconsistent condition over two time windows. 
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2.2.2.2.2. 500-1000 ms 
 In the later time window there was a significant interaction of Quantifier, Consistency, 
and Region in the lateral ANOVA only. Resolving the interaction by Quantifier revealed that 
pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers elicited both a significant main effect of Consistency 
(F(1,18) = 4.56, p = .047) and a Consistency by Region interaction (F(5,90) = 3.07, p = .039), 
but neither an interaction nor a main effect of Consistency was observed for the semantically 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
elicited an anterior positivity only, whereas pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers elicited both an anterior positivity 
and posterior negativity. However, the interaction of Quantifier and Consistency in the omnibus ANOVA did not 
reach significance (see Table 1), providing no evidence for differential ERP responses to semantic and pragmatic 
inconsistencies in this time window. 
 
Effect 200-500 ms 500-1000 ms 
Quantifier F(1,18) = 1.07 
F(1,18) = 2.42 
F(1,18) = 4.04 
F(1,18) = 1.07 
* 
Consistency F(1,18) = 0.15 
F(1,18) = 0.18   
F(1,18) = 2.08 
F(1,18) = 2.34 
Region  F(5,90) = 49.19 
F(2,36) = 38.60 
**** 
**** 
F(5,90) = 20.67 
F(2,36) = 11.12 
**** 
*** 
Quantifier × Consistency F(1,18) = 1.92 
F(1,18) = 2.46 
F(1,18) = 2.63 
F(1,18) = 1.04 
Quantifier × Region F(5,90) = 2.98 
F(2,36) = 1.90 
** F(5,90) = 0.05 
F(2,36) = 0.48 
Consistency × Region F(5,90) = 6.73 
F(2,36) = 7.25 
*** 
*** 
F(5,90) = 0.65 
F(2,36) = 0.64 
Quantifier × Consistency × 
Region 
F(5,90) = 0.31 
F(2,36) = 0.14 
F(5,90) = 3.06 
F(2,35) = 0.50 
** 
Table 1. Results of the lateral and midline omnibus ANOVAs in Experiment 1 at two time 
windows, with each cell showing the lateral ANOVA result above and the midline ANOVA 
result below. *.05 < p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .005; ****p < .001. 
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inconsistent quantifiers (Fs < 1). For the pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers, the main effect 
of Consistency was due to a more negative ERP for inconsistent than consistent quantifiers in 
this time window, and the interaction with Region was due to the fact that the simple effect of 
Consistency for some of reached significance at the right central (F(1,18) = 7.09, p = .016) and 
right posterior (F(1,18) = 11.63, p = .003) regions, but not at other regions (ps > .108). 
 
2.2.3. Discussion 
This experiment tested whether the pragmatic meaning of a scalar quantifier affects 
processing immediately when the quantifier itself is read, and how the detection of pragmatic 
implicature violations is manifested electrophysiologically when lexico-semantic differences are 
controlled for. Both quantifiers that were semantically inconsistent with a context and those that 
were pragmatically inconsistent elicited a less negative anterior ERP than controls in an earlier 
(200-500 ms) time window. This early effect indicates that the pragmatic interpretation of the 
scalar quantifier was used rapidly during processing, since the quantifier was only inconsistent 
with its context when interpreted pragmatically; this effect was not unique to scalar implicature 
processing, however, as it was also elicited by unexpected, semantically inconsistent quantifiers. 
Effects unique to scalar implicature processing were observed later in the epoch (500-1000 ms), 
at which time pragmatically inconsistent but not semantically inconsistent quantifiers elicited a 
sustained posterior negativity. While this negativity also appeared earlier in the epoch with a 
topography similar to an N400 effect, it is apparent from the waveforms that the effect is more 
likely the beginning of a sustained negativity lasting throughout the epoch; note that Pijnacker 
and colleagues (2011) also found a dissociation between a transient N400 elicited by 
lexico-semantic violations, and a more long-lasting negativity elicited by discourse processing. 
34 
 
In experimental contexts like this one, rapid effects of pragmatic inconsistency could be 
due to participants' ability to verbally pre-encode the picture contexts as Some-type or All-type 
contexts, and then make a forward prediction about the quantifier that will appear in the sentence 
(Huang et al., 2010; Hartshorne & Snedeker, submitted). Indeed, the presence of an early effect 
is not surprising, as previous research has already shown that pragmatic expectations about 
upcoming words can modulate ERPs as early as the N400 (Van Berkum, 2009; Nieuwland et al., 
2010; Hunt et al., 2013). However, it is unlikely that the results of the present experiment are due 
only to effects of seeing an unexpected word. First of all, unexpected linguistic input typically 
elicits a N400 or P300/P600 effect (Lau et al., 2008; Bornkessel-Schlesewsky et al., 2011), 
whereas the topography and polarity of the early effect in the present experiment was consistent 
with neither of these. Rather, the effect is consistent in timing and topography with the Nref, a 
negativity suggested associated with establishing the antecedent of a word (Van Berkum et al., 
2007). In the present experiment, the smaller negativity for inconsistent quantifiers may reflect a 
decrease in effort made to link all of or some of with an antecedent when the participant 
recognizes it to be pragmatically or semantically inconsistent with the context. More importantly, 
if participants were making predictions based on verbal pre-encoding, then all of and some of 
would both be unexpected; nevertheless some of elicited a qualitatively different effect later in 
the epoch. 
In the present experiment, pragmatically inconsistent some of, but not semantically 
inconsistent all of, elicited a sustained negativity in the late time window. The present 
experiment is not the first to observe such an effect. Sustained negativities have also been 
observed on sentences in which readers must re-compute a discourse model or revise a discursive 
inference (Baggio et al., 2008; Pijnacker et al., 2011). The former study examined the Dutch 
equivalents of sentences such as "The girl was writing a letter when her friend spilled coffee on 
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the paper" (note that the verb is sentence-final in the Dutch equivalent of the sentence, which 
was used in the experiment), in which the main clause allows the reader to infer that the girl will 
eventually finish writing the letter but following clause cancels that inference. The authors 
observed a sustained anterior negativity on the sentence-final verb, which they argue reflects the 
process of re-computing a previously computed discourse model in which the girl finishes 
writing the letter. The experiment by Pijnacker and colleagues (2011) presented participants with 
modus ponens reasoning problems in which a normally logical conclusion is defeated by 
contextual information: for example, the conclusion in problem (4) would normally be logical, 
but is disabled by the context presented in (4a). 
4) a. Context: Lisa probably lost a context lens. 
 b. Premise 1: If Lisa is going to play hockey, then she will wear contact lenses. 
 c. Premise 2: Lisa is going to play hockey. 
 d. Conclusion: Lisa will wear contact lenses. 
 
They found that the final words of the disabled conclusions elicited a broad sustained negativity 
relative to controls, and they interpreted this effect as representing the revision of the discursive 
inference that would normally lead from the premises to the conclusion. The sustained negativity 
observed in the present study has a similar morphology and latency as the negativities observed 
in those experiments. It may be the case that the negativity observed in the present study reflects 
revision of the reader's interpretation of the quantifier's meaning (inhibition of the pragmatic 
reading and retrieval of the semantic reading) after the reader realizes that the pragmatic reading 
is inappropriate.  
While psycholinguistic models assert that realizing and/or cancelling a pragmatic 
inference may involve processing costs (Katsos & Cummins, 2010, Hartshorne & Snedeker, 
submitted; see also Garrett & Harnish, 2007), they do not yet articulate precisely what sort of 
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costs or mechanisms this computation entails (see Bott et al., 2012, for further discussion). Thus, 
the next experiment examines whether the canceling or suppression of a pragmatic inference 
(reflected by the sustained negativity in Experiment 1) interacts with lexico-semantic processing. 
This experiment factorially manipulates the presence of a lexico-semantic violation (i.e., a 
sentence object that does not match the objects in the picture) and the felicity of the quantifier 
some of upstream of the violation; example pictures and sentences for Experiment 2 are shown in 
Figure 4. For example, the sentence “Some of the girls are sitting on blankets suntanning” is 
pragmatically and lexically correct when preceded by a sentence in which some girls are sitting 
on blankets and some sitting instead on couches (depicted in the upper-left portion of Figure 4). 
The same sentence is pragmatically correct but lexically incorrect when none of the girls are 
sitting on blankets but not all the girls are sitting on the same thing (upper-right portion). The 
sentence is pragmatically incorrect but lexically correct when in fact all of the girls are sitting on 
blankets (lower-left portion). Finally, when all the girls are sitting on the same thing and that 
thing is not a blanket, the sentence is both pragmatically and lexico-semantically incorrect 
(lower-right portion), making it possible to examine how the neural response to lexico-semantic 
inconsistency at the object position interacts with the processing of the pragmatic inconsistency 
previously instantiated at the quantifier position.  
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Lexico-semantic picture-sentence mismatches have been shown to elicit robust N400s 
(Knoerfle, Urbach, & Kutas, 2011). If the ongoing pragmatic revision process after encountering 
an infelicitous quantifier affects lexico-semantic processing, either by limiting the extent to 
which the parser commits to predictions about upcoming material or by using the same 
processing resources that would otherwise be used for lexico-semantic prediction and integration, 
then the N400 effect for lexico-semantic violations at the object position should be modulated. 
For instance, Panizza and colleagues (2011) found that participants in a visual world 
eye-tracking experiment were slower to look to an unambiguous target (e.g., slower to look to a 
referent with paper clips after paper clips had already been heard) when the target word was in 
an upward entailing environment, which supports scalar implicature (e.g., "A boy has some of 
Figure 4. Sample pictures used in Experiment 2; in this sample, all pictures were 
followed by the sentence 图片里，有的女孩坐在毯子上晒太阳 ("In the picture, 
some of the girls are sitting on blankets suntanning"). In a given trial, only one of 
the pictures was shown before the sentence. The condition labels on the picture 
are for expository purposes only and were not included in the experiment. 
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the paper clips; click on him"), than when it was in a downward entailing environment, which 
does not (e.g., "If a boy has all of the paper clips, then click on him"). The authors suggest that 
generating a scalar implicature may have interfered with participants' ability to use 
disambiguating phonological information for lexico-semantic integration. In a similar vein, 
Experiment 2 of the current study tests whether revising an underinformative scalar inference 
interferes with lexico-semantic integration between the picture and the sentential object. The 
Quantifier by Consistency manipulation at the quantifier position from Experiment 1 was also 
included in this experiment, in order to test whether the effect obtained in that experiment would 
be replicated. (The pragmatically inconsistent "some" and correct "some" conditions were 
included in the critical items; items corresponding to the semantically inconsistent "all" and 
correct "all" of Experiment 1 were included in the fillers for this experiment.) While the primary 
motivation for Experiment 2 was to examine the interaction of pragmatic and lexical processing 
rather than effects of modality, auditory presentation of sentences was found both to be 
comfortable for participants and to reduce the duration of each trial. For this reason, sentence 
stimuli were presented auditorily rather than visually in Experiment 2. 
 
2.3. EXPERIMENT TWO 
 
2.3.1. Methods 
 
2.3.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-three Peking University students (9 females; mean age 22.5 years, range 18-26) 
who were native speakers of Mandarin participated in the study. Three were excluded from the 
statistical analysis due to excessive artifacts in their recordings, leaving a total of 20 participants 
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in the final analysis. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were 
right-handed according to the Chinese Handedness Survey (Li, 1983). All participants provided 
their informed consent and received payment, and all methods for the study were approved by 
the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, Peking University, and the Human 
Subjects Committee of Lawrence at the University of Kansas. 
 
2.3.1.2. Materials 
Two hundred and sixty sets of picture arrays were designed according to the same criteria 
as in Experiment 1. Each Some- and All-type picture array had two versions, such that in the first 
version the object being interacted with by some or all of the characters matched the object 
mentioned in the associated sentence, and in the second version it mismatched. At the object 
position, this formed a 2 (Lexical Consistency) × 2 (Pragmatic Consistency) design: sentences 
with correct objects, sentences with lexical mismatches at the object position, sentences with 
correct objects but a pragmatic violation upstream, and sentences with both a pragmatic violation 
upstream and a lexically incorrect object. It formed a one-factor design at the quantifier position: 
sentences with consistent quantifiers and those with pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers (each 
of these conditions collapsed across lexically consistent and inconsistent sentences, since at the 
quantifier position the lexical mismatch has not yet been encountered). A sample stimulus set is 
shown in Figure 4. Critical sentences were written so that none of the critical objects were at the 
end of the sentence. All the critical objects used were either 2 or 3 syllables long.
12
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 The 200 plausible most plausible all-type pictures were normed with a sentence completion task to select pictures 
in which the objects were most identifiable. Twenty-eight students from Beijing Union University participated in the 
task. Participants were presented with the pictures along with sentence fragments up to but not including the objects 
(e.g. "图片里，所有的女孩都坐在。。。", "In the picture, all the girls are sitting on…") and asked to complete the 
sentence. For critical stimuli for the ERP experiment, the 160 sentence-picture pairs whose objects had the highest 
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Two hundred forty filler sentences were prepared, using picture-sentence pairs that had 
not been chosen for the critical items as well as new picture-sentence pairs. Eighty were used to 
test the semantic violation at quantifier position (forty correct all and forty semantically 
inconsistent all of sentences, counterbalanced across participants); these sentences, together with 
the critical sentences, making it possible to test whether the Consistency by Quantifier 
interaction reported in Experiment 1 could be replicated. Of the remaining fillers, eighty were 
correct all of sentences that were not analyzed, and the last 80 were sentences using other 
quantifiers. Of those 80, 40 used some-like quantifiers (e.g. 有一些 a few) and 40 used all-like 
quantifiers (e.g. 每个 every). None included quantifier-related violations; 40 were entirely 
correct, 20 mismatched with the picture at the object position, and 20 mismatched at the verb 
position. (Out of each of these types, half of the items used all-like quantifiers and half used 
some-like.)  
Auditory stimuli were read by a female native speaker from the Peking University 
Chinese department, who was instructed to avoid placing contrastive stress on the quantifiers and 
objects. The recordings were digitized at 22050 Hz using CoolEdit Pro (Syntrillium Software) 
and segmented using Praat (Boersma & Weenik, 2012), and the onset latencies of the quantifiers 
and objects were measured. The onset of the quantifier yǒu de (some of) was defined as the point 
of lowest intensity between the preceding syllable lǐ and the yǒu, which in most tokens also 
coincided with a perceptible change in phoneme quality and preceded, by 10-20 ms, a 200-400 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
cloze probability were chosen, with the condition that a pair was not chosen if any identical objects were given in 
response to both pictures. All sentences chosen had an object cloze probability above 46% (mean 81%). Due to 
reorganization of target and filler stimuli to avoid repetition of target objects, two picture/sentence pairs that had not 
been cloze tested were later introduced into the critical stimuli.  
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Hz drop in frequency of the second through fourth formants. The onset of the quantifier suǒyǒu 
de (all of) was defined as the onset of high-frequency energy in the spectrogram. Onsets of 
objects were measured as the audible onset of the first consonant of the word (plosives were 
measured at the burst), except in two cases where the onset of the first consonant of the second 
syllable was measured since this was the point of disambiguation for the critical word. The 
latency between quantifier onsets and object onsets in the critical sentences was 1309 ms on 
average (SD = 203 ms, range 832-2127 ms). 
The 400 trials (160 critical some of sentences, 80 all of fillers, and 160 other fillers) were 
arranged into four lists in a Latin square design. Each list contained 40 trials per object condition. 
For the all of sentences tested, each list contained 40 trials per condition (correct "all", 
semantically inconsistent "all").  
Each list was divided into five blocks of 80 trials each, such that the first trial in each 
block was a filler sentence. Each block was pseudorandomized according to the following 
criteria: no more than three trials of the same condition could appear consecutively, no more than 
four correct or incorrect trials could appear consecutively, no more than six Some-type or 
All-type pictures could appear consecutively, and no more than six some of or all of sentences 
could appear consecutively. The order of trials was kept the same for each list, such that a given 
item appeared at the same position (but in different conditions) in every list, and each of the lists 
adhered to the above constraints. 
 
2.3.1.3. Procedure 
Participants were seated comfortably in a dimly lit and electromagnetically shielded room, 
about 80 cm in front of a 51-cm CRT monitor. Pictures were presented on the monitor and 
sentences were presented through tube earphones (Etymotic Research, Inc.). Stimulus 
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presentation and recording of behavioral responses was controlled using Presentation software 
(Neurobehavioral Systems). Each trial began with a fixation point presented at the center of the 
screen for 500 ms, followed by the picture, which was presented at the center of the screen for 
4000 ms. After this time the picture disappeared and was immediately replaced by a fixation 
point at the center of the screen, which remained on the screen throughout the presentation of the 
auditory sentence. The sentence began between 500 and 1500 ms after the appearance of the 
fixation point. After the end of the sentence, a 1-7 scale appeared on the screen. The extremes (1 
and 7) were labeled "一致" ("consistent") and "不一致" ("inconsistent"); the sides of the scale on 
which these extremes appeared were counterbalanced across participants. 
The participants' task was to rate how consistent the sentence was with the preceding 
picture within 3000 ms. The rating task was chosen to encourage participants to pay attention to 
the entire sentence and thus reduce the possibility that they could complete the task strategically 
simply by matching numbers of items in the picture with quantifiers in the sentence; rating tasks 
have been used in previous online studies investigating quantification (Urbach & Kutas, 2010) 
and scalar implicature (Foppolo, 2007). After the rating task was complete, the trial was 
followed by a 2500 ms blank screen before the fixation point signaling the beginning of the next 
trial.  
After every 80 trials the participants were given a break. In addition, after every 20 trials 
they were given a 15-second break, during which time a message appeared on the screen asking 
them to relax briefly. The formal experiment was preceded by a practice session consisting of 10 
trials. The trial structure and picture formats were identical to those used in the main experiment, 
but no violations involving picture-object mismatch or pragmatic underinformativeness were 
included. The recording took about 100 minutes. 
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2.3.1.4. Data acquisition and analysis 
The EEG was continuously recorded using an elastic electrode cap (Brain Products, 
Munchen, Germany) containing 64 tin electrodes organized according to the 10-20 system. 
Additional channels were placed above the right eye and at the outer canthus of the left eye for 
monitoring vertical and horizontal electro-oculograms (EOGs), respectively. An electrode placed 
on the tip of the nose served as the reference during data acquisition, and AFz served as the 
ground. Impedances were kept below 10 kΩ. The recordings were amplified using a Brain 
Products Brainamp amplifier with a bandpass from 0.016 to 100Hz, and digitized at a sampling 
rate of 500 Hz.  
The raw EEG was segmented into epochs from 1000 ms before to 4250 ms after the 
quantifiers (this epoch ensured at least 2000 ms after each critical object). Data were then 
demeaned using the mean amplitude of each epoch (Groppe et al., 2009), decomposed with an 
ICA algorithm (Makeig et al., 1996) to remove ocular artifacts, and re-segmented into two 
separate datasets (one consisting of -200 to 1000 ms epochs time-locked to the quantifiers, and 
one consisting of -200 to 1000 ms epochs time-locked to the objects). Artifact rejection was 
performed separately for the quantifier and object data, and ERPs time-locked to the object used 
a 100-ms post-stimulus baseline rather than a 200-ms pre-stimulus baseline, since the 
pre-stimulus interval contained sustained effects of processing violations at the quantifier. 11.7% 
of trials were rejected (9.8% of epochs time-locked to the objects, and 13% of epochs 
time-locked to the quantifiers); all subjects included in the analysis had at least 29 trials per 
condition in the object analysis and 25 per condition in the quantifier analysis. The proportion of 
trials rejected did not differ between conditions in either analysis (objects: Fs < 1; quantifiers: Fs 
< 1.06, ps > .315). 
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The following electrode regions were defined on this cap: left anterior (F1, F3, F5, FC1, 
FC3, FC5), right anterior (F2, F4, F6, FC2, FC4, FC6), left central (C1, C3, C5, CP1, CP3, CP5), 
right central (C2, C4, C6, CP2, CP4, CP6), left posterior (P1, P3, P5, PO3, PO7, O1), right 
posterior (P2, P4, P6, PO4, PO8, O2), midline anterior (Fz, FPz), midline central (Cz, CPz), 
midline posterior (POz, Oz). For the quantifier position, the analysis used the factors Consistency 
(consistent, inconsistent), Quantifier (some of, all of), and Region (6 levels for the lateral 
ANOVA, 3 for the midline ANOVA). For the object position, the factors were Pragmatic 
Consistency (consistent, inconsistent), Lexical Consistency (consistent, inconsistent), and Region. 
The Huynh-Feldt correction was applied to F-tests with more than one degree of freedom in the 
numerator. 
 
2.3.2. Results 
 
2.3.2.1. Behavioral results 
The participants' task was to rate the consistency between the picture and the sentence 
using a 7-point scale. Average ratings are shown in Figure 5. A repeated measures ANOVA on 
the four critical conditions (correct some of, pragmatic violation, lexical mismatch, and double 
violation) revealed significant effects of Pragmatic Consistency (F(1,18) = 29.11, p < .001) and 
of Lexical Consistency (F(1,18) = 206.68, p < .001), but no significant interaction (F(1,18) = .03, 
p = .862). Furthermore, pairwise t-tests between all six conditions, with the two-tailed alpha level 
Bonferroni-corrected to α = .003, revealed significant differences for every comparison except 
correct some of vs. correct all of (p > .5) and the double violation vs. semantically incorrect all of 
(p = .32). These results indicate that participants treated correct sentences, pragmatic violations, 
lexical mismatches, and double violations as decreasingly acceptable, but they did not 
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differentiate between the two correct conditions or between double violations (with both 
pragmatic violation and picture-sentence mismatch) and semantically incorrect "all". Because the 
present experiment used a gradient rating task rather than a categorical judgment task, it was not 
possible to classify participants as pragmatic or semantic responders using the same criteria as in 
Experiment 1 or previous studies (Noveck & Posada, 2003; Bott & Noveck, 2004; Feeney et al., 
2004; Hunt et al., 2013).
13
 
 
2.3.2.2. ERP results 
                                                 
 
13
 Nevertheless, the number of pragmatic responders was assessed using one-tailed independent samples t-tests for 
each participant comparing ratings for pragmatic violations against ratings for correct sentences. Twelve participants 
reliably rated pragmatically inconsistent sentences lower than correct sentences (ps < .05), whereas eight did not. 
The former group may be considered pragmatic responders (those who interpreted some as meaning not all), 
whereas the latter group may be either semantic responders (those who interpreted some as meaning at least one) or 
inconsistent responders. Compared to the acceptability judgment task used in Experiment 1, in which most 
participants were inconsistent, the consistency rating in Experiment 2 yielded a greater number of pragmatic 
responders.  
Figure 5. Consistency ratings in Experiment 2 (1=very inconsistent, 7=very 
consistent) for the some of sentences (left) and all of sentences (right). Error bars 
represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
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The waveforms time-locked to the quantifier position (Figure 6) show a sustained 
negativity for pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers, similar to the one obtained in Experiment 1 
but broader in distribution, and a sustained positivity for semantically inconsistent quantifiers. At 
the object position (Figure 7), both picture-sentence mismatches and double violations elicited 
broadly-distributed negativities from about 200-600 ms, whereas both types of objects following 
pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers elicited a sustained negativity from about 400-1000 ms. In 
this time window the sustained negativity appeared to be present for the objects following 
pragmatic violations and for the double violations, but not for the picture-sentence mismatches.  
Figure 6. Effects of pragmatic and semantic inconsistency at the quantifier in Experiment 2. 
Upper portion: Grand average ERPs at the midline central region. Lower portion: Topographic 
maps formed by subtracting the correct quantifier condition from the corresponding inconsistent 
quantifier conditions. 
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These patterns of effects are examined statistically below; the omnibus ANOVA results 
for the quantifier and object positions are presented in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. 
 
Experiment 2 – quantifiers 
Effect 300-1000 ms 
Quantifier F(1,19) = 0.06 
F(1,19) = 0.08 
Consistency F(1,19) = 0.85 
F(1,19) = 1.70   
Region  F(5,95) = 71.96 
F(2,38) = 34.36 
**** 
**** 
Quantifier × Consistency F(1,19) = 10.92 
F(1,19) = 6.10 
** 
** 
Quantifier × Region F(5,95) = 1.30 
F(2,38) = 0.75 
Consistency × Region F(5,95) = 1.51 
F(2,38) = 0.98 
Quantifier × Consistency × 
Region 
F(5,95) = 2.83 
F(2,38) = 0.82 
** 
Table 2. Results of the lateral and midline omnibus ANOVAs at the quantifier position in 
Experiment 2, with each cell showing the lateral ANOVA result above and the midline 
ANOVA result below. *.05 < p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .005; ****p < .001. 
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2.3.2.2.1. Quantifier position 
 We quantified the effects of pragmatic and semantic inconsistency using the mean ERP 
amplitudes over the 300-1000 ms window. There was a significant interaction of Quantifier and 
Consistency, reflecting the fact that inconsistent some of elicited a negativity (lateral: F(1,19) = 
8.03, p = .011; midline: F(1,17) = 3.59, p = .073) whereas inconsistent all of elicited a positivity 
(lateral: F(1,19) = 7.72, p = .012; midline: F(1,17) = 5.63, p = .028). There was also a significant 
interaction of Quantifier, Consistency, and Region in the lateral ANOVA only. The interaction 
was due to the fact that the negativity for the some of sentences was broadly distributed (the 
Consistency by Region interaction for some of did not reach significance, F(5,95) < 1), whereas 
the positivity for the all of sentences was somewhat left-posterior in distribution. Specifically, for 
semantically inconsistent all of sentences, the Consistency by Region interaction was significant 
(F(5,95) = 2.80, p = .033); the simple effect of semantic Consistency was significant in the left 
Figure 7. Effects of lexical and pragmatic inconsistency in Experiment 2. Upper 
portion: Grand average ERPs (a 30 Hz low-pass filter was applied for plotting) at 
nine scalp regions. Lower portion: Topographic maps of difference waves. 
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posterior (p = .001), right posterior (p = .005), and left central (p = .046) regions, and marginal in 
the left anterior (p = .063) and right central (p = .054) regions.  
 
2.3.2.2.2. Object position 
N400. The N400 was quantified using mean amplitudes in the 200-500 ms time window. 
In this window there was a highly significant effect of Lexical Consistency, reflecting the fact 
that both lexically inconsistent conditions (picture-sentence mismatch and double violation) 
elicited more negative ERPs than lexically consistent conditions (correct object, and correct 
object following a pragmatically inconsistent quantifier). The effect was broadly distributed (it 
did not interact significantly with Region). The effect of Pragmatic Consistency was not 
significant. Crucially, no interactions of Pragmatic Consistency and Lexical Consistency were 
significant, indicating that the presence of a pragmatic violation did not modulate the 
lexico-semantic N400 effect. 
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Late negativity. The late ERP effect was quantified using the mean amplitudes in the 
500-1000 ms window. In this window there was a significant main effect of Pragmatic 
Consistency, indicating that objects following pragmatic violations elicited more negative ERPs 
in the late window. In the lateral ANOVA there was a marginal interaction between Pragmatic 
Consistency, Lexical Consistency, and Region, due to the fact that although the main effect of 
pragmatic inconsistency was significant for both lexically correct (i.e., correct objects following 
pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers) and lexically incorrect (i.e., double violations) sentences, 
it was somewhat broadly distributed for lexically correct sentences (the interaction of Pragmatic 
Consistency and Region did not reach significance in these sentences, F(5,95) = 1.20, p = .320), 
but was more limited to the anterior regions for the double violations. Specifically, for the double 
violations, the interaction of Pragmatic Consistency and Region was marginally significant 
Effect 200-500 ms 500-1000 ms  
Pragmatic Consistency F(1,19) = 0.36 
F(1,19) = 0.45 
F(1,19) = 22.96 
F(1,19) = 23.76  
**** 
**** 
Lexical Consistency F(1,19) = 58.82 
F(1,19) = 53.15 
**** 
**** 
F(1,19) = 0.21 
F(1,19) = 0.06 
Region F(5,95) = 60.48 
F(2,38) = 54.18  
**** 
**** 
F(5,95) = 29.46 
F(2,38) = 27.64 
**** 
**** 
Pragmatic Consistency × 
Lexical Consistency 
F(1,19) = 0.60 
F(1,19) = 0.60  
F(1,18) = 0.27 
F(1,19) = 0.19 
Pragmatic Consistency × 
Region 
F(5,95) = 0.57 
F(2,38) = 1.88 
F(5,95) = 1.24 
F(2,38) = 0.48 
Lexical Consistency × Region F(5,90) = 1.38 
F(2,38) = 2.59 
F(5,95) = 1.05 
F(2,38) = 0.59 
Pragmatic Consistency × 
Lexical Consistency × Region 
F(5,90) = 0.30 
F(2,38) = 0.15 
F(5,95) = 2.26 
F(2,38) = 1.73 
* 
 
Table 3. Results of the lateral and midline omnibus ANOVAs at the object position in 
Experiment 2, with each cell showing the lateral ANOVA result above and the midline 
ANOVA result below. *.05 < p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .005; ****p < .001. 
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(F(5,95) = 2.23, p = .095), and the Pragmatic Consistency effect was significant or marginal in 
the left anterior (p = .017), right anterior (p = .034), and left central region (p = .070), but not 
significant in the right central, left posterior, or right posterior regions (ps > .190). 
To investigate whether the topographical difference was likely to be due to qualitatively 
different underlying sources or to quantitative differences in the signal, a scaling analysis was 
performed (Jing et al., 2006), which tests whether the signal in one effect has the same 
topography as the signal in another effect after being scaled based on a hypothetical scaling 
factor that represents the change in signal that would occur from a quantitative change in the 
strength of the underlying source. In this analysis, in which the pragmatic effect for the double 
violation (formed by subtracting the ERP for the mismatching object condition from the ERP for 
the double violation condition) was directly compared to that for the pragmatic violation 
(subtracting the correct condition from the pragmatic violation), the interactions with region 
were not significant (F(5,95) = 1.60, p = .204; F(5,95) = 1.85, p = .147),
14
 indicating that the 
topographic differences found in the raw analysis are not likely to result from different 
underlying generators.  
 
2.3.3. Discussion 
At the quantifier position, the finding of Experiment 1 was partially replicated: pragmatic 
violations elicited a sustained negativity, albeit broader in distribution than the effect in 
Experiment 1. Unlike Experiment 1, semantically and pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers did 
not elicit similar effects in any time window; also unlike Experiment 1, a sustained positivity was 
                                                 
 
14
 In the procedure proposed by Jing and colleagues (2006), it is recommended to perform two comparisons: one 
between the raw Condition 1 and the scaled Condition 2, and one between the scaled Condition 1 and the raw 
Condition 2. Therefore, two F-tests are reported here. 
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observed for the semantically inconsistent quantifiers. The primary differences between the 
experiments were stimulus presentation modality (auditory in Experiment 2, visual in 
Experiment 1), task (consistency rating in Experiment 2, correctness judgments and 
comprehension questions in experiment 1), and composition of other sentences in the experiment 
(in particular, Experiment 1 did not include sentences with both pragmatic and lexico-semantic 
violations).
15
 Importantly, in both experiments semantically inconsistent quantifiers elicited a 
qualitatively different ERP pattern than the pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers, which 
provides evidence that the sustained negativity for pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers does 
not reflect a general reanalysis mechanism or a general response to unexpected input, but rather a 
process specific to the kinds of revision or inhibition processes that are necessary for 
revising/inhibiting the pragmatic interpretation of a quantifier and activating its semantic 
meaning. 
 The ERPs elicited at the object position showed evidence that pragmatic and 
lexico-semantic information were processed independently: the presence or absence of a 
pragmatic violation upstream did not modulate the lexico-semantic N400 effect elicited by 
picture-sentence mismatch. The lack of an interaction cannot be explained by assuming that 
pragmatic revision had already been completed by the time the object was heard, since the 
objects still elicited a sustained negativity associated with pragmatic revision. Rather, the finding 
                                                 
 
15
 It should also be noted that, whereas Quantifier and Consistency were fully crossed in a Latin square design in 
Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 they were not: the items for the some of conditions (pragmatically inconsistent and 
correct some of) came from the 160 critical items, whereas the items for the all of conditions came from 80 fillers. 
Thus, while the Consistency factor was balanced across lists (i.e., a given item appeared in inconsistent conditions in 
some lists and consistent conditions in others), the Quantifier factor was not (it was not the case that, for a given 
item, it appeared with some of in some lists and all of in others). This was necessary for the experimental design; 
creating a fully crossed 2×2×2 design would have required more stimuli than it would have been feasible to create 
and to show to a single participant (assuming 40 trials per condition, it would have required 320 critical trials and at 
least as many fillers). 
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suggests that the revision or inhibition of the pragmatic interpretation of scalar terms utilizes 
different processing resources than those used for lexico-semantic prediction and integration. 
The late time window on the ERPs time-locked to objects continued to show a sustained 
negativity in response to pragmatically inconsistent sentences, suggesting that pragmatic revision 
was not yet completed by the time the object was encountered (which was, on average, 1300 ms 
after the onset of the quantifier). Thus, the data seem to suggest that pragmatic and semantic 
aspects of meaning were processed in parallel and their respective effects were additive. 
 
2.4. EXPERIMENT THREE 
The sustained negativity elicited by pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers in Experiment 
1 was significant but small. While a similar but larger effect was observed in Experiment 2, the 
design of that experiment was different. Therefore, the main purpose for Experiment 3 was to 
attempt to replicate the negativity observed in Experiment 1 while using the same design 
(crossing Quantifier and Consistency) and only minor differences in the stimuli (see Materials, 
below). In addition, Experiment 3 tested whether group differences would emerge at the 
quantifier position, as they did at the quantified noun in recent ERP studies (Nieuwland et al., 
2010; Hunt et al., 2013). In order to address this question, several measures of participants' 
judgments were collected in an offline questionnaire (Appendix A:), in addition to the 
consistency ratings collected during the recording. 
 
2.4.1. Methods 
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2.4.1.1. Participants 
Thirty-two Peking University students (15 females; mean age 22.6 years, range 18-28) 
who were native speakers of Mandarin participated in the study. Five were excluded from the 
statistical analysis due to excessive artifacts in their recordings, leaving a total of 27 participants 
in the final analysis. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were 
right-handed according to the Chinese Handedness Survey (Li, 1983). All participants provided 
their informed consent and received payment, and all methods for the study were approved by 
the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, Peking University, and the Human 
Subjects Committee of Lawrence at the University of Kansas. 
 
2.4.1.2. Materials 
The pictures used were identical to those used in the previous experiments. The sentences 
used in the current experiment followed the same criteria as those used in Experiment 1, with the 
exception that no extra phrase was included after the object in cases where having no extra 
phrase made the sentence sound more natural. As in Experiment 1, "some"- and "all"-type 
pictures were crossed with "some"- and "all"-type sentences to form a 2x2 experiment comparing 
the effects of pragmatic violations (relative to matched controls) to those of logic violations 
(relative to matched controls). 
 One hundred sixty picture-sentence pairs were used as fillers. The filler pictures met the 
same specifications as the critical trials, except that some of them depicted intransitive events. 
Eighty of the fillers were correct sentences (40 each of correct "some"-type and "all"-type 
picture-sentence pairs), 40 consisted of sentences with objects that did not match the objects 
shown in the picture (20 each of "some"-type and "all"-type pairs), and 40 consisted of sentences 
with verbs that did not match the activities shown in the picture (20 each of "some"-type and 
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"all"-type pairs). Unlike in Experiment 1, all fillers used the same quantifiers as the critical 
sentences (you-de 有的 "some of", and suoyou-de 所有的 "all of"), to eliminate the possibility 
that subjects might recognize the critical quantifiers as a cue that there was no object or verb 
mismatch error coming up in the sentence. 
 All the experiment sentences were read aloud by a female Mandarin speaker from Beijing 
The recording was carried out within an anechoic chamber at the University of Kansas, using an 
ElectroVoice 767 microphone and a Marantz PMD-671 digital solid-state recorder sampling at 
22050 Hz and in mono format. 
 
2.4.1.3. Offline questionnaire 
Participants completed a paper-pencil questionnaire in Chinese after the ERP recording. 
The full questionnaire is shown in Appendix A: (with an English translation in Appendix B:). 
For the purposes of data analysis, only responses to questions 2, 3, and 5 were used. Question 2 
showed participants an underinformative picture-sentence combination (All-type picture with 
some of sentence) and asked them to qualitatively describe whether the sentence and picture were 
consistent, and why. Responses to this question were coded as "pragmatic" (participants who 
found the combination inconsistent or "not totally consistent") or "logical". Question 3 showed 
participants a some of sentence and five pictures (in which five, four, three, two, or one out of the 
five characters were performing the action described), and asked them to indicate all pictures that 
were consistent with the sentence. Responses were coded as "pragmatic" if the participant did not 
select the five-out-of-five picture, and "logical" if the participant did. Finally, Question 5 
presented participants with a series of category sentences in the style of Noveck and Posada's 
(2003) stimuli, which were either true (e.g., Some buildings have elevators) or underinformative 
(e.g. Some sentences have words). Participants were asked to rate, on 1-7 scales, both the truth 
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and the naturalness of the sentences. For the purpose of an individual difference measure, only 
their responses on the truth judgment of underinformative sentences were analyzed. Assuming 
that such sentences are true (logically speaking) but pragmatically infelicitous and thus unnatural, 
then participants who give high truth ratings for these sentences were assumed to be better at 
realizing the semantic meaning as separate from the pragmatic meaning, whereas those who give 
low truth ratings to these sentences were assumed to be poor at distinguishing between the 
semantic and pragmatic meanings. 
 
2.4.1.4. Procedure 
The procedure for the EEG recording was identical to that of Experiment 2, except for the 
following changes. 1) The experiment was divided into two sessions, with half of the stimuli 
being presented at each session; the first session began with a practice block consisting of 10 
sentences, and the second session began with a practice block consisting of five sentences; the 
offline questionnaire was completed at the end of the second session. 2) The fixation point 
appearing at the beginning of the trial remained on-screen for 250 ms, and the picture remained 
on-screen for 5000 ms. 3) The delay between the offset of the picture and the onset of the 
sentence varied from 250-750 ms. 3) The rating scale appeared immediately at the offset of the 
sentence, rather than 100 ms later. 4) Each session of the experiment included 160 trials, divided 
into four blocks of 40 trials each; after every 20 sentences the participant was given a 10-second 
break, and after every 40 sentences the participant was given a full break. 5) The lists and fillers 
were pseudorandomized with the constraints that no more than four correct or incorrect 
sentences could appear consecutively, no more than four "some"- or "all"-type sentences could 
appear consecutively, and no more than four "some"- or "all"-type pictures could appear 
consecutively. 6) The recording took about 50 minutes. 
57 
 
 
2.4.1.5. Data acquisition and analysis 
Data were acquired using the same equipment and settings as in Experiment 2, except 
that the sampling rate was 1000 Hz. Offline data analysis followed the same procedure as the 
data analysis for the quantifiers in Experiment 2, except that 1) a 0.5 Hz high-pass filter was 
applied to the continuous data before any other procedures were performed (this was to attenuate 
low-frequency skin potentials, which many trials were contaminated by); 2) ICA decompositions 
were performed separately for each session of each participant's recording, after which the two 
sessions for each participant were combined; 3) artifact rejection was only performed after, not 
before, ICA decomposition; 4) to allow for correlating with between-subjects covariates, ERP 
voltages were converted into z-scores using each participant's mean and standard deviation over 
all scalp channels.
16
 
Data were analyzed statistically using repeated measures ANOVAs with the 
within-subjects factors Consistency (consistent, inconsistent), Quantifier (some of, all of), and 
Region (6 levels for the lateral ANOVA, 3 for the midline ANOVA).
17
 For exploratory analysis, 
mixed ANOVAs using between-subject measures (average online consistency ratings, and the 
offline questionnaire measures described above) were also conducted, with the α level set to .01. 
The Huynh-Feldt correction was applied to F-tests with more than one degree of freedom in the 
numerator. 
 
                                                 
 
16
 Analyses were also conducted using raw ERP voltages rather than z-scores. Where the two analysis methods 
yielded different results, the discrepancies are noted in the text. 
17
 Exploratory analyses of the raw voltages were also conducted using linear mixed models with crossed random 
factors for subjects and items (Baayen et al., 2008). Model significance was evaluated using log-likelihood tests and 
the significance of coefficients using Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling. The α level was set to .01. Where the 
two analysis methods yielded different results, the discrepancies are noted in the text. 
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2.4.2. Results 
 
2.4.2.1. Behavioral results 
The participants' task was to rate the consistency between the picture and the sentence 
using a 7-point scale. One participant's data were not saved because of a software error, and thus 
the analysis was conducted based on data from 26 participants. Average ratings are shown in 
Figure 8. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant effects of Consistency (F(1,25) = 
250, p < .001) and of Quantifier (F(1,25) = 107.2, p < .001), and a significant interaction (F(1,25) 
= 167.2, p < .001). Planned t-tests revealed that for both quantifier types, inconsistent sentences 
received lower ratings than consistent sentences (some of: t(25) = -4.51, p < .001; all of: t(25) = 
-24.73, p < .001), and that the interaction was due to the effect of inconsistency being more 
pronounced for all of sentences than for some of sentences (t(25) = 12.93, p < .001). Nine out of 
26 participants reliably related pragmatically inconsistent sentences lower than consistent some 
of sentences (ps < .05), and 25 out of 26 reliably rated these sentences higher than semantically 
Figure 8. Consistency ratings in Experiment 3 (1=very inconsistent, 7=very 
consistent). Error bars represent ±2 standard errors of the mean. 
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inconsistent sentences (ps < .05). 
 
2.4.2.2. ERP results 
ERPs elicited by some of are depicted in Figure 9, and those elicited by all of in Figure 10. 
Visual inspection of the data suggests that pragmatically inconsistent some of elicited a sustained 
negativity, broadly distributed over centro-parietal sites, which began approximately 200 ms 
after the onset of the quantifier and lasted through the rest of the epoch. Semantically 
inconsistent all of, on the other hand, did not elicit a clear pattern, in this time window, although 
it appeared to elicit an increased negativity over right anterior sites from 300 to 500 ms. 
Therefore, two time windows were analyzed: one from 300-500 ms, and one from 500-900 ms. 
Below the results of the whole-group analysis without between-participant covariates are 
reported first, followed by the results of the analysis using the between-participant covariates. 
 
Figure 9. Effect of pragmatic inconsistency in Experiment 3. Upper portion: 
Grand average ERPs (a 30 Hz low-pass filter was applied for plotting) at nine 
scalp regions. Lower portion: Topographic map formed by subtracting the correct 
some of condition from the pragmatically incorrect condition. 
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2.4.2.2.1. Overall analysis 
300-500 ms. The ANOVA on the z-scores averaged over this time window revealed 
marginal main effects of Consistency (lateral: F(1,26) = 3.90, p = .059; midline: F(1,26) = 3.58, 
p = .070), indicating that both pragmatically inconsistent and semantically inconsistent 
quantifiers elicited negativities in this time window.
18
 Exploratory linear mixed effects models 
yielded a significant three-way interaction of Consistency, Quantifier, and Region (χ
2
(8) = 29.65, 
p < .001). This analysis suggested that pragmatically inconsistent some yielded significant 
negativities (ps < .001) in the left central, left posterior, midline central, and right posterior 
regions, and marginal negativities (ps < .05) in the left anterior and midline posterior regions; 
                                                 
 
18
 When the ANOVA was conducted on raw voltages rather than z-scores, no significant effect of Consistency or 
interactions with Consistency were obtained.  
Figure 10. Effect of semantic inconsistency in Experiment 3. Upper portion: 
Grand average ERPs (a 30 Hz low-pass filter was applied for plotting) at nine 
scalp regions. Lower portion: Topographic map formed by subtracting the correct 
all of condition from the semantically incorrect condition. 
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whereas semantically inconsistent all yielded a significant negativity in the right anterior region 
only (p < .001), marginal negativities in the right central and posterior regions (ps < .02), and a 
nearly marginal negativity in the midline anterior region (p = .062). 
In sum, both types of inconsistency yielded negativities in this time window, although 
exploratory analyses using mixed-effects modeling suggest that the negativity elicited by 
pragmatic inconsistencies had a broad posterior distribution whereas the negativity elicited by 
semantic inconsistencies had a right frontal distribution. 
500-900 ms. The ANOVA on the z-scores averaged over this time window revealed a 
marginal interaction between Quantifier and Consistency in the lateral analysis (lateral: F(1,26) 
= 3.27, p = .082; midline: F(1,26) = 2.75, p = .109).
19
 This interaction was due to an effect of 
Consistency in the some of sentences (F(1,26) = 5.87, p = .023) but not the all of sentences (F < 
1). The same pattern of results was observed, with a higher significance level, in the exploratory 
linear mixed effects analysis: the Quantifier*Consistency interaction was significant (χ
2
(1) = 
103.2, p < .001), and the effect of inconsistency was non-significant for all of sentences (t = 0.21, 
p > .8) but significant for some of sentences (t = -10.16, p < .001). The three-way interaction of 
Quantifier, Consistency, and Region was not significant (χ
2
(8) = 1.83, p = .159). 
In sum, during this time window a negativity was only observed for pragmatically 
inconsistent some of, and it had a broad distribution.  
 
2.4.2.2.2. Analysis with individual-level covariates 
                                                 
 
19
 When the ANOVA was conducted on raw voltages rather than z-scores, the interaction reached significance in 
the midline analysis (F(1,26) = 4.44, p = .045) but did not approach significance in the lateral analysis (F(1,26) = 
2.53, p = .124). 
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The goal of this analysis was to identify participant-level predictors that showed at least 
third-order interactions with Quantifier and Consistency (as this is the minimum interaction 
necessary to establish that a predictor specifically affects responses to pragmatic violations). 
Because of the exploratory nature of the analysis, the α level was set to .01. The three 
individual-level predictors were whether the participant responded pragmatically on Question 3 
(see section 2.4.1.3, "Offline questionnaire"), hereafter referred to as Group; the average truth 
value the participant gave to underinformative sentences in the offline questionnaire, hereafter 
referred to as Truth Rating; and the difference between consistency ratings the participant gave 
to pragmatically inconsistent and consistent some of sentences during the recording, hereafter 
referred to as Consistency Rating. Some participants did not respond the same way to both 
questions 2 and 3, as shown by the cross-tabulation in Table 4. Nevertheless, a logistic regression 
showed that across participants, responses to one question were significantly predictive of 
responses to the other (b = 2.28, SE = 0.94, z = 2.43, p = .015). Therefore, to minimize the 
number of comparisons, and because two participants did not complete question 3, only 
responses to question 2 were used in the analysis reported below; the same pattern of results was 
also found when using responses to question 3 instead. 
  Response on Question 3 
  Pragmatic Logical 
Response on Question 2 
Pragmatic 11 3 
Logical 3 8 
Table 4. Cross-tabulation of responses to questions 2 and 3 on the offline survey. The cells sum 
to 25 rather than 27 because two participants failed to respond to Question 3. 
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Consistency Rating had a negative skew (-1.443), with most participants rating inconsistent some 
of sentences as slightly worse than consistent some of sentences, and only a few participants 
rating them as very much worse. Thus, before using this variable as a covariate, the values were 
reflected, transformed via reflected reciprocal, and then re-reflected, to transform the values into 
a more normal distribution (skew = -.006). Since one participant's consistency ratings were not 
saved, that participant was excluded from the analyses. Truth Rating had a roughly bimodal 
distribution with peaks at the endpoints (1 and 7), as shown in Figure 11. Both of these variables 
were centered before statistical tests were conducted.  
No predictors showed interactions of interest in the ANOVAs on either time window. 
Figure 11. Distribution of truth ratings of underinformative sentences in the 
offline survey. 
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Exploratory analyses using linear mixed effects models, however, showed several interactions. 
These are discussed below. 
300-500 ms. The linear mixed effects model revealed a significant three-way interaction 
between Consistency, Quantifier, and Consistency Rating (χ
2
(1) = 10.78, p = .001), as well as a 
significant four-way interaction between Consistency, Quantifier, Region, and Group (χ
2
(8) = 
21.13, p = .006).  
The three-way interaction with Consistency Rating is illustrated in Figure 12. Resolving 
the interaction by Quantifier showed that there were significant interactions of Consistency with 
Figure 12. Relationship between Quantifier, Consistency, and participants' 
sensitivity to pragmatic inconsistency. The x-axis shows the participant's 
sensitivity in the online ratings (consistency ratings for pragmatically inconsistent 
some of sentences minus ratings for correct some of sentences; more negative 
values indicate greater sensitivity). The y-axis shows ERP voltages. 
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Consistency Rating for both some of sentences (χ
2
(1) = 40.97, p < .001) and all of sentences (χ
2
(1) 
= 106.38, p < .001). As shown in Figure 12, for both types of sentences it was the case that the 
negativity elicited by inconsistent quantifiers was largest for participants who rated 
pragmatically inconsistent sentences as much worse than correct some of sentences, whereas 
participants who rated these sentences as similar tended to show less negativity, or even a 
positivity, for both pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers and semantically inconsistent 
quantifiers. The main difference between the pragmatic and semantic violations was the 
magnitude of the negativity—pragmatically inconsistent sentences tended to show negativities 
for all subjects, whereas semantically inconsistent sentences tended to show positivities for 
participants who showed the least sensitivity to the pragmatic inconsistency in their ratings.  
As for the interaction with Group, resolving the interaction by Quantifier revealed that all 
of sentences showed no significant interactions with Group (ps > .4), whereas some of sentences 
showed a significant three-way interaction between Consistency, Region, and Group (χ
2
(1) = 
Figure 13. Relationship between Consistency, Group (pragmatic responders vs. logical 
responders), and ERP responses to some of at two scalp regions. The y-axis shows the 
mean ERP voltage over 300-500 ms, in z-score standardized µv. 
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40.97, p < .001). Further resolving this interaction by Region revealed significant interactions 
between Consistency and Group in the left anterior region (χ
2
(1) = 17.7, p < .001) and right 
posterior region (χ
2
(1) = 10.11, p = .001). These interactions are shown in Figure 13. As the 
figure indicates, pragmatic responders (those who responded "Inconsistent" on Question 2 of the 
offline survey) showed a negativity with a different topography than logical responders: for 
pragmatic responders the negativity extended into the left anterior region, whereas for logical 
responders it did not. (All other regions except for midline anterior showed significant effects of 
Consistency (ps < .009), suggesting that both groups showed negativities in those regions.) 
67 
 
500-900 ms. The linear mixed effects model revealed significant three-way interactions 
between Consistency, Quantifier, and Truth Rating (χ
2
(1) = 12,71, p < .001), and between 
Consistency, Quantifier, and Group (χ
2
(1) = 11.29, p < .001). The four-way interaction between 
Consistency, Quantifier, Region, and Group was also significant (χ
2
(8) = 24.71, p = .002).  
The three-way interaction of Consistency, Quantifier, and Truth Rating is plotted in 
Figure 14. Resolving this interaction by Quantifier revealed significant interactions of 
Consistency and Truth Rating for both some of (χ
2
(1) = 104.22, p < .001) and all of sentences 
(χ
2
(1) = 23.65, p < .001). As shown in the figure, for both some of and all of sentences, the 
Figure 14. Relationship between Quantifier, Consistency, and 
participants' offline truth ratings of underinformative sentences. The 
x-axis shows the participant's truth ratings (higher values suggest better 
ability to realize semantic interpretations). The y-axis shows ERP 
voltages. 
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negativity elicited by inconsistent quantifiers tended to be largest for participants who were poor 
at distinguishing between the semantic and pragmatic meanings (those who judged 
underinformative sentences as "untrue"). This pattern appeared for both some of and all of 
sentences, but with different magnitudes; as is apparent from the figure, to effect of 
inconsistency in some of sentences ranged from negative (among participants who gave low truth 
ratings) to no effect (among participants who gave high truth ratings), whereas the effect of 
inconsistency in all of sentences was a positivity among some participants who gave high truth 
ratings. 
Resolving the four-way interaction of Consistency, Quantifier, Region, and Group 
revealed that there was a significant Consistency × Group × Region interaction for some of 
sentences (χ
2
(8) = 27.26, p < .001) but not for all of sentences (χ
2
(8) = 8.07, p =.427). In some of 
sentences there were significant Consistency × Group effects in several regions (left anterior: 
χ
2
(1) = 4.15, p = .042; right central: χ
2
(1) = 4.04, p = .044; left posterior: χ
2
(1) = 5.95, p = .015; 
right posterior: χ
2
(1) = 15.67, p < .001), indicating that in each of these regions one group 
showed a greater sustained negativity than the other. The interaction is plotted in Figure 15. As 
the figure indicates, over posterior sites the negativity was greatest for logical responders, 
whereas over left anterior sites it was greatest for pragmatic responders; this suggests that the 
two different groups showed effects with differing scalp distributions.  
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2.4.3. Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to replicate the comparison between pragmatic and 
semantic inconsistencies from Experiment 1, and to examine potential individual differences in 
the sustained negativity elicited by quantifiers that are pragmatically infelicitous with a context. 
Figure 15. Relationship between Consistency, Quantifier, Group (pragmatic 
responders vs. logical responders), and ERP responses. The y-axis shows the 
ERP effect (mean voltage over 500-900 ms, in z-score standardized µv, for 
pragmatically inconsistent some of or semantically inconsistent all of, minus 
mean voltage over 500-900 ms for correct some of or correct all of). Blue bars 
show effects for logical responders, and red bars effects for pragmatic 
responders. 
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Regarding the first goal, such quantifiers in this experiment once again elicited a broad sustained 
negativity, replicating the findings of the previous experiments. The ERP elicited by 
semantically inconsistent quantifiers, on the other hand, differed from that elicited in the 
previous experiments (in Experiment 1 there was only an early anterior positivity, in Experiment 
2 there was a sustained broad positivity, and in this experiment there was an early, right-anterior 
negativity). Nevertheless, this effect was dissociated from the ERP elicited by pragmatically 
inconsistent quantifiers, both in terms of morphology (pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers 
elicited a negativity with a more sustained duration) and topography (pragmatically inconsistent 
quantifiers elicited a negativity with a broad posterior distribution, whereas semantically 
inconsistent quantifiers elicited one with a more restricted right-anterior distribution).  
Regarding the second goal, the relationship between the individual-level predictors tested 
and the sustained negativity remains inconclusive, but exploratory analyses provided preliminary 
evidence suggesting that 1) participants who tended to rate underinformative sentences as "false", 
or as inconsistent with a preceding picture, also tended to show greater negativities in response to 
underinformative quantifiers; and 2) the topography of the sustained negativity differed between 
participants who judged the pragmatically infelicitous sentences as inconsistent with their 
pictures in the offline and participants who judged these sentences as consistent. Regarding the 
first point, it is worth noting that participants who rate underinformative sentences as "true" and 
those who judge the pragmatically infelicitous pictures as "consistent" are both, presumably, 
participants who are either better at realizing the semantic meaning of the quantifier or are less 
sensitive to the pragmatic meaning (or both). These are precisely the participants who showed 
smaller negativities in response to the quantifier. This suggests that the sustained negativity may 
reflect extra effort that the participants who are poorer at realizing semantic meaning must spend 
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to process the quantifier. The possible functional significance of the sustained negativity will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 2.5, General discussion.  
The exploratory analyses also suggested that participants who tended to judge 
underinformative sentences as consistent with their contexts (as determined by the 
post-experiment questionnaire) showed ERP responses that differed in terms of topography from 
those of participants who judged underinformative sentences as inconsistent with their context. 
The latter group (pragmatic responders) showed a more left-anterior effect throughout the epoch, 
and the former group (logical responders) showed a more posterior effect than the pragmatic 
responders in the late portion of the epoch. The functional interpretation of this topographical 
difference was not predicted and is thus difficult to interpret, but it should be noted that an 
anterior negativity was observed in the experiment by Baggio and colleagues (2008), in which 
participants had to re-compute discourse models, but not in the experiment by Pijnacker and 
colleagues (2011), in which participants had to revise discursive inferences. This topographical 
difference might suggest functional differences in the way the two groups of participants in the 
present experiment—although it is not possible at this point to rule out the possibility that 
topographical differences between experiments could be due to different preprocessing routines 
used (in particular, Baggio and colleagues employed no ocular correction algorithm, Pijnacker 
and colleagues employed a regression-based algorithm, and in the present study ICA-based 
correction was used). It should also be noted that the authors of those studies do not propose that 
the difference in the topographies of the two effects necessarily imply functional differences 
between re-computing discourse models and revising discursive inferences. 
 
2.5. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF ERP EXPERIMENTS 
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The three experiments reported here examined the neural responses to pragmatic 
violations while controlling for lexico-semantic factors and allowing for the detection effects at 
the moment the critical quantifier is encountered. Perhaps most importantly, different ERP 
patterns were observed for pragmatic and semantic violations: whereas lexico-semantic 
violations elicited an N400 and quantificational semantic violations elicited different effects in 
each experiment, pragmatic violations consistently elicited sustained negative components. 
Pragmatic violations were also the only conditions to elicit sustained negativities in these 
experiments. The results suggest that 1) the pragmatic reading of the quantifier is used rapidly 
during online processing and must be inhibited effortfully if it is inconsistent with the context; 
and 2) pragmatic inconsistency is processed differently than semantic inconsistency, at least in 
the context tested here. Experiment 2 also examined the interaction between pragmatic and 
lexico-semantic processing and found that pragmatic reanalysis did not modulate lexico-semantic 
processing downstream, suggesting that pragmatic and lexico-semantic aspects of meaning were 
processed independently. Below, each of these findings is discussed in turn. 
 
2.5.1. The sustained negativity 
At the quantifier position, in all experiments a sustained negativity was elicited by 
quantifiers that are pragmatically inconsistent with a context. This effect seems to be related to 
pragmatic processing in particular, as it was not elicited by quantifiers that were semantically 
inconsistent with a context. The effect could not be due only to processes related to seeing or 
hearing an unexpected word, since semantically inconsistent quantifiers and lexico-semantically 
inconsistent objects elicited qualitatively different effects even though they were also unexpected. 
The effect could also could not be due to revising expectations about what aspect of the picture 
will be pointed out later in the sentence, since this sort of revision is also possible in the 
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semantically inconsistent all of sentences but did not elicit a sustained negativity. It is not likely 
to be due to generating or retrieving the pragmatic interpretation of the quantifier, since that 
process may have already been initiated during verbal pre-coding when the participant viewed 
each picture (Huang et al., 2010; Hartshorne & Snedeker, submitted). Rather, the sustained 
negativity is more likely to be related to effortful pragmatic reanalysis: specifically, inhibiting 
the pragmatic reading of some of and retrieving the semantic reading. This interpretation is 
consistent with several recent studies (Baggio et al., 2008; Pijnacker et al., 2011) that have 
observed sustained negativities related to revising discourse models or discourse-based 
inferences. Further support for this interpretation comes from a study by Leuthold and colleagues 
(2012), who observed a sustained right-posterior negativity (and corresponding left-frontal 
positivity) in response to emotion words that were incongruent with a situation previously 
described (e.g., "The golf pro was distraught", after a context suggesting that the golf pro had a 
good chance to win a tournament). They speculated that this negativity may be due to 
suppressing the expected emotion words. It is possible that such an operation also involves 
reconsideration of the character's point of view, which is a hallmark of Gricean pragmatic 
processing. While the linguistic manipulation in the present study is different than those 
discussed above, pragmatic violations in the present study would have led participants to 
reanalyze the implicature-based meaning of some, similar to Pijnacker et al. (2011), and to 
re-consider the point of view of another speaker or character, as in Leuthold et al. (2012). It is 
also possible that re-interpreting the quantifier requires constructing new mental models of the 
possible meanings of the quantified phrase in order to find a mental model that is consistent with 
the picture—i.e., a model in which some, and in fact all, of the girls are sitting on blankets. (For 
a review of mental models theory, see Nicolle, 2003). 
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It should be noted that an alternate strategy participants could employ to interpret 
sentences with inconsistent quantifiers is to make no attempt to evaluate the meaning and 
reference of the quantifier whatsoever until more information becomes available later in the 
sentence. Recall that semantic violations consisted of Some-type pictures (e.g., several girls 
sitting on blankets and the rest sitting on chairs) followed by sentences beginning "In the picture, 
all…". Such a sentence could turn out to be correct (e.g., "…all the girls are wearing bathing 
suits"), and thus it is possible that participants waited until they had more information before 
attempting to further evaluate the consistency between the sentence and the picture. Crucially, 
however, pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers could also be followed by sentences that turn out 
to be correct (e.g., an All-type picture could be followed by "…some of the girls are happy"). If 
participants employed such a processing strategy, one might expect effects to appear at the verb 
or object position, where the semantically incorrect sentences become unambiguously incorrect 
(e.g., at "…all the girls are sitting on…" or "…some of the girls are sitting on…", it becomes 
impossible to analyze the sentence as "…all the girls are wearing bathing suits" or "…some of 
the girls are happy"). Because the structure of the verbs used in the present study varied (verbs 
were presented simultaneously with aspect markers that preceded or followed them and differed 
in length and other properties) as did the point where the violation becomes unambiguous, such 
an analysis was not feasible with the present data, although the sustained negativity elicited by 
objects following pragmatic inconsistencies in Experiment 2 may be evidence for this sort of 
processing. Nevertheless, participants showed different ERP responses to the two types of 
inconsistency, even though this delayed interpretation strategy is available for both. Only the 
pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers can be reconciled with the context by reanalyzing the 
meaning of the quantifier (cancelling the implicature and retrieving the semantic meaning), and 
accordingly only the pragmatically inconsistent quantifiers showed the sustained negativity. 
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An alternative account of the sustained negativity observed in the present study is that it 
reflects truth-verificational processes initiated by the inconsistency between the quantifier and 
the context. Wiswede and colleagues (in press) found a late negativity elicited by nouns that 
make sentences untrue (e.g., "Africa is a planet"), but this negativity only occurred for 
participants who were performing a truth-value judgment task, not those who were performing a 
memory task. One might argue that pragmatically inconsistent some of in the present study 
initiated this truth-verificational process, whereas semantically inconsistent all of did not since 
its interpretation could be delayed until later in the sentence. Other aspects of the results, 
however, speak against this interpretation. In particular, no late negativity was elicited by objects 
that mismatched only the lexico-semantic content of the picture (e.g., the pure picture-sentence 
mismatch condition in Experiment 2, which only elicited an N400, as did the lexico-semantically 
mismatched objects in the Experiment 1 fillers in an exploratory analysis). Such words also 
introduce falsehood into the sentence, and are more similar to the words that elicited the late 
negativity in Wiswede and colleagues' (in press) study. Nevertheless, the sustained negativity in 
the present study only occurred in conditions where the inconsistency was related to pragmatic 
meaning. 
The fact that the responses to the pragmatic condition were characterized by early 
recognition of the inconsistency and revision of the inference has implications for both the theory 
of scalar implicature processing and for the cognitive neuroscience of language; these 
implications are discussed below. 
 
2.5.2. The costs of scalar implicature processing 
 The present set of experiments was not designed to test the time course and processing 
costs of realizing a pragmatic meaning (the processing cost question will be addressed in the next 
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chapter), but it does provide evidence about the time course and costs of adjudicating between 
the semantic and pragmatic readings. As noted above, the sustained negativity effect at the 
quantifier position for conditions in which the pragmatic reading of the quantifier was 
inconsistent with the context suggests that suppressing that aspect of meaning and accessing the 
semantic aspect was costly and effortful. The fact that this effect is strongest in participants who 
are poor at distinguishing between the semantic and pragmatic interpretations (Experiment 3; see 
Figure 14) is consistent with this interpretation: retrieving the semantic reading may require 
more effort for these participants, making the sustained negativity more prominent. In line with 
this account, Feeney and colleagues (2004), based on findings from a speeded verification task, 
also concluded that participants reading underinformative instances of some needed to suppress 
the pragmatic meaning and that this suppression is cognitively taxing. Garrett & Harnish (2007) 
provide evidence from another pragmatic phenomenon, standardization implicitures (e.g., "I've 
had breakfast" is interpreted as "I've had breakfast today"), that the pragmatically enriched 
reading is computed by default and the semantic reading can only be retrieved with 
effort—although it is not necessarily the case that standardization-based implicitures are 
processed via the same mechanisms as scalar implicatures (see also Bezuidenhout & Cutting, 
2002). On the other hand, a recent study in Mandarin suggests that the retrieval of the literal 
meanings of conventionalized lexical metaphors are not delayed relative to their metaphorical 
meanings (Lu & Zhang, 2012), raising the interesting possibility that pragmatic inferencing (at 
least scalar inference triggered by quantifiers) unfolds in a different manner than metaphor 
comprehension. 
 In sum, the results of the present study suggest that accessing the semantic reading of a 
scalar quantifier takes extra cognitive effort, eliciting a sustained negativity in the ERP. This is 
easy to reconcile with default models of scalar implicature processing (Levinson, 2000), which 
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assume that inferences are realized quickly and with little regard for whether the enriched 
pragmatic meaning makes the sentence more informative, and that these inferences can be 
subsequently cancelled. It does not, however, preclude context-driven (Noveck & Sperber, 2007) 
or constraint-based models (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2011), since the possibility of verbal 
pre-encoding of the stimuli should have made the pragmatic reading easy to generate rapidly, 
and these models do not necessarily predict inhibition of pragmatic meaning to be effortless. 
Further study of the processing costs associated with both scalar inference realization and scalar 
inference reanalysis is needed to elucidate which cognitive resources are used for pragmatic 
processing and allow these models to become more explicit about this issue. 
 
2.5.3. Neural correlates of different aspects of meaning processing 
Much work on the processing of meaning in the brain has focused on the N400 ERP 
component and its sensitivity to manipulations of real-world plausibility (e.g., sentences such as 
"She spread her bread with socks"). Substantially fewer studies have examined how the brain 
processes compositional aspects of meaning (for reviews see Pylkkänen et al., 2011; Panizza, 
2012) and how context and discourse interact with meaning (see Van Berkum, 2009). Scalar 
implicatures offer a promising test case for these issues, given that they represent an aspect of 
meaning that is composed in concert with semantic meaning and that the generation of scalar 
implicatures is strongly affected by context and expectations about speakers. 
 The present study offers converging evidence with other emerging work in 
neurosemantics suggesting that the mechanisms by which the brain composes meaning may not 
be the same as those by which it accesses words from the lexicon, notices associations between 
words, or evaluates real-world plausibility (i.e., several of the processes reflected by the N400). 
Recent investigations suggest that the patterns of brain activation elicited by violations of 
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real-world plausibility are not the same as those elicited by linguistically-motivated abstract 
operations such as semantic composition (Pylkkänen et al., 2011), licensing of negative polarity 
items (Steinhauer et al., 2010; Panizza, 2012) and semantic subcategorization (Kuperberg et al., 
2000). In the present experiments it was found that quantifiers which were pragmatically 
inconsistent with a context elicited a qualitatively different ERP response than quantifiers which 
were semantically inconsistent, suggesting that they were processed by different mechanisms. It 
was also found that costly pragmatic reanalysis of a quantifier’s meaning did not modulate 
concurrent processing of lexico-semantic errors, providing further evidence that these two 
aspects of meaning are processed independently. It should be noted, however, that while the 
qualitative differences in ERP responses found in the present study are consistent with distinct 
mechanisms of pragmatic and semantic meaning composition, it is difficult to infer the 
underlying sources of the ERP pattern. For this reason, localizing the neural generators of these 
effects using methods with high spatial resolution would be a valuable avenue for further 
research, and could provide additional evidence for a dissociation of pragmatic and 
combinatorial semantic meaning composition. 
 
2.5.4. Limitations and open questions 
 
2.5.4.1. The baseline for comparison 
In the present study, ERP responses to a quantifier that made a sentence pragmatically 
inconsistent with its context were compared against responses to a quantifier that made a 
sentence semantically inconsistent with its context. The goal of this manipulation was to isolate 
correlates of the processing of pragmatic inconsistency, while subtracting out other factors (such 
as the mismatch between the expected lexical item and the perceived one). Nonetheless, these 
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two types of inconsistencies also differ in ways other than the presence or absence of a pragmatic 
interpretation. Particularly, even though all of and some of are often considered to belong to the 
same class of quantifiers (logical quantifiers; see, e.g., Morgan et al., 2011), the processes 
involved in verifying the meanings of at least one of, not all of, an all of may be different (see, 
e.g., Bott et al., 2012). To verify whether "at least one of the girls is sitting on blankets" (the 
semantic interpretation of "some of the girls are sitting on blankets") is true, the participant only 
needs to find one instance of set intersection (i.e., one entity in the context that is a girl and is 
sitting on a blanket). Verifying whether "not all of the girls are sitting on blankets" (the 
pragmatic interpretation of "some of the girls are sitting on blankets") is true (or failing to verify 
whether "all of the girls are sitting on blankets is true) requires a similar procedure, except that in 
this case the participant only needs to find one entity in the context that is a girl and is not sitting 
on a blanket. In either of these cases, once the participant finds one entity that meets the 
necessary criteria, she can in theory verify the meaning and stop examining entities (although it 
is an empirical question whether comprehenders actually do this in natural language). On the 
other hand, to verify whether "all of the girls are sitting on blankets" is true (or fail to verify "not 
all of the girls are sitting on blankets"), the participant must check every girl in the context to 
make sure she is sitting on a blanket.
20
 Presumably the latter case, which corresponds to the 
underinformative sentences and the correct all of sentences, requires slightly more processing 
than the former cases, which correspond to the correct some of and the semantically incorrect 
                                                 
 
20
 There may be exceptions to this; Newstead (1988), for example, reviews experimental evidence showing that the 
meaning of all of may be fuzzy, particularly in the case of large sets—so that comprehenders may except all of when 
it refers to, for example, 998 entities out of a set of 1000. This suggests that there may be instances in which 
comprehenders verifying all of do not necessarily check every entity in the context, but just check until the number 
of entities that meet their criteria reaches some threshold which may be close to, but slightly below, the total number 
of entities in the context. This is unlikely to be the case in the present experiment, where the number of entities in 
each context is small enough to fall within the subitizing range (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2011). 
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sentences. The present experiments cannot yet rule out the possibility that these different 
quantifiers involve different types of verification strategies and that these different strategies 
yield different ERP signatures.  
In short, then, there are potential differences across conditions in the present study that 
are due to quantification rather than to scalar implicature, and it is important to be cognizant of 
these differences. A valuable direction for future research in this area of inquiry would be to 
compare neural responses to pragmatic violations against other sorts of semantic violations. For 
instance, responses to pragmatically inconsistent some of in the context of an All-type picture 
could be compared to responses to different quantifiers for which the upper bound is part of the 
quantifier's inherent meaning, rather than a bound added through an enrichment process. This is 
the case, for example, for the complex quantifier only some, the upper bound of which is not 
defeasible (that is to say, unlike with some, it is not possible to say "Only some of the X are Y; in 
fact, all of the X are Y" without contradicting oneself. Only some is commonly used as a control 
quantifier in experiments on scalar implicature (see, e.g., Breheny et al., 2006; Bott et al., 2012), 
although a potential concern with this method is that the presence of only may induce additional 
semantic composition operations not invoked by bare some. Another option would be to test a 
bare quantifier with a similar lower-bounded meaning as some of and with an inherent rather 
than an inferred upper bound. In Mandarin, for example, the quantifier shǎoshù –de (少数的, 
"the smaller portion of" or "less than half of") may have a stronger upper-bounded meaning than 
yǒu –de (有的, "some of") and its upper-bounded meaning may be less defeasible (Jiayu Zhan, 
unpublished data). It should be noted, however, that the fact that participants are less tolerant of 
"underinformative" instances of this quantifier does not necessarily mean its upper-bounded 
meaning is part of the word's inherent semantics rather than an inference-based meaning (given 
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that tolerance varies even among "pragmatic" scalars, see Doran et al., 2009), and currently there 
is not sufficient theoretical or empirical evidence to determine whether the upper bound of 
shǎoshù –de is qualitatively different than that of yǒu –de. 
 
2.5.4.2. Does the sustained negativity reflect pragmatics or semantics? 
An additional question left open in the present study is whether the operations implicated 
here reflect inferential pragmatic processing, or a different kind of semantic processing. While I 
have been referring to some of in the context of an All-type picture as "pragmatically" 
inconsistent, for ease of exposition, the grammatical account of scalar inference holds that the 
not all interpretation of the quantifier results from a semantic inference rather than a pragmatic 
one (see Section 1.1). On the basis of the present studies it is not possible to distinguish these 
two accounts. The fact that different ERP patterns were observed for "pragmatically" 
inconsistent some of and "semantically" inconsistent all of does not necessarily mean that the 
former process was pragmatic and the latter semantic; the difference in ERPs could be due to 
other factors, such as the availability of an alternate interpretation in the scalar implicature case 
but not in the all of case. In short, the mere presence of different brain responses to the different 
inconsistencies is not sufficient evidence to rule out the possibility that these reflect different 
types of semantic processing, rather than pragmatic versus semantic processing.  
Nonetheless, from the present studies one can conclude that information due to scalar 
inference is processed differently than information inherent to the word's meaning. Above it was 
proposed that the difference was related to the ability to inhibit or revise the inference-based 
meaning. The specific nature of the inference through which this distinct meaning is realized, 
however, remains an open question for future research. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF CONTEXT AND PROCESSING LOAD IN SCALAR 
INFERENCING 
3.1. INTRODUCTION21 
The ERP studies reported in the previous chapter showed evidence that violations based 
on the upper-bounded, "pragmatic" meaning of a scalar quantifier are processed differently than 
violations based on the lower-bounded, "semantic" meaning of a scalar quantifier. This finding 
suggests that these different aspects of meaning are represented differently. However, those 
experiments do not show how the upper-bounded meaning is realized in the first place, as they 
tested quantifiers that mismatched with already-generated "all" or "some" representation of a 
picture. The goal of the experiments reported in this chapter, then, is to investigate how scalar 
inferences are actually realized. Rather than measuring responses to violations, these 
experiments adopt a violation-free design in which scalars (again the quantifier some of) are 
embedded in either contexts that encourage an inference or contexts that do not. Specifically, the 
experiments aim to test whether the realization of a scalar inference evokes a processing cost, an 
issue which is a point of fundamental disagreement among models of scalar inference processing. 
Background on this research question is presented in the following section.  
 
3.2. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC INVESTIGATIONS OF SCALAR INFERENCE REALIZATION 
Section 1.1 presented several competing accounts of scalar implicature processing, the 
most prominent among these being the classes of default accounts and context-driven accounts. 
As described there, these accounts make different predictions about the speed, 
                                                 
 
21
 Portions of this chapter are adapted from Politzer-Ahles & Fiorentino (in press) and Politzer-Ahles & Fiorentino 
(forthcoming). 
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context-dependency, and processing cost of inferencing. Particularly, traditional default accounts 
predict that inferences are realized immediately, in all contexts and without processing cost. 
Traditional context-driven accounts, on the other hand, predict that inferences are realized at a 
delay, only in certain contexts, and that the process is costly. Below, psycholinguistic studies 
testing each of these three predictions are reviewed. (It will be seen that these predictions are not 
wholly independent—that is to say, many of the studies reviewed below examine two or three of 
these predictions at once.) 
 
3.2.1. Speed of scalar inferencing 
 Many recent studies of scalar inference processing have examined the speed at which 
inference-based meanings (i.e. not all) are realized using the visual world eye-tracking paradigm 
or its variant, the look-and-listen eye-tracking paradigm. Such experiments examine whether 
participants can use the inference-based meaning of a quantifier to rapidly restrict its possible 
reference. For example, in the visual world paradigm used for these studies (Huang & Snedeker, 
2009, 2011; Panizza et al., 2011; Grodner et al., 2010; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2010), participants 
may see an array of pictures including girls and boys, and socks and soccer balls. One girl is 
holding all of the soccer balls present in the array, and another holding some but not all of the 
socks present in the array. The participant hears a sentence such as "Click on the girl who has 
some of the socks in the picture", and eye fixations are measured to test whether the participant 
looks preferentially to the appropriate referent rapidly—if preferential looking to the appropriate 
target emerges before the disambiguating noun socks is heard, and as rapidly as preferential 
looking triggered by semantically unambiguous quantifiers like all or numbers like two or three, 
this would be evidence that the participant rapidly realized the scalar inference (some of = not all 
of) and used it to establish appropriate reference. Several studies have indeed found this pattern 
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(Grodner et al., 2010; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2010), whereas others have instead found that the 
emergence of the inference-based interpretation was delayed relative to semantic interpretations 
(Huang & Snedeker, 2011, 2009; Panizza et al., 2011). Numerous design differences between the 
studies may contribute to the difference in results. In particular, the presence of numerals in the 
latter experiments but not the former ones could account for the difference, in the lack of other 
quantifiers in the studies that observed rapid inferencing may have allowed participants to 
establish a one-to-one relationship between quantifiers and referents and "pre-encode" each 
referent as corresponding to one quantifier or the other (Huang et al., 2010; Hartshorne & 
Snedeker, submitted). 
Breheny, Ferguson, and Katsos (in press) have questioned the results of experiments 
using this paradigm, noting that according to some theories, scalar inferences within definite 
descriptions (the girl that has some of the…) are thought to be either unavailable or at least 
derived through different steps than typical scalar inferences. In their experiment, participants 
watch a video of someone pouring two different types of water (water with orange slices versus 
water with lime slices) into different bowls, such that all of one type of water (e.g., the water 
with limes) and only some of the other type (the water with oranges) is poured out. Participants 
then hear verbal descriptions of the video, in which the quantifiers are not embedded in definite 
descriptions, e.g. "The man poured some of the water with oranges into bowl A…". Filler items 
included quantifiers other than some of and all of (e.g., quantifiers such as both of and a few of), 
but not numerals. In this study participants looked to the correct bowl about as quickly after 
some of as they did after all of, suggesting that the inference was computed rapidly.  
In a parallel line of research, participants have been instructed to make True/False 
judgments as quickly as possible, in response to underinformative statements such as "Some 
elephants are mammals" that have a semantic interpretation that is true and a pragmatic 
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interpretation that is false (Noveck & Posada, 2003; Bott et al., 2004; Feeney et al., 2004; 
Chevallier et al., 2008; Bott et al., 2012). Participants are often shown to take longer to verify the 
quantifier's pragmatic interpretation (i.e., to respond "false" after realizing that it is not the case 
that not all elephants are mammals) than the semantic interpretation (i.e., to respond true after 
realizing that there are elephants that are mammals). While many of these experiments do not 
distinguish between the amount of time taken to realize the inference and the amount of time 
taken to confirm or disconfirm whether the sentence is true under that interpretation, the study by 
Bott and colleagues (2012) does suggest that realizing the inference itself takes time. Using a 
speed-accuracy tradeoff paradigm, they found that participants took longer to respond to some 
sentences (e.g. "Some elephants are mammals") than to only some sentences (e.g., "Only some 
elephants are mammals") when they were asked to interpret some as meaning not all, but did not 
take longer to respond to these sentences than to at least some sentences (e.g. "At least some 
elephants are mammals") when they were asked to interpret some as meaning at least one. The 
authors suggest that this indicates the upper-bounded interpretation of the quantifier is realized 
differently than the lower-bounded interpretation (consistent with the Gricean notion that the 
lower-bounded interpretation is inherent and semantic, whereas the upper-bounded interpretation 
is pragmatically added), and that realizing the upper-bounded interpretation takes additional time. 
On the other hand, Feeney and colleagues (2004) found a different pattern of results from the 
previous speeded verification studies; these authors found that participants took longer to make 
logical responses (i.e., based on the quantifier's lower-bounded semantic interpretation) than 
pragmatic responses (based on the quantifier's upper-bounded pragmatic interpretation). 
 In sum, evidence regarding the speed at which scalar inferences are realized remains 
mixed. The results of some studies suggest that inferences are realized at a delay, while others 
suggest that inferences are realized just as rapidly as semantic meanings. 
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3.2.2. Context-sensitivity of scalar inferencing 
Many studies have investigated whether certain aspects of the context influence the 
ultimate outcome of scalar inferencing, i.e., whether a sentence is judged to have a pragmatic or 
a semantic reading based on the authors' introspection (e.g. Levinson, 2000; Chierchia, 2004, 
among others) or on experimental evidence (e.g. Geurts & Pouscoulous, 2009; Foppolo, 2007, 
among others). Some contextual factors that influence the ultimate realization of scalar 
inferences include the presence or absence of lexical alternatives in the context whether the 
quantifier is partitive (some of) or bare (some), whether the scalar expression has contrastive 
stress, whether some of is prosodically reduced into summa, and the syntactic position that the 
scalar expression occupies (see Section 1.1). Such investigations, while forming an important 
part of our understanding of the nature of scalar implicature, are not necessarily informative on 
the matter of the psychological realization of scalar inferences, as all the competing 
psychological models can account for offline judgments. As described above, context-driven 
models in general assume that the inference is simply not realized in such cases, and default 
models assume that it is realized but then cancelled through context-updating mechanisms (see 
Levinson, 2000, for a description of this process). Thus, this section will focus on experimental 
evidence probing whether context influences the initial realization of inferences. 
The realization of the pragmatic interpretation of a quantifier can influence expectations 
about upcoming words in a sentence (Nieuwland et al., 2010; Hunt et al., 2013). This fact has 
been used to examine whether or not pragmatic meanings are realized in certain contexts and not 
others. Breheny, Katsos, and Williams (2006), examined reading times to the Greek equivalent 
of the rest in contexts that bias readers towards making the inference ("upper-bound" contexts, 
where what is relevant to the discourse is whether not all is true, and thus some of is likely to be 
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interpreted as not all of) and in contexts that do not ("lower-bound" contexts, where what is 
relevant is whether any is true, and thus some of is unlikely to be interpreted as not all); see the 
examples in (5), translated from Greek. 
5) a. Upper-bound: Mary asked John whether he intended to host all of his relatives in his 
tiny apartment. John replied that he intended to host some of his relatives. The rest 
would stay in a nearby hotel. 
 b. Lower-bound: Mary was surprised to see John cleaning his apartment and she asked 
the reason why. John told her that he intended to host some of his relatives. The rest 
would stay in a nearby hotel. 
The rest was read more quickly in upper-bound contexts, which encourage the realization of the 
inference, than in lower-bound contexts, which do not. The authors argue that the rest is more 
strongly expected and easier to integrate into the discourse when some of has been interpreted as 
meaning not all of (because this interpretation makes the reader aware that there is another subset 
of relatives in the discourse that has not been mentioned yet), whereas it is less strongly expected 
and more difficult to integrate when some of has not been interpreted in this way. Thus, the faster 
reading times in the upper-bound (inference-supporting) context indicate that the pragmatic 
interpretation had been realized online in that context and not in the irrelevant 
(inference-nonsupporting) context. (This study also examined whether context affected reading 
times at the quantifier itself; those results will be discussed in the next section.) 
In a similar study, Hartshorne and Snedeker (submitted) also manipulated the number of 
words intervening between some of and the rest (and, by extension, the amount of time readers 
had to realize the pragmatic meaning), and found that the pragmatic meaning was realized in 
time to facilitate reading of the rest only when there was intervening lexical material between the 
quantifier phrase and the rest. This finding suggests that realizing the scalar inference is not just 
context-sensitive but also takes extra processing time—although it should be noted that the 
difference in results between the experiment with intervening material and the experiment 
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without intervening material could be due to differences in the syntactic structure of the stimuli 
rather than differences in the amount of time participants had available to realize the inference. 
Additional evidence regarding context-sensitivity derives from visual-world eye-tracking 
studies. Whereas the studies described above tested the sensitivity of scalar inferencing to local 
information structure (relevance of not all to the discourse: Breheny et al., 2006) and semantic 
structure (entailment polarity of the environment in which the quantifier is embedded: 
Hartshorne & Snedeker, submitted), preliminary evidence from Huang, Hahn, and Snedeker 
(2010) suggests that inferencing is also sensitive to global experimental context. These authors 
performed a visual world eye-tracking study similar to those described in the previous section, 
and between participants manipulated the presence of numbers in the filler items. For some 
participants, all items in the experiment used quantifiers (some of or all of), making the contrast 
between some of and all of more salient; for others, fillers used numbers (two of or three of), 
which should both reduce the salience of the contrast between some of and all of, and provide 
more felicitous lexical alternatives for referring to targets (that is to say, participants should be 
slower to interpret "the girl who is holding some of the balls" as referring to a girl holding two 
out of three of the balls, because presumably it would be more felicitous to refer to this target 
using a numeral). They found that looks to the target were earlier in the experimental context 
with only quantifiers than in the experimental context with both quantifiers and numbers, 
suggesting that the overall experimental context influenced the speed with which scalar 
inferences were realized. 
Another aspect of context shown to influence the realization of scalar inferences is the 
epistemic state of the speaker. As described in Section 1.1, the pragmatic account of scalar 
inferencing assumes that inferences are realized because the hearer expects the speaker to be as 
informative as possible, and infers that if the speaker knew all of to be true then the speaker 
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would have said all of rather than some of. (Contrast this account with the grammatical account 
of Chierchia and colleagues, 2012, which takes scalar inferencing to be a semantic process 
triggered by linguistic structure.) Crucially, in Gricean reasoning, the assumption that the 
speaker knows the stronger quantifier to have not been true is a necessary (but not sufficient) step 
in deriving the scalar inference. Bergen and Grodner (2012) have shown that inferences are less 
likely to be derived online when a scalar term is uttered by a speaker who is not fully informed. 
Using a self-paced reading design similar to that of Breheny and colleagues (2006), they found 
that reading times for the rest were faster in context where the implicit speaker of the sentences 
was assumed to have full knowledge of the referent set ("I meticulously compiled the investment 
report. Some of the real estate investments had lost money. The rest…") than in those where the 
implicit speaker had only partial knowledge ("I skimmed the investment report. Some of the real 
estate investments had lost money. The rest…"). Such results suggest that the online realization 
of scalar inferences is sensitive to speaker knowledge as well as to linguistic context. Converging 
results have been observed by Breheny, Ferguson, and Katsos (in press) who tested 
particularized conversational implicatures, rather than scalar implicatures, using a 
look-and-listen task, and again found that the realization of the inference was faster in situations 
where the speaker had full knowledge of the situation. 
 
3.2.3. Processing cost of scalar inferencing  
 The issue of whether realizing the pragmatic meaning entails processing cost is also 
unresolved. De Neys and Schaeken (2007; see also Dieussaert et al., 2011) provide some 
evidence that it does: when judging underinformative sentences that were true if the quantifier 
was interpreted semantically and false if it was interpreted pragmatically (e.g. "Some oaks are 
trees"), participants were less likely to interpret the quantifier pragmatically if they were engaged 
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in a concurrent dot memory task which burdened their executive processing resources. Studies 
using the speed-accuracy trade-off paradigm (Chevallier et al., 2008; Bott et al., 2012) have 
shown that participants are more likely to interpret a quantifier pragmatically when given more 
time to respond, suggesting that limiting their time to respond makes then unable to access the 
required processing resources in time. A limitation of studies investigating overt judgments is the 
difficulty of determining whether what is affected (by processing time or by concurrent 
processing load) is specifically inference generation, or other strategies related to evaluation and 
decision-making necessary for the overt response (see Huang & Snedeker, 2009; see also, 
however, Bott et al., 2012, for an attempt to isolate these components in an overt judgment 
experiment). 
On the other hand, attempts to directly measure processing costs evoked by scalar 
inferencing have obtained mixed results. The studies described above investigating context 
effects on the realization of inferencing (Breheny et al., 2006; Bergen & Grodner, 2012; 
Hartshorne & Snedeker, submitted), in addition to testing reading times at the rest as an indicator 
of whether an inference was realized or not, also tested whether scalar terms elicit longer reading 
times in contexts where an inference is realized. For instance, Breheny and colleagues (2006) 
examined reading times to the Greek equivalent of some of in an upper-bounded context which 
encourages the comprehender to realize the inference, and in a lower-bounded context which 
does not (English translations of sample stimuli from their study are repeated in (6)). They 
hypothesized that if the realization of an inference requires processing effort, then the quantifier 
would be read more slowly in the upper-bound context; on the other hand, if the realization of 
the inference is automatic but the cancellation of the inference requires processing effort, then 
the quantifier would be read more slowly in the lower-bound context. 
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6) a. Upper-bound: Mary asked John whether he intended to host all of his relatives in his 
tiny apartment. John replied that he intended to host some of his relatives. The rest 
would stay in a nearby hotel. 
 b. Lower-bound: Mary was surprised to see John cleaning his apartment and she asked 
the reason why. John told her that he intended to host some of his relatives. The rest 
would stay in a nearby hotel. 
 
This study found longer reading times on the quantified phrase in inference-supporting contexts, 
suggesting that the realization of the inference was effortful. The contexts differed in more ways, 
however, than just whether they encouraged a scalar inference. In particular, the upper-bound 
context (which was meant to facilitate inferencing) mentioned the noun (his relatives) which was 
then repeated in the quantified phrase (e.g., "Mary asked John whether he intended to host all of 
his relatives in his tiny apartment. John said that he intended to host some of his relatives"), 
whereas the lower-bound context did not mention the noun (e.g., "Mary asked John why he was 
cleaning his apartment. John said that he intended to host some of his relatives"). Thus, the 
increased reading times could be due to the infelicity of repeating the noun (rather than using a 
pronoun) in that context. Indeed, in Hartshorne and Snedeker's (submitted) experiment and an 
eye-tracking experiment by Lewis and Phillips (2011), both using a similar design but avoiding 
this repeated noun effect, no difference was observed at the quantified phrase, even though the 
inference was realized by the time the rest was read.  
A recent experiment by Bergen and Grodner (2012), on the other hand, included no 
repeated noun penalty or other confounding differences between contexts and yet found a 
slowdown at the quantifier itself, replicating the effect that Breheny and colleagues (2006) 
observed at the quantifier + noun phrase. This study used a different context manipulation: rather 
than manipulating the boundedness of the information-structural constraints in the context (as in 
Breheny et al., 2006, and Lewis & Phillips, 2011) or the entailment polarity of the environment 
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in which the quantifier is embedded (as in Hartshorne & Snedeker, submitted), the study by 
Bergen and Grodner (2012) manipulated the knowledge of the implicit speaker. In the 
inference-supporting context, the implicit speaker had full knowledge of the situation (e.g., "I 
meticulously compiled the investment report; some of the real estate investments lost money"), 
whereas in the inference-nonsupporting context the speaker only had partial knowledge of the 
situation (e.g., "I skimmed the investment report; some of the real estate investments lost 
money"). 
In sum, although the results of overt judgments suggest that scalar inferencing is at least 
sensitive to the availability of processing resources, it is currently unclear whether the realization 
of a scalar inference evokes a directly measurable processing cost when it does occur. It should 
be noted that the contexts used to bias participants towards or against realizing an inference 
differ across these studies. Breheny and colleagues (2006) and Lewis and Phillips (2011) 
manipulated information structure (comparing upper-bound versus lower-bound contexts); 
Hartshorne and Snedeker (submitted) manipulated the entailment polarity of the semantic 
environment (comparing upwards entailing versus downwards entailing [conditional] 
environments), and Bergen and Grodner (2012) manipulated the epistemic state of the implicit 
speaker. These experiments also differed in the composition of their fillers, which could 
influence the extent to which participants are able to expect some of and the rest in the critical 
regions: fillers in Breheny et al. (2006), and fillers in Bergen & Grodner (2012) included (among 
other fillers) passages in which the inference is cancelled ("…some of the real estate investments 
lost money; in fact, they all did"). Only Hartshorne and Snedeker (submitted) included fillers 
specifically chosen to balance the number of items with and without the rest mentioned. 
A different kind of evidence for processing costs may be found in the visual world 
eye-tracking study by Panizza and colleagues (2011). These authors found no evidence for rapid 
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inferences—that is to say, looks to target remained at chance until well after the quantifier in 
their study, and participants only managed to preferentially fixate the target after hearing the 
disambiguating noun (e.g. "socks" or "soccer balls"). The authors also found that when some of 
was interpreted pragmatically, participants took longer to fixate on the target after hearing the 
disambiguating noun, compared to their performance in a context in which some of was unlikely 
to be interpreted pragmatically (a downward entailing semantic environment, in which the 
quantifier was embedded within an if-then statement: "If a boy has some of the paperclips, then 
point to him"). They argue that this may be evidence that realizing the scalar implicature 
occupied the participants' processing resources and prevented them from immediately using the 
lexical disambiguation information. This is, however, a post-hoc account based on an unexpected 
pattern of data which their experiment was not designed to test, motivating additional research to 
further explore potential processing costs.  
In contrast to the above findings, several studies have suggested that it is the 
upper-bounded semantic meaning, rather than the lower-bounded pragmatic meaning, that 
requires extra effort. Feeney and colleagues (2004) found that, when reading underinformative 
sentences which were true when the quantifier was interpreted semantically but false when it was 
interpreted pragmatically, participants with higher working memory span were more likely to 
judge the sentences semantically (i.e., as "true"); this suggests that inhibiting the pragmatic 
interpretation and retrieving the semantic interpretation requires extra effort. Garrett & Harnish 
(2007), examining another type of pragmatic meaning (standardization implicitures) found that 
sentences were read more slowly in a context that cancels the implicature than in one that 
enables it, suggesting that the cancellation of the pragmatic interpretation and retrieval of the 
semantic interpretation is costly. The event-related potential (ERP) studies reported in the 
previous chapter are also consistent with this account; I have interpreted the sustained negativity 
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elicited during the processing of underinformative quantifiers as an index of extra processing 
difficulty associated with retrieving the dispreferred semantic reading of the quantifier. The ERP 
studies, then, seem to suggest that it is the realization of the lower-bounded semantic reading, 
rather than the upper-bounded pragmatic reading, that is effortful. It should be noted, however, 
that the ERP studies probed responses to a quantifier that was presented after a picture was 
already viewed and encoded in memory; thus, retrieval of the semantic reading of the quantifier 
may have been difficult because the preferred pragmatic reading was already expected before the 
sentence was seen or heard. In the previous studies reviewed, on the other hand, quantifiers were 
either presented without a context (as in the case of the verification-time experiments) or with a 
context that presumably did not particularly bias the participant towards expecting one quantifier 
or the other (in the case of the reading-time experiments). Thus, whereas the reading-time 
experiments aimed to more directly probe the generation of scalar inferences, the ERP studies 
reported in the previous chapter aimed to probe the revision and processing of the meaning of 
some of after a scalar inference had already been generated. 
 
3.2.4. Remaining questions 
While several studies have found evidence that the realization of scalar inferences may be 
delayed and context-sensitive (although these results, particularly regarding speed, have also 
been challenged), few experiments have successfully linked these issues to processing costs. The 
majority of experiments showing slowdowns or context sensitivity have failed to show 
corresponding processing costs (with the possible exceptions of the studies by Bergen and 
Grodner, 2012, and Bott and colleagues, 2012). The lack of evidence for processing cost in many 
of these paradigms poses a conundrum. According to context-driven theories of scalar 
implicature, the reason for pragmatic meaning to be realized at a delay is precisely that the 
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realization of this meaning is effortful and thus should be avoided when not necessary. Studies 
showing evidence for delays or context sensitivity in the realization of scalar inferences but 
failing to directly show increased processing cost raise the important question of where the 
slowdowns and context sensitivity come from. Is scalar inferencing generation associated with 
an increased processing cost that simply has not been detected yet in these paradigms? If so, 
what is the nature of this processing cost? The remainder of this chapter outlines two 
experiments that aim to address these questions. 
 
3.3. THE PRESENT EXPERIMENTS 
The experiments reported in this chapter test whether the realization of a scalar inference 
triggers an immediate processing cost that is directly measurable. As mentioned above, previous 
studies investigating this matter are equivocal. Breheny, Katsos, and Williams (2006) reported 
that scalar inferencing triggered a reading time slowdown, but this slowdown is likely to be due 
to irrelevant features of the materials used; Huang and Snedeker (submitted) found no such 
slowdown and Bergen and Grodner (2012) did. Furthermore, results of the ERP studies reported 
in the previous chapter are difficult to link directly to the question of whether inferencing is 
effortful, given that those studies tested how previously-realized inferences are processed and 
revised, rather than how such inferences are realized in the first place. 
The experiments reported here adopt the design of Breheny, Katsos, and Williams (2006), 
but use maximally similar upper- and lower-bound contexts. A full sample set of materials is 
shown in (7). In this study, the only difference between the contexts is whether the context 
sentence uses the quantifier all (7a,c; compare to the upper-bound example from Breheny et al., 
2006, in (5)) or any (7b,d).  
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7) a. Upper-bound some: Mary was preparing to throw a party for John's relatives. / She 
asked John whether all of them were staying in his apartment. / John said that / some 
of them / were. / He added / that / the rest / would be / staying / in a hotel. 
 b. Lower-bound some: Mary was preparing to throw a party for John's relatives. / She 
asked John whether any of them were staying in his apartment. / John said that / some 
of them / were. / He added / that / the rest / would be / staying / in a hotel. 
 c. Upper-bound only some: Mary was preparing to throw a party for John's relatives. / 
She asked John whether all of them were staying in his apartment. / John said that / 
only some of them / were. / He added / that / the rest / would be / staying / in a hotel. 
 d. Lower-bound only some: Mary was preparing to throw a party for John's relatives. / 
She asked John whether any of them were staying in his apartment. / John said that / 
only some of them / were. / He added / that / the rest / would be / staying / in a hotel. 
 
Including all in the context makes the upper bound relevant in the discourse and thus encourages 
the comprehender to interpret some of as not all of, whereas any makes the upper bound 
irrelevant and discourages the inference. Importantly, unlike in the study by Breheny and 
colleagues (2006), this is the only difference between contexts, so reading time differences at the 
quantifier and quantified phrase cannot be due to a repeated noun penalty. 
Furthermore, to verify whether the inference is ultimately realized, a sentence with "the 
rest" is included after the critical sentence with some of. If the reader has interpreted some of as 
meaning not all of (i.e., in the upper-bounded context of (7a), "Mary asked John whether all of 
them were staying in his apartment; John said that some of them were"), then she is aware of a 
remaining set of referents (e.g. "relatives") and thus more easily able to link "the rest" with a 
referent. On the other hand, this linking process should be more difficult when the reader has not 
interpreted some of as meaning not all of (i.e., in the upper-bounded context of (7b), "Mary asked 
John whether any of them were staying in his apartment; John said that some of them were"). 
Therefore, faster reading times at "the rest" in the upper-bound than the lower-bound context 
indicate that the inference has been realized in the upper-bound but not the lower-bound context. 
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"The rest" also provides a secondary test of the speed of inferencing. As mentioned above, 
Hartshorne and Snedeker (submitted), found faster reading times at "the rest" in the 
inference-supporting context when "the rest" appeared about 2500ms after the quantifier but not 
when it appeared about 900ms after; the authors took this as evidence that the inference takes 
over 900ms to realize. The current study will examine whether the inference is realized at a 
potentially different range of delays than those tested by Hartshorne and Snedeker (submitted), 
and whether the length of the delay affects the magnitude of the context effect. 
In the first experiment, participants read vignettes such as those described above, without 
any concurrent processing load. In the second experiment the same stimulus set was used, but 
participants were given a concurrent processing load: listening to (and trying to ignore) irrelevant 
background speech (Martin, Wogalter, & Forlano, 1988). Examining how participants' 
interpretations of scalar quantifiers change when their processing resources are being recruited 
by the concurrent task makes it possible to test the role of processing resources in scalar 
implicature and how processing resources and context interact. While previous offline studies 
have suggested that the availability of processing resources influences the extent to which scalar 
inferences are realized overtly (De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Dieussaert, 2011), no study has yet 
used online measures to examine whether processing load inferences the realization of scalar 
inferences during sentence processing. 
Finally, participants in both experiments completed a battery of cognitive assessments, 
including measures of working memory span, cognitive control, pragmatic ability, and logical 
strategies. Several studies have suggested that individual differences in the extent to which 
comprehenders realize scalar inferences may be related to individual differences in more general 
cognitive abilities such as working memory (Feeney et al., 2004; Dieussaert et al., 2011) or 
pragmatic ability (Nieuwland et al., 2010). Therefore, accounting for these individual differences 
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may provide a fuller picture of how scalar implicatures are processed across many individuals. 
Furthermore, investigating the relationship between scalar implicature and individual-level 
cognitive resources is important for its own sake, as it can provide information about the nature 
of the resources used for inferencing. While context-driven accounts of scalar inference 
processing assume that inferencing requires processing resources, these accounts have not yet 
articulated specifically what kinds of processing resources these might be. Thus, a variety of 
cognitive data were collected in this study to test whether individual differences in online, 
implicit realization of scalar inferences could inform our understanding of the nature of the 
processes underlying inference realization. The following tests were administered: 
 The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001), a 50-item questionnaire which measures the traits associated with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder in adults. Scores on the Communication subscale of this instrument 
have been shown to be correlated with participants' brain responses to manipulations of 
scalar implicature, and may be related to either participants' general pragmatic ability or 
their strategies in evaluating semantic and pragmatic meanings (Nieuwland et al., 2010). 
 The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983), a 28-item questionnaire which 
mainly measures individual differences in empathy but also includes items testing 
perspective-taking abilities. Given that Gricean accounts of scalar inferencing assume 
that perspective-taking and awareness of the speaker's epistemic state are relevant to 
inferencing (Bergen & Grodner, 2012; Breheny et al., in press), it is possible that 
participants with greater perspective-taking abilities may be more able to realize scalar 
inferences. A recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study has also shown 
that individual variation on this the Perspective-Taking subscale may be related to neural 
activations in processing pragmatically infelicitous even sentences (e.g., "He can ear even 
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a very loud sound"), and individual variation on the Fantasy subscale may be related to 
making inferences to comprehend underspecified even sentences (e.g., inferring that a 
sound is quiet based on the sentence "He can hear even that kind of sound") (Sai, Jiang, 
Yu, & Zhou, submitted). 
 Reading span and counting span tests, which require participants to recall letters or 
numbers while engaging in a secondary task. They are measures of working memory 
capacity, which has been shown to be related to participants' inferential ability (Calvo, 
2001; Feeney et al., 2004; Dieussaert et al., 2011). While there is substantial 
disagreement over whether the working memory resources measured by these tasks are 
the same as those implicated in basic syntactic processing (see Caplan & Waters, 1999), 
it is likely that post-syntactic processes (such as discourse integration) involve these 
resources, and traditional context-driven accounts of scalar inferencing would classify it 
as a post-syntactic process. 
 Flanker and Stroop tasks. In the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), participants 
make a response based on a central target while ignoring distracter targets to the left or 
right that are either congruent (>>>>>) or incongruent (<<><<) with the target. In the 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), participants name colors while ignoring the incongruous 
words that are printed in those colors (e.g., they say "blue" when seeing the word RED 
written in blue ink). Both of these tasks are considered a measures of conflict control 
(specifically, response inhibition), which may be accessed during the negotiation between 
alternative meanings of the quantifier. Neural activation in these tasks has been shown to 
overlap with activations in making acceptability judgments of implausible sentences (Ye 
& Zhou, 2009a, b); while the task in the present study is very different than that task and 
does not involve overt acceptability judgments, it is nevertheless possible that 
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participants with greater cognitive control may also be more able to make scalar 
inferences, particularly when burdened with a concurrent processing load (Experiment 5). 
 Truth judgments of underinformative sentences. This task was conducted in 
Experiment 3, reported above, and preliminary analyses suggested that participants who 
gave lower truth-value ratings in this task also took more effort to switch from the 
upper-bounded to the lower-bounded interpretation of some of. The sentences used for 
this task were the English equivalents of the sentences used for this task in Experiment 3 
(see Appendix B:). 
 
3.4. EXPERIMENT FOUR 
 
3.4.1. Methods 
 
3.4.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-nine native English speakers from the University of Kansas (20 women; ages 
18-56, median 19) participated in the study for payment. Participants provided their written 
informed consent. One male participant did not return for the second session of the experiment, 
in which the individual differences measures were collected, and thus that participant was 
included in the group analysis of reaction times but not in the individual differences analysis. 
One female participant was unable to complete the reading span task because of an equipment 
failure.  
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3.4.1.2. Materials 
Forty-eight sets of four-sentence vignettes were constructed following the template in (7) 
above, repeated as (8) for convenience. Slashes indicate how the vignettes were divided into 
segments for the self-paced reading task (see Procedure). 
8) a. Upper-bound some: Mary was preparing to throw a party for John's relatives. / She 
asked John whether all of them were staying in his apartment. / John said that / some 
of them / were. / He added / that / the rest / would be / staying / in a hotel. 
 b. Lower-bound some: Mary was preparing to throw a party for John's relatives. / She 
asked John whether any of them were staying in his apartment. / John said that / some 
of them / were. / He added / that / the rest / would be / staying / in a hotel. 
 c. Upper-bound only some: Mary was preparing to throw a party for John's relatives. / 
She asked John whether all of them were staying in his apartment. / John said that / 
only some of them / were. / He added / that / the rest / would be / staying / in a hotel. 
 d. Lower-bound only some: Mary was preparing to throw a party for John's relatives. / 
She asked John whether any of them were staying in his apartment. / John said that / 
only some of them / were. / He added / that / the rest / would be / staying / in a hotel. 
 
In each set, the first sentence establishes a set of items or people (e.g., John's relatives). The 
second sentence establishes an upper- or lower-bound context by asking about either all of them 
or any of them. The third sentence includes a response to the previous indirect question, using 
some of, which is predicted to be interpreted as not all in the upper-bound (since "all" is relevant 
in that context, but was not used) but not the lower-bound context (since "all" is not relevant in 
that context). Finally, the fourth sentence includes a mention of the rest of the set. "The rest" was 
always followed by "would be" and two or three more segments of one or more words each. The 
only difference between contexts is the use of all or any in the second sentence. A full list of 
critical, filler, and practice stimuli, including comprehension questions (see Procedure) is 
included in Appendix C:. 
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 In addition to the boundedness of the context, the quantificational expression in the third 
sentence was also manipulated. Each of the vignette types above also has a counterpart written 
using only some of rather than some of (see (8c-d)), serving to make the not all interpretation 
semantically explicit (see Minai & Fiorentino, 2010, for a discussion of the semantics of only 
some). This is important because comparing reading times between sentences in which the 
quantifier was interpreted pragmatically and those in which the quantifier was interpreted 
semantically involves comparing across sentences with different meanings, which may take 
different amounts of time or effort to interpret or verify (see Bott et al., 2012; Hartshorne & 
Snedeker, submitted). For example, evaluating whether not all is true may involve a different 
sort of reasoning than evaluating whether at least one, or all, or none, is true; these differences 
are not necessarily based on pragmatic inference. Furthermore, in the present study a lack of 
facilitation in reading times for the rest might be due to a failure to generate the pragmatic 
reading, or to a failure to use that information to predict and integrate upcoming words in the 
sentence. The goal of the present study is to examine pragmatic processing, rather than 
quantificational, truth-verificational, or predictive/integrative processing, and thus it is important 
to include a control comparison to isolate those factors from factors relating to pragmatic 
inferencing. If a difference between upper- and lower-bound conditions is due to pragmatic 
inferencing rather than other factors, then that difference should appear in the implicit 
upper-bound (some of) sentences but not in the explicit upper-bound (only some of) sentences. 
 In addition to the critical stimuli, 144 filler vignettes were created. Forty-eight follow the 
same format as the critical sentences but do not include the rest; this is both to make sure 
participants cannot predict the rest in every item and to make sure that some of is not always 
associated with the rest (which is an explicit cue to the inference). Forty-eight use all of rather 
than some of or only some of in the third sentence, to make sure participants cannot predict some 
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of or only some of in every item; these items also do not include the rest. The last 48 use various 
other quantifiers in the third sentence (many of, most of, several of, a few of, none of, and 
numbers) to increase the variety of lexical alternatives to some of present in the experimental 
context, which has been shown to influence the speed and outcome of scalar inferencing (Degen 
& Tanenhaus, 2011).  
 
3.4.1.3. Procedure 
Participants were tested individually, each in two one-hour sessions. Participants 
completed the self-paced reading task in the first session, and the individual difference measures 
in the second session. The seven individual difference tasks were administered in a random order 
for each participant. 
 
3.4.1.3.1. Self-paced reading 
Participants read the vignettes in a non-cumulative moving-window self-paced reading 
paradigm (Just et al., 1982), administered using the Presentation software package 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). In each trial, the passage was shown on the screen with all the 
characters replaced with dashes; the participant pressed a button on a gamepad to show a phrase 
(at which point the dashes were replaced with the phrase). With each button press, the currently 
displayed phrase turned back into dashes and the next phrase was displayed. Line breaks always 
occurred after the first context sentence, the second context sentence, and "he/she added" in the 
final sentence, as shown in (9): 
9) Mary was preparing to throw a party for John's relatives. /  
 She asked John whether all of them were staying in his apartment. /  
 John said that / some of them / were. / He added / 
 that / the rest / would be / staying / in a hotel. 
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This ensured that the critical segments (some of them and the rest) never appeared adjacent to a 
line break. 
Participants were instructed to read the sentences for comprehension at a natural reading 
speed. One-third of the sentences were followed by comprehension questions, e.g. "Who was 
Mary throwing a party for?" The comprehension questions never targeted aspects of the passage 
that depend upon the interpretation of quantifiers. The main experiment was preceded by eight 
practice items. The procedure took 40-50 minutes to complete, with five breaks.  
 
3.4.1.3.2. Flanker task 
The flanker task was administered using the Presentation software package 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). Stimuli consisted of rows of one or five angle brackets (>, <). 
There were six types of stimulus, based on direction of the target (facing left or right) and type of 
flankers (no flankers [e.g. <], congruent flankers [e.g. <<<<<], or incongruent flankers 
[e.g. >><>>]). A 600x300px light gray rectangle remained on the screen throughout the task, 
and stimuli were presented at the center of it in 30pt Times New Roman font. Each trial began 
with a fixation point (+) presented in the center of the rectangle for a random duration between 
500 and 1750 ms, followed by the stimulus; the target bracket appeared in the same spot as the 
fixation point. The participant's task was to press, as quickly as possible, the button (left or right 
shift key) corresponding to the direction the target bracket was pointing. The stimuli remained on 
screen until the participant's response or for 1500 ms. If the participant responded incorrectly or 
did not respond within the allotted time, a feedback message ("Wrong!" or "Too slow!") was 
presented in red at the center of the screen for 500ms. The inter-trial interval was 1500 ms. 
Participants performed three blocks consisting of 48 fully randomized trials each; the task was 
preceded by a practice block of 24 fully randomized trials. 
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3.4.1.3.3. Stroop task 
The paper-based version of the Stroop task described by Hinkin, Castellon, Hardy, Granholm, 
and Siegle (1999) was used. In this task, participants saw lists of 100 items and were instructed 
to read them aloud one item at a time (the instructions emphasized reading as quickly as possible 
without making a mistake); the time taken to complete each list was measured using a stopwatch. 
Participants completed three lists, always in the same order: the first list consisted of uppercase 
color words printed in black, which they had to read aloud; the second consisted of "XXXX"s 
printed in different colors of ink, the colors of which they had to name; and the third consisted of 
uppercase color words printed in incongruous colors of ink, the colors of which they had to name. 
The four colors used (both for words and ink) were red, blue, green, and yellow. The full list of 
stimuli for the Stroop task is included in Appendix D:. 
 
3.4.1.3.4. Counting span 
Participants completed a computer-mediated version of the counting span task described 
by Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, and Conway (1999; see also Conway, Kane, Bunting, Hambrick, 
Wilhelm, & Engle, 2005). The task was administered using Paradigm (Perception Research 
Systems, Inc.). Participants saw 15 items, each consisting of two to six trials. On each trial, the 
participant saw an array of three to nine blue dots, one to nine blue squares, and one to nine 
green dots. The particpant's task on each trial to count aloud the number of blue dots and then 
repeat the final count, after which the next trial was presented. After completing all two to six 
trials in an item, the participant was asked to recall the final counts for that item in order. Items 
were presented in the same order for all participants. Within an item, no two trials had the same 
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number of blue dots. Before beginning the test, participants completed a practice block 
consisting of three two-trial items. 
 
3.4.1.3.5. Reading span 
Participants completed a computer-mediated version of the reading span task described 
by Kane, Hambrick, Tuholski, Wilhelm, Payne, and Engle (2004; see also Conway, Kane, 
Bunting, Hambrick, Wilhelm, & Engle, 2005). The task was administered using Paradigm 
(Perception Research Systems, Inc.). Participants saw 12 items, each consisting of two to five 
trials. On each trial, the participant saw a visually-presented sentence followed by a "?" and a 
capital letter. Sentences were either semantically anomalous (e.g., "During the week of final 
spaghetti, I felt like I was losing my mind") or semantically acceptable (e.g., "During the winter 
you can get a room at the beach for a very low rate"). The participants' task was to read the 
sentence aloud and then make a semantic acceptability judgment using the mouse. After making 
the judgment, the participant was to say the letter aloud, after which the next trial was presented. 
After completing all two to six trials in an item, the participant was asked to recall the final 
letters of each trial in that item, in order. Items were presented in the same order for all 
participants. Within an item, no two trials had the same letter following the sentence. Before 
beginning the test, participants completed a practice block consisting of three two-trial items. 
 
3.4.1.3.6. Autism-Spectrum Quotient, Interpersonal Reactivity Index, and truth-value ratings of 
underinformative sentences 
Each of these instruments was written in Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) and 
administered at a computer using Perl CGI. Participants were shown all items at once in a list 
format, and chose the appropriate rating for each item by selecting a radio button with the mouse. 
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3.4.1.4. Data analysis 
 
3.4.1.4.1. Reaction time data 
Reading times for filler items and for the first two segments of the critical items (the 
context segments which were presented as entire sentences) were excluded from all analyses. 
The remaining reading times were log-transformed for normality, and outliers for each 
participant and item removed based on visual inspection.
22
 Linear mixed models with crossed 
random intercepts for participants and items (Baayen et al., 2008) were fit with predictors 
Quantifier (some, only some), Boundedness (upper, lower), and sentence Segment, and model 
comparison was conducted with log-likelihood tests.
23
 Accuracy was analyzed using generalized 
linear mixed models with predictors Quantifier and Boundedness. Evaluation of the significance 
of model coefficients was conducted using Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling. 
 
3.4.1.4.2. Flanker task 
Incorrect responses were removed from the analysis, and outliers for each participant 
removed based on visual inspection. Reaction times were transformed using the reflected 
reciprocal transformation (each observation was divided by 1 and then subtracted from the 
                                                 
 
22
 This method is recommended by Baayen (2008: 266). The pattern of results reported below was also observed 
using other outlier-trimming methods such as a flat criterion (as in Hartshorne & Snedeker, submitted), a 
subject-wise standard deviation criterion, and a hybrid method based on that described in Breheny et al., 2006 (first 
removing observations below 150ms or greater than 3 times the overall mean of observations in a given region; then 
removing observations that differ by more than three standard deviations from that subject's mean for that region). 
23
 A common practice in both ANOVA-based and mixed-model-based self-paced reading research is to test separate 
models for each segment of the stimuli. In the experiments reported here, results were instead based on tests of a 
single model with Segment as a factor (a method used by, for example, Grodner, Gibson, and Tunstall, 2002). This 
was done both in order to minimize the chance of observing spurious effects at some segments due to conducting 
multiple comparisons, and provide a stronger test of whether crucial effects (i.e., those at "some of" and "the rest") 
were limited to those segments, rather than being general effects emerging because of the different contexts. 
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highest raw reaction time in the data set) to yield an approximately normal distribution. For each 
participant, the transformed reaction times were regressed on Target Direction (left or right), 
Fixation Duration (the duration for which the fixation point was displayed before the 
presentation of the target) and Flanker Type (Congruent, Incongruent, or None). Each 
participant's coefficient for Flanker Type == Incongruent represented the flanker effect—the 
amount by which the participant slowed down when responding to incongruent flankers as 
compared to congruent flankers. The other regressors were nuisance regressors to reduce error. 
Descriptive statistics for the flanker effects are given in Appendix E:. 
 
3.4.1.4.3. Stroop task 
For each participant, the time taken to complete the Color Naming list was subtracted 
from the time taken to complete the Incongruent list to represent the Stroop effect—the amount 
by which the participant slowed down when naming colors that were incongruent with their 
background as compared to colors with neutral backgrounds. Stroop effect scores were 
log-transformed to approximate a normal distribution. Descriptive statistics for the Stroop effects 
are given in Appendix E:. 
 
3.4.1.4.4. Counting span and reading span 
Each participant's performance on the recall portion of each span task was scored 
according to the partial-credit unit scoring procedure described by Conway and colleagues 
(2005). In this procedure, each item gets a score reflecting how many what proportion of trials 
the participant recalled correctly in that item (e.g., a participant correctly recalling 2 trials out of 
5 would receive a score of .4 for that item) and the scores of the 15 items are then averaged, 
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yielding an aggregate score between 0 and 1 for each participant, with higher scores reflecting 
greater recall accuracy.  
Each participant's accuracy on the secondary processing task task (reading or counting) 
was also calculated as the proportion of trials with correct performance. Finally, recall and 
processing scores were converted to z-scores, and a composite working memory score was 
calculated for each participant by averaging the recall z-score and the processing z-score.
24
 The 
analyses reported below were all conducted using the composite scores. One participant did not 
participate in the reading span task; the group mean was substituted for this participant's score. 
Prior to analysis, the composite scores for each span task were reflected, square root transformed, 
and re-reflected to approximate a normal distribution. Descriptive statistics for the working 
memory span tasks are given in Appendix E:. 
 
3.4.1.4.5. Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
Participants were scored according to the guidelines given by Baron-Cohen and 
colleagues (2001). In the Autism-Spectrum Quotient, half the items are designed such that an 
"agree" answer corresponds to an Autism-like trait, and half are designed such that a "disagree" 
answer corresponds to an Autism-like trait. Each participant receives a total score (between 0 
and 50) which is the number of items to which she gave an answer that corresponds to an 
abnormal or Autism-like behavior. Furthermore, each of the 50 items is associated with one of 
                                                 
 
24
 Conway and colleagues (2005) suggest using only recall scores in computing the working memory score, and not 
considering scores on the processing task. Waters and Caplan (1996), however, argue that composite scores which 
take into account both the recall and the processing components of a task should be used. First of all, correlations 
between the recall and processing scores on working memory span tasks tend to be positive but small (Waters & 
Caplan, 1996; Kane, 2004), suggesting that the processing scores contain information not reflected in the recall 
scores; this was also the case for the present dataset (Reading Span: r = .22, p = .116; Counting Span: r = .35, p = 
.009). Secondly, Waters and Caplan (1996) found that composite scores, compared to recall scores, showed better 
test-retest reliability and stronger correlations with other reading comprehension and memory tasks.  
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five subscales (Social Skill, Attention Switching, Attention to Detail, Communication, and 
Imagination), so the participant also receives five subscale scores, each between 0 and 10. Scores 
on the Social Skill, Attention Switching, and Imagination subscale were log-transformed, and 
scores on the Communication subscale were square root transformed. Descriptive statistics for 
the subscales are given in Appendix E:. 
 
3.4.1.4.6. Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
Participants were scored according to the guidelines given by Davis (1983). In the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index, half the items are designed such that an answer of "this statement 
describes me very well" corresponds to a high value on the corresponding scale (e.g., high 
perspective-taking ability, high empathy, etc.), and half are designed such that a "this statement 
does not describe me very well" answer corresponds to high value. Each item receives a score of 
0 to 5 points (because the participant's responses are on a 5-point Likert scale). Each participant 
receives a total score (between 0 and 112, since the test consists of 28 items) with a higher score 
corresponding to overall higher interpersonal/empathetic ability. Furthermore, each of the 28 
items is associated with one of four subscales (Perspective-Taking, Fantasy, Empathetic Concern, 
and Personal Distress), so the participant also receives four subscale scores, each between 0 and 
28. Scores on the Fantasy and Empathy subscales were reflected, square root transformed, and 
re-reflected to approximate a normal distribution. Descriptive statistics for the subscales are 
given in Appendix E:. 
 
3.4.1.4.7. Truth-value ratings of underinformative sentences 
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Participants' mean truth-value and mean naturalness ratings for the underinformative 
sentences in the task were recorded; ratings for the true sentences were not analyzed. Descriptive 
statistics for the rating task are given in Appendix E:. 
 
3.4.1.4.8. Regression with individual difference measures 
Because these tasks were administered in a random order for each participant, it was 
necessary to test whether scores on any tests were substantially influenced by the order in which 
the test appeared in a session, to rule out potential fatigue effects. Scores on none of the tests 
were significantly correlated with the order in which the test occurred during the session (flanker: 
r = .167, p = .237; Stroop: r = -.005, p = .97; count span: r = .018, p = .9; reading span: r = -.064, 
p = .654; Autism-Spectrum Quotient total score: r = -.012, p = .929; Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index total score: r = -.202, p = .148; truth ratings of underinformative sentences: r = .083, p 
= .556).  
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The data from each measure were sphered (such that each measure had a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1), and the total scores on the Autism-Spectrum Quotient and Interpersonal 
Table 5. Correlation matrix of individual difference variables in the model, 
with corresponding variance inflation factors (VIFs). 
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Activity Index were excluded from the analysis.
25
 Table 5 shows the correlation matrix of the 
variables that were kept for further analyses, as well as the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for 
each variable. 
 
3.4.2. Results 
 
3.4.2.1. Accuracy 
Participants responded correctly to 94% of items in the upper-bound some condition, 
89.7% in lower-bound some, 94.8% in upper-bound only some, and 91.4% in lower-bound only 
some. There were no significant differences in accuracy across conditions (Quantifier: χ
2
 = 0.29, 
p = .591; Boundedness: χ
2
 = 2.59, p = .107) and no interaction (χ
2
 < 0.01, p = .968). 
 
3.4.2.2. Reading times: group analysis 
Figure 16 shows the reading times for the last two sentences of the vignettes. It is evident 
that, for some sentences, "the rest" was read more slowly in the lower-bounded context, whereas 
such a pattern was not observed in only some sentences. It is also apparent that there is no 
slowdown at the quantifier in some sentences in the upper-bound context. Statistical analysis 
confirmed these observations. 
                                                 
 
25
 Including the total scores as well as the subscale scores would make the set of measures highly multicollinear, 
since the total scores on each test are a mathematical combination (a sum) of the subscale scores. Even with 
sphering, the condition number of the entire set with these variables included 7.939012×10
16
, and the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) for all the Autism-Spectrum Quotient and Interpersonal Reactivity Index measures were 
infinite. A condition number of 30 or more is considered to indicate a high level of multicollinearity (Baayen, 
Feldman, & Schreuder, 2006). With a set of predictors that is highly multicollinear it becomes difficult or 
impossible to estimate the effect of any given predictor (Baayen et al., 2006). Removing the Autism-Spectrum 
Quotient and Interpersonal Reactivity Index total scores from the analysis was sufficient to reduce the condition 
number of the sphered data to 4.51, which is considered low, and to reduce the VIFs such that they were all within 
the acceptable range (below 4). 
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After outlier removal (see Data analysis), 12,543 observations remained for analysis. 
There was a significant three-way interaction between Region, Quantifier, and Boundedness 
(χ
2
(9) = 26.18, p = .002).
26
 For some sentences, reading times for "the rest" were significantly 
slower in the lower-bound than upper-bound context (b = 0.068, SE = 0.022, t = 3.11, p = .002); 
a marginal pattern in the same direction was also observed in the following segment (b = 0.036, 
SE = 0.022, t = 1.66, p = .096). No significant difference was observed at "the rest" in only some 
sentences, and the trend was in the opposite direction (b = -0.026, SE = 0.022, t = -1.17, p 
= .242). The only segments where only some sentences showed a boundedness effect were "that" 
(the region preceding "the rest"; b = -0.046, SE = 0.022, t = -2.08, p = .038) and the last two 
segments (b = 0.038, SE = 0.022, t = 1.73, p = .083; b = -0.163, SE = 0.022, t = -2.95, p 
                                                 
 
26
 Standard deviations for the random effects in this model were as follows: Items: 0.034; Participants: 0.17; 
Residual: 0.288. 
Figure 16. Reading times by segment for the last two sentences in some vignettes 
(panel A) and only some vignettes (panel B). Segments showing a significant 
effect of boundedness for a given quantifier type are indicated with an asterisk. 
Error bars represent ±2 standard errors of the mean. 
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= .003).
27
 No significant effect of context was observed at the quantifier ("some of" or "only 
some of") or the following two regions, either for some sentences (bs < 0.031, SEs = 0.022, ts < 
1.41, ps > .156) or for only some sentences (|b|s < 0.02, SEs = 0.022, |t|s < 0.9, ps > .368). 
Because Hartshorne and Snedeker (submitted) found an effect of context when "the rest" 
appeared about 2500ms after the quantifier but not when it appeared about 900ms after, the lag 
between quantifier and "the rest" in the implicit upper-bound (some of) vignettes was calculated. 
                                                 
 
27
 These segments represent the 11
th
 and 12
th
 segments. It should be noted, however, that the stimuli differed in 
length: for 40 stimuli the 11
th
 segment was the last in the vignette, whereas for eight stimuli the 12
th
 was the last. 
Therefore, reading times for these segments are not particularly meaningful, given that the 12
th
 segment represents a 
very small number of items, and the 11
th
 represents a mixture of final and non-final segments. 
Figure 17. Relationship between reading times on "the rest" and lag between the 
quantifier and "the rest" for upper-bound (blue) and lower-bound (red) contexts. 
Points represent individual observations, and regression lines represent 
predictions from a mixed model with fixed effects of Boundedness, Lag Time, 
and their [non-significant] interaction. The bottom and left axes show log lag time 
and log reading time respectively, and the top and right axes show raw lag time 
and raw reading time. 
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The average lag was 1440 ms. A mixed model on the reading times at "the rest" and the 
following region, for the some sentences only, showed that the effect of context did not interact 
with the lag time (χ
2
(2) = 0.24, p = .627), thus not providing evidence that the effect of context 
on scalar inferencing emerged only at long lag times. As illustrated in Figure 17, the effect of 
context (at "the rest") remains the same regardless of the lag time.  
 
3.4.2.3. Reading times: individual differences analysis 
The goal for the analysis of individual differences in reaction times was to identify 
whether any of the individual measures collected predicts inferencing ability specifically. 
Therefore, the focus of the analysis will be on individual measures which were involved in, at the 
least, three-way interactions with Segment and Quantifier.
28
 An interaction with Quantifier is 
necessary to show that the measure is related to inferencing in particular, rather than other 
aspects of evaluating upper- versus lower-bounded meanings; and an interaction with Segment is 
necessary to show that the relationship between reading times and the individual differences 
measure is limited to segments of the vignette that are expected to show effects of inferencing 
(i.e., "some of" and "the rest"), rather than being a general effect throughout reading. Individual 
difference measures that also interact with Boundedness would be of particular interest, since the 
focus of this experiment was to test whether the effect of Boundedness in the critical segments of 
some of sentences would be moderated by individual difference measures. Presumably, however, 
moderation of entirely context-independent aspects of inferencing by individual differences 
could also manifest as a three-way interaction of Segment, Quantifier, and an individual 
                                                 
 
28
 Interactions between individual differences measures were not tested. That is to say, these measures each were 
allowed to interact with the within-participant factors Segment, Quantifier, and Boundedness, but not with the other 
between-participant measures. 
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difference measure. (This would be the case if, for instance, if reading times for critical segments 
were modulated by individual differences in some of sentences but not only some of sentences.) 
 The omnibus model revealed no significant four-way interactions, but did reveal a 
significant three-way interaction between Segment, Quantifier, and IRI-Fantasy (χ
2
(7) = 18.63, p 
= .009) and a marginal three-way interaction between Segment, Quantifier, and AQ-Social (χ
2
(7) 
= 12.48, p = .086). These interactions were resolved by Segment. 
 The Quantifier × IRI-Fantasy interaction was marginal at the segment before the 
quantifier (χ
2
(1) = 2.74, p = .098); at this segment, IRI-Fantasy had a non-significant positive 
association with reading times for only some of sentences (b = 0.07, SE = 0.06, t = 1.32, p 
= .109), but had little effect for some of sentences (b = 0.04, SE = 0.06, t = 0.60, p = .431). At the 
quantifier itself ("only some of them" or "some of them"), the Quantifier × AQ-Social interaction 
was significant (χ
2
(1) = 7.13, p = .008); at this segment, reading times for "only some of them" 
decreased somewhat as AQ-Social subscale scores increased (b = -0.10, SE = 0.07, t = -1.31, p = 
.097), but this was not the case for reading times for "some of them" (b = -0.02, SE = 0.07, t = 
-0.32, p = .679). At the following segment, the Quantifier × IRI-Fantasy interaction reached 
significance (χ
2
(1) = 6.49, p = .011); here, reading times in some of sentences increased as a 
function of IRI-Fantasy (b = 0.09, SE = 0.06, t = 1.66, p = .055), but reading times for only some 
of sentences were relatively unaffected (b = 0.03, SE = 0.06, t = 0.52, p = .543). Two segments 
later (at "that", the third segment after the quantifier, and the first segment before "the rest"), 
both interactions were marginal (Quantifier × AQ-Social: χ
2
(1) = 3.03, p = .082; Quantifier × 
IRI-Fantasy: χ
2
(1) = 2.93, p = .087). At this segment, AQ-Social did not have a significant effect 
in either type of sentence (only some sentences: b = 0.03, SE = 0.0523567, t = 0.63, p = .458; 
some sentences: b = -0.01, SE = 0.05, t = -0.10, p = .906); on the other hand, IRI-Fantasy had a 
significant positive effect in only some sentences (b = 0.09, SE = 0.0498854, t = 1.81, p = .033), 
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and an even larger positive effect in some sentences (b = 0.13, SE = =0.05, t = 2.57, p = .030). 
Finally, The Quantifier × IRI-Fantasy interaction was marginal again in the segment following 
"the rest", "would be" (χ
2
(1) = 3.28, p = .070); again, IRI-Fantasy had a larger positive effect on 
reading times in some of sentences (b = 0.09, SE = 0.05, t = 1.82, p = .030) than only some of 
sentences (b = 0.05, SE = 0.05, t = 1.06, p = .188). 
 
3.4.2.3.1. Exploratory individual differences analysis 
 As mentioned above, the analysis did not find evidence for individual differences in 
context-specific inferencing costs (which would have required four-way interactions between 
any individual difference measure, Segment, Quantifier, and Boundedness). Given that the 
analysis with 28 participants may have lacked power to find such a four-way interaction, an 
exploratory analysis was conducted to further examine potential individual differences in context 
effects. For this analysis, each participant's context effect (log reading time for lower-bounded 
items minus log reading time for upper-bounded items) was calculated for each segment in both 
some and only some sentences, and these context effects were submitted to a mixed model as 
described above. Interactions were found between Segment, Quantifier, and the following 
individual predictors: Stroop (χ
2
(7) = 14.80, p = .039), AQ-Social (χ
2
(7) = 12.46, p = .086), and 
AQ-Imagination (χ
2
(7) = 13.73, p = .056). These interactions were resolved by Segment. 
 At the segment containing the quantifier ("only some of them" or "some of them"), the 
Quantifier × AQ-Social interaction reached significance (χ
2
(1) = 4.85, p = .028); reading times 
for "only some of them" were faster in the upper-bound than lower-bound context on average, 
but the effect decreased as AQ-Social subscale scores increased (b = -0.07, SE = 0.04, t = -1.571, 
p = .140); the context effect for "some of them", however, was not substantially affected by this 
predictor (b = 0.03, SE = 0.04, t = 0.60, p =.542). At the following segment, all three interations 
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were significant or marginal (Quantifier × Stroop: χ
2
(1) = 13.22, p < .001; Quantifier × 
AQ-Social: χ
2
(1) = 3.55, p = .060; Quantifier × AQ-Imagination: χ
2
(1) = 11.42, p = .001). These 
interactions are illustrated in Figure 18. The Quantifier × Stroop interaction indicated that for 
only some sentences the effect of context tended to be negative (that is, faster reading times in 
lower-bounded than upper-bounded sentences) for participants with lower Stroop effects (greater 
cognitive control), and positive for participants with higher Stroop effects (b = 0.07, SE = 0.04, t 
= 1.80, p = .068); whereas for some sentences this pattern was reversed (b = -0.07, SE, 0.04, t = 
-1.92, p = .068). The Quantifier × AQ-Social interaction was of a similar nature (only some: b =  
0.04, SE = 0.04, t = 1.071, p = .291; some: b = -0.03, SE = 0.04, t = -0.77, p = .443), whereas the 
Quantifier × AQ-Imagination interaction showed the opposite pattern (only some: b = -0.06, SE 
= 0.04, t = -1.63, p = .112; some: b = 0.07, SE = 0.04, t = 1.80, p = .087).   
At the segment containing "the rest", the Quantifier × AQ-Social interaction was 
significant (χ
2
(1) = 7.01, p = .008), as was the Quantifier × AQ-Imagination interaction (χ
2
(1) = 
6.04, p = .014). As shown in Figure 19, these interactions were driven by individual differences 
in the processing of only some sentences; the context effect in some sentences was relatively 
unaffected. The Quantifier × AQ-Social interaction remained significant into the following 
Figure 18. Context effects at the segment following the quantifier. The thin black dashed line 
indicates 0 (no context effect). 
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segment (χ
2
(1) = 5.60, p = .018), and was marginal in the second segment after "the rest" (χ
2
(1) = 
3.00, p = .083). The interactions at these two segments are shown in Figure 20. While there was 
a slight numerical trend for some of sentences to show a greater context effect (slower reading 
times in lower-bounded contexts) in participants with higher AQ-Social subscale scores, the 
effects of AQ-Subscale did not reach significance in either segment, either for some or only some 
sentences ("the rest"+1, only some: b = -0.03, SE = 0.03, t = -0.85, p = .393; "the rest"+1, some: 
b = 0.03, SE = 0.03, t = 0.82, p = .410; "the rest"+2, only some: b = -0.03, SE = 0.03 t = -0.86, p 
= .400; "the rest"+2, some: b = 0.02, SE = 0.03, t = 0.59, p = .561.). 
 
3.4.2.3.2. Summary of individual differences analyses 
While several predictors emerged as significant in the individual differences analyses, 
only a few of them are likely to be related to the inferencing process itself. In the omnibus 
analysis, scores on the Fantasy subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index modulated reading 
times in the spillover region after "some of them"; in the segments immediately before and after 
Figure 19. Context effects at "the rest". The thin black dashed line indicates 0 (no context 
context effect). 
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"the rest", scores on the same subscale modulated reading times in some of sentences more than 
reading times in only some of sentences. In the exploratory analysis, the context effect 
(difference in reading times between lower-bounded and upper-bounded sentences) at the 
spillover region following "some of" was modulated by cognitive control abilities as assessed by 
the Stroop task, and by scores on the Social Skill and Imagination subscales of the 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient. Potential interpretations of these effects will be addressed in the 
discussion (Section 3.4.3). Other predictors had effects on only some sentences but not some 
sentences; these effects are potentially interesting, given that comprehending only some may 
require complex syntactic composition (see Minai & Fiorentino, 2010), but they are unlikely to 
be related to scalar inferencing and thus are not discussed here. 
 
3.4.3. Discussion 
The results of the present experiment suggest that the ultimate realization of scalar 
inferences is sensitive to context—the inference is more likely to be realized in the upper-bound 
Figure 20. Context effects at "the rest". The thin black dashed line indicates 0 (no context 
context effect). 
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than lower-bound context, as evidenced by the fact that "the rest" was read faster in the former 
context. These results are consistent with the majority of previous studies exploiting this 
paradigm. Crucially, however, no evidence was found for increased processing costs—either in 
the form of reading time slowdowns or reading time moderation by individual differences—at 
the point of the scalar quantifier in the context that encourages inferencing, even using a rather 
liberal analysis. This finding contrasts with the results of Breheny, Katsos, and Williams (2006), 
who found a reading time slowdown at the quantifier and argued that the realization of a scalar 
inference is effortful. The results of this study, along with similar recent studies that have failed 
to find reading time slowdowns in similar designs (Lewis & Phillips, 2011; Hartshorne & 
Snedeker, submitted) suggest that the slowdown observed in that study was due to properties of 
the stimuli other than the pragmatic manipulation—for example, the repeated noun penalty. On 
the other hand, Bergen and Grodner (2012) did observe a reading time slowdown at the 
quantifier in a design similar to this, and without the repeated name confound; further discussion 
of the differences between that study and the present experiment is in the general discussion of 
the self-paced reading experiments below. 
 
3.4.3.1. The facilitation effect at "the rest" 
 There are at least two potential interpretations of the effect observed at the mention of the 
complement set ("the rest"). The account made by Breheny and colleagues (2006), and in the 
predictions given above, is that the increased reading times in the lower-bounded context relative 
to the upper-bounded context reflect difficulty in integration of the word "the rest" into the 
discourse when the participant has not already made the scalar inference which makes her aware 
of the complement set. In other words, the reading times reflect the reader's trying to find a set of 
referents to which they can link "the rest". I will refer to this account as the discourse linking 
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account. An alternative explanation is that the reading time slowdown in this segment in fact 
reflects the realization of the scalar inference in the lower-bounded context. Under this 
explanation, in the upper-bounded context the inference is realized immediately and effortlessly 
at the quantifier; this occurs because the nature of the context, combined with a reader's lexical 
knowledge about the scalar nature of some of, constitute a strong cue for making the inference. 
On the other hand, in the lower-bounded context, the quantifier is not a sufficiently strong cue 
for the inference, and thus the reader does not make the inference until she reaches "the rest", 
which explicitly indicates that the quantifier in this item is inconsistent with all; in this case, the 
realization of the inference may be more effortful than it was in the upper-bounded context 
because the cue is less effective, or because the cue comes later in the sentence (several words 
after the quantifier) and thus the reader needs to revise an initial interpretation. I will refer to this 
account as the late inferencing account. At present, it is not clear whether the discourse linking 
account and the late inferencing account are distinguishable. The discourse linking account 
assumes that the reading time slowdown is based on the identification of a complement set; if the 
meaning of quantifiers is represented in terms of sets, this may well be the same process as 
interpreting some as not all.
29
 Furthermore, while the late inferencing account assumes that 
mention of the complement set triggers a scalar inference, it should be noted that the complement 
set could be recognized even without making the inference. Interpretation of the complement set 
only requires recognizing that some was referring to less than all, and the semantic interpretation 
of the quantifier (at least one) can be consistent with this meaning. In other words, while 
integrating "the rest" with the discourse requires identifying a complement set, it is not 
                                                 
 
29
 The semantic representation of quantifiers is under debate. The idea that quantifiers represent relations between 
sets (functions from properties to [functions from properties to truth-values]: ⟨ ⟨e,t⟩, ⟨ ⟨e,t⟩, t⟩ ⟩) is a central tenet of 
Generalized Quantifier Theory (see Barwise & Cooper, 1981). For further discussion on Generalized Quantifier 
Theory and alternatives, see, among others, Hackl (2009). 
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necessarily the case that identifying a complement set requires making a scalar inference—the 
scalar inference might facilitate the identification of a complement set but not be a necessary 
condition. 
 
3.4.3.2. The speed of inferencing 
Regarding the speed of inferencing, the results of this experiment were not wholly 
consistent with the conclusions drawn by Hartshorne and Snedeker (submitted) regarding the 
time necessary to realize an inference. In the study they report, the upper-bounded context 
facilitated reading times for "the rest" when "the rest" occurred about 2500 ms after the 
quantifier, but not when it occurred about 900 ms after the quantifier. They took this as evidence 
that the realization of the inference takes at least 900 ms. In the present study, however, the 
relationship between facilitation at "the rest" and lag time between the quantifier and "the rest" 
was directly tested, and the tests did not reveal evidence that the context effect only emerged at a 
long lag; rather, the context effect remained the same across lag times, even though the range of 
lag times observed in the present experiment ranged from below 900 ms to above 2500 ms. The 
failure to replicate this interaction suggests that the lag-time effect of Hartshorne and Snedeker 
(submitted) may be due to other structural properties of the stimuli and not to the speed of 
inference. In particular, the long-lag conditions in that experiment included adverbial phrases 
after the quantifier, whereas the short-lag conditions did not, as shown in (10): 
10) a. Long lag: Addison ate some of the cookies before breakfast this morning, and the 
rest are on the table. 
 b. Short lag: Addison ate some of the cookies, and the rest are on the table. 
 
This manipulation may have introduced several differences between the conditions other than 
just a difference in the time available to complete the inference. For instance, the lack of 
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adverbial detail in the short-lag condition may have reduced the felicity of the more specific 
upper-bounded description, thus creating a global experimental context that discourages 
participants from computing such readings (compare to Nieuwland et al., 2010). It should be 
noted, however, that whereas the experiment by Hartshorne and Snedeker (submitted) 
manipulated the lag between the quantifier and the mention of the complement set ("the rest"), 
the present experiment did not manipulate that lag time, but rather used lag time variations 
introduced by the participants themselves as a result in their own variations in reading speed. 
Thus, while the present experiment did not show evidence that participants or items with more 
time in between the quantifier and "the rest" were more able to realize inferences, factors that 
contribute to the increased lag time could also be factors that inhibit inferencing. For example, if 
a participant has more time between the quantifier and "the rest", that participant may have 
relatively poor reading comprehension or working memory, and thus even though that 
participant has more time to realize inferences, she may also have fewer processing resources 
available to do so. Thus, the results of the present study together with those of Hartshorne and 
Snedeker (submitted) suggest that this type of inference may be realized within about 1440 ms 
(the mean lag time observed in the present experiment) in general, but that further research is 
needed to determine just how quickly the effect of inferencing emerges in this research paradigm, 
and to better understand whether the strength of this effect is modulated by lag time.  
 
3.4.3.3. Individual differences in inferencing 
 The individual differences analysis revealed that some individual-level cognitive factors 
may be associated with inferencing. Reading times after some of increased as a function of scores 
on the Fantasy subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index—people with higher scores spent 
longer reading these segments. This was not the case in only some of sentences. In the present 
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study there was not an a priori prediction regarding this pattern and thus conclusions about this 
effect need to be verified through further study, but one possible interpretation of the effect is 
that it is due to uncertainty introduced by the ambiguous quantifier some of. Evidence for this 
account comes from an fMRI study by Sai and colleagues, in which the authors found that this 
subscale correlated positively with BOLD activations in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) for 
underspecified sentences. More specifically, participants in this study read even sentences in 
Chinese which were either specified (e.g., "He can even hear such a quiet sound"), or 
underspecified (e.g., "He can even hear that kind of sound"); in the former case, the sentence 
specifies that the sound is quiet, whereas in the latter case, the listener must infer that the sound 
is quiet. Participants with higher scores on the Fantasy subscale showed a greater difference in 
activation between underspecified and specified sentence in the mPFC, a region potentially 
associated with mentalizing and with making inferences under uncertain situations (Jenkins & 
Mitchell, 2010). In the present study, participants with higher fantasizing ability may have 
committed more resources to considering alternative interpretations (i.e., both the semantic and 
the pragmatic interpretations) of some of. The fact that this effect did not interact with 
Boundedness may suggest that such participants consider both interpretations regardless of the 
context, a pattern not predicted by context-driven accounts of inferencing. It should be noted that 
this account of the effect does not explain why the effect re-emerged after "the rest", a point at 
which the uncertainty may have been removed (the phrase "the rest" makes the existence of the 
complement set explicit). 
An exploratory analysis of the individual difference measures also suggested that the 
context effect after reading the quantifier (i.e., how much slower this segment was read in 
lower-bounded contexts than in upper-bounded contexts) was modulated by cognitive control (as 
measured by the Stroop task) and by scores on the Imagination and Social Skill subscales of the 
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Autism-Spectrum quotient. Recall that context-driven accounts predict faster reading times in the 
lower-bounded context at this point (in the terms used here, this would be a negative context 
effect. In fact, such an effect only emerged in a subset of participants—participants with poorer 
cognitive control (higher Stroop scores) and worse social skill (higher scores on the Social Skill 
subscale), were more likely to show a negative effect of context. This might suggest that the 
inferencing process was more costly for such participants, whereas for others it was relatively 
effortless; such an account remains to be directly tested in future study. As for imagining abilities, 
inspection of Figure 18 suggests that worse imagining ability (higher scores on the subscale) was 
associated with more positive context effects (which are not predicted by context-driven 
accounts), but participants with better than average imagining ability did not necessarily have 
more negative effects. A traditional prediction regarding the default account of inferencing (see 
Breheny et al., 2006) is that scalars in lower-bounded contexts might take longer to read because 
the reader must cancel the inference (see Section 3.6, General Discussion, for further discussion 
of this assumption). Thus, this effect might suggest that cancelling inferences is only costly for a 
subset of participants for whom the process of imagining other possible interpretations is 
difficult. This hypothesis remains to be tested in future experimentation.  
 
3.4.3.4. An alternative means of testing for processing costs 
 Although the present experiment did not find evidence that the realization of scalar 
inferences involves an increased processing cost, it remains possible that there was a processing 
cost that self-paced reading times and individual differences in the skills measured are simply not 
sensitive to. Thus, the following experiment uses another method to test for processing costs: a 
dual-task design. De Neys and Shaeken (2007) and Dieussaert and colleagues (2011) found 
evidence that participants make fewer pragmatic responses to underinformative sentences when 
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they are engaging in a concurrent spatial working memory task; these results were taken as 
evidence that inferencing requires processing resources, although it is also possible that their task 
influenced participants' ability to make off-line evaluations or verifications or pragmatic readings 
rather than to generate those readings. Thus, the following experiment adopts a concurrent task 
along with self-paced reading of the types of vignettes used in the previous experiment, in order 
to test whether concurrent task load modulates implicit realization of scalar inferences as 
measured by self-paced reading times. Rather than using the dot recall task used in those studies, 
the present study instead used a task in which participants listen to irrelevant background speech, 
following the design of Martin, Wogalter, & Forlano (1988). As the presence of unattended 
background noise has been shown to modulate sentence comprehension (Martin et al., 1988), and 
as it is a secondary task that is performed continuously while the self-paced reading is under way 
(rather than memorization before and recall after the reading task), this task may offer a greater 
chance of detecting an effect, compared to the dot recall task. If scalar inferencing is dependent 
on the availability of processing resources, then the facilitation effect at "the rest" observed in the 
previous experiment should be eliminated in the presence of the secondary task.  
 
3.5. EXPERIMENT FIVE 
  
3.5.1. Methods 
3.5.1.1. Participants 
Thirty-seven native English speakers from the University of Kansas (28 women; ages 
18-32, median 20) participated in the study for payment. Participants provided their written 
informed consent. The computer failed to record data from the flanker task for one female 
participant. One additional female participant participated in the experiment, but her data were 
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not used because a scripting error on the experimenter's part caused the quantifiers in the 
self-paced reading task not to display. Data from one female participant were removed from 
analysis because this participant responded with less than 75% accuracy to comprehension 
questions on critical trials; thus, the total number of participants included in data analysis was 
thirty-six. 
 
3.5.1.2. Materials 
The materials for the self-paced reading task were identical to those in Experiment 4. 
 The materials for the unattended listening task were two lists of words: one comprising 
real words, and one pseudowords. (Martin and colleagues, 1988, found that unattended real 
words disrupt sentence comprehension to a greater extent than unattended pseudowords, 
presumably because the presence of lexical information makes the parser automatically devote 
processing resources to recognizing real words.) The real-word list consisted of 800 English 
words pseudorandomly chosen from a convenience sample of texts. The novel-word list 
consisted of 791 pseudowords that followed English phonotactics but did not match the 
pronunciation of any existing English word. Two hundred eleven of these were created by 
changing and/or transposing several phones from words in the real-world list; 49 were novel 
compound stimuli from Fiorentino, Politzer-Ahles, Popescu, & Popescu (2011); 444 were novel 
compound stimuli from Fiorentino, Politzer-Ahles, & Pak (2012), and 87 were from another 
experiment in progress in our laboratory. The full list of words is available in Appendix F:. 
 The words were read aloud by four native speakers of English (two male and two female) 
who were naïve to the purposes of the study. Each participant read the real-word list first and the 
novel-word list second. A different random order of words in each list was used for each 
participant. The recording was carried out within an anechoic chamber at the University of 
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Kansas, using an ElectroVoice 767 microphone and a Marantz PMD-671 digital solid-state 
recorder sampling at 22050 Hz and in mono format. Offline processing of the recordings was 
conducted using Praat (Boersma & Weenik, 2012). Pauses between words were removed, all 
four lists were intensity-normalized, and male and female lists were combined (overlain on top 
of one another) to create four lists: male/real (9.5 minutes), male/novel (10 minutes), female/real 
(9.5 minutes), and female/novel (10 minutes). In cases where one speaker's list was shorter than 
another speaker's list because of faster speaking rate, a few extra tokens from the middle of that 
speaker's list were appended to the end of the same speaker's list to ensure that for the entirety of 
the sound file there were always two speakers audible. The reason for creating multi-talker lists 
was to reduce the salience of list intonation, which otherwise may have influenced reading times 
by making the self-paced reading participants synchronize their button-pressing to the rhythm of 
the background speech. 
 
3.5.1.3. Procedure and data analysis 
The procedure for this experiment was the same as that for Experiment 4, except that 
participants in the self-paced reading task also listened to the background speech over binaural 
headphones. On each trial, speech from one of the lists began to play at the start of the trial and 
continued through the end of the trial. The next time speech from the same list was to be played, 
it began at whatever point in the list had been reached when the last trial on that list ended. If the 
end of a list was reached, playback for that list began again at the start of the list. The real- and 
novel-word background speech conditions were randomly mixed on a trial-by-trial basis. 
The procedures for all individual differences measures were the same as in Experiment 4. 
Data analysis for reading time data, accuracy data, and individual differences measures was all 
the same as in Experiment 4. One participant did not participate in the flanker task; the group 
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mean was substituted for this participant's score. One participant each in the Stroop and flanker 
tasks showed effects that were more than 4 standard deviations lower than the group's mean 
(these participants had faster naming times in the incongruent than congruent Stroop conditions, 
and faster reaction times in the incongruent than congruent flanker conditions, respectively); 
these participants' scores were replaced with the group minima prior to sphering. One participant 
on the Reading Span task had a composite score nearly 4 standard deviations below the group's 
mean (this participant only recalled 8% of items correctly, and also misjudged the acceptability 
of the sentences 20% of the time); this participant's reading span composite score was replaced 
with with a the group minimum prior to sphering.
30
 
 
3.5.2. Results 
3.5.2.1. Accuracy 
                                                 
 
30
 Some individual difference measures had significant interactions with reading times and other predictors of 
interest when these correctional measures were not taken, but no longer had significant interactions after the data 
were treated in this way. This suggests that those significant interactions were driven by outliers.  
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All participants performed at an average accuracy of 85% or higher. Accuracy for each 
condition is shown in Figure 21. A generalized linear mixed model on accuracy revealed only a 
main effect of Background Condition (χ
2
(1) = 7.55, p = .006), reflecting the fact that participants 
were more accurate on items with real-word background speech than novel-word background 
speech.  
 
3.5.2.2. Reading times: group analysis 
Figure 21. Comprehension accuracy on critical items in Experiment 5. 
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Figure 22. Self-paced reading times for some of sentences with real-word 
background speech (panel A) and novel-word background speech (panel B). 
Error bars represent ±2 standard errors of the mean. 
Figure 23. Self-paced reading times for only some of sentences with 
real-word background speech (panel A) and novel-word background speech 
(panel B). Error bars represent ±2 standard errors of the mean. 
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After removal of outliers, 15,166 observations remained for analysis. Reading times are 
shown in Figure 22 and Figure 23. Compared to the previous experiment, the difference between 
reading times for lower-bound and upper-bound contexts in some of sentences appears smaller. 
The quantifier in some of sentences also appeared to be read slightly slower in the upper-bound, 
implicature-supporting context. The following statistical analyses, however, demonstrate that 
none of these differences was significant. 
Unlike in the previous experiment, the interaction between Segment, Quantifier, and 
Boundedness was not significant (χ
2
(9) = 9.71, p = .375), nor was the four-way interaction with 
Background Condition (χ
2
(9) = 2.60, p = .978).
31
 These findings indicate that that there was no 
effect of Boundedness specific to the critical regions.
32
 The other effect of interest is a marginal 
interaction between Background Condition and Boundedness (χ
2
(1) = 3.56, p = .059), reflecting 
the fact that overall reading times in upper-bounded sentences were not significantly affected by 
the lexicality of the background speech (b = -0.01, SE = 0.02, t = -0.80, p = .437), but overall 
reading times in lower-bounded sentences were somewhat slower with real word background 
speech than novel word background speech (b = 0.02, SE = 0.01, t = 1.88, p = .061). 
                                                 
 
31
 Standard deviations for random effects in the model were as follows: Items: 0.03; Participants: 0.21; Residual: 
0.28. 
32
 There was a significant main effect of Boundedness (χ
2
(1) = 12.83, p < .001), indicating that lower-bounded 
sentences were read more slowly overall (b = 0.02, SE < 0.01, t = 3.58, p = .001). There was also a marginal 
Quantifier × Boundedness interaction (χ
2
(1) = 3.00, p = .083). Because these effects did not interact with Segment, 
they do not provide any evidence for effects of context specific to the critical regions (either slowdowns for "some 
of" or facilitation for "the rest" when an inference is realized). 
135 
 
As in Experiment 4, tests were conducted to examine whether the lag time between 
"some of" and "the rest" influenced the facilitation effect at "the rest" and the following segment. 
This time, a significant four-way interaction between Segment, Lag Time, Boundedness, and 
Background Condition did emerge in some of sentences (χ
2
(1) = 5.20, p = .023). Resolving the 
interaction by Region revealed that the effect of lag time was not moderated by Boundness or 
Background Condition in the region following "the rest" (χ
2
s(1) < 2.40, ps > .301), whereas at 
"the rest" itself there was a three-way interaction between Lag Time, Boundedness, and 
Background Condition (χ
2
(1) = 6.34, p = .012). Resolving that interaction by Background 
Condition revealed that the effect of lag time was not significantly moderated by Boundedness in 
trials with real-word background speech (χ
2
(1) = 2.62, p = .105), but it was in trials with 
novel-word background speech (χ
2
(1) = 6.57, p = .010). As shown in Figure 24, when the 
Figure 24. Relationship between reading times on "the rest" and lag 
between the quantifier and "the rest" for upper-bound (blue) and 
lower-bound (red) contexts, in trials with real-word background speech 
(left) and novel-word background speech (right). Points represent 
individual observations, and regression lines represent predictions from 
a mixed model with fixed effects of Boundedness, Lag Time, and their 
interaction. The bottom and left axes show log lag time and log reading 
time respectively, and the top and right axes show raw lag time and raw 
reading time. 
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background speech consisted of novel words, longer lag time was associated with a more 
positive effect of Boundedness (i.e., reading times for lower-bounded sentences became more 
and more slower than those for upper-bounded sentences), similar to the pattern reported by 
Hartshorne and Snedeker (submitted). When the background speech consisted of real words, on 
the other hand, the effect was in the opposite direction and was not significant 
 
3.5.2.3. Reading times: Individual differences analysis 
The analysis of individual differences in reading times was conducted following the same 
standards as in Experiment 4. No interactions of interest reached significance. 
 
3.5.2.3.1. Exploratory individual differences analysis 
As in Experiment 4, an exploratory analysis of the context effects was conducted. For this 
analysis, each participant's context effect (log reading time for lower-bounded items minus log 
reading time for upper-bounded items) was calculated for each segment in both some and only 
Table 6. Interactions of interest that reached significance in the omnibus analysis. *p < .05 **p 
< .005, ***p < .001. The "Significant segments" column indicates the segments at which the 
lower-order interaction was significant. 4: the quantifier; 5: the verb following the quantifier; 6: 
the beginning of the following sentence ("He/she added"); 8: "the rest". 
   
Effect χ
2
(7) p Significant segments 
Segment × Quantifier × AQ-Imagination 
 
20.41 .005 ** 5*, 6* 
Segment × Quantifier × IRI-
PerspectiveTaking 
19.64 .006 * 8*** 
Segment × Quantifier × CountSpan 
 
19.62 .006 * 4* 
Segment × Quantifier × Background 
Condition × IRI-PerspectiveTaking 
17.49 .014 * 5*, 8* 
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some sentences, and these context effects were submitted to a mixed model as described above. 
Table 6 shows which individual difference measures showed significant interactions with the 
predictors of interest in this analysis.  
At the quantifier itself, the Quantifier × Count Span interaction was significant (χ
2
(1) = 
6.60, p = .010). As shown in the upper left portion of Figure 25, the context effect at the 
quantifier in only some of sentences was relatively unaffected by Count Span (b = 0.015, SE = 
0.03, 0.50, p = .613); in some of sentences, however, negative context effects (faster reading 
times in lower-bound than upper-bound sentences) were marginally more likely to appear in 
participants with higher composite Count Span scores (b = -0.053, SE = 0.03, t = -1.83, p = 
.072).  
Figure 25. Relationship between individual difference measures and context effects at 
segments where significant interactions were observed. The y-axis for each subplot indicates 
which segment is being shown. See text for details. 
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At the following segment, the Quantifier × AQ-Imagination interaction reached 
significance (χ
2
(1) = 6.74, p = .009) The effects of AQ-Imagination in only some of and some of 
sentences were opposite, but did not reach significance in either sentence type. (only some: b = 
0.040, SE = 0.03, t = 1.19, p = .239; some: b = -0.039, SE = 0.03, t = -1.16, p = .255). The 
Quantifier × Background Condition × IRI-PerspectiveTaking interaction also reached 
significance at this segment (χ
2
(1) = 4.24, p =.040), but when resolving the interaction the 
Background Condition × IRI-PerspectiveTaking effect did not reach significance for either only 
some of sentences (χ
2
(1) = 1.76, p = .185) or some of sentences (χ
2
(1) = 2.58, p = .108). 
Resolving the interaction by Background Condition rather than Quantifier revealed a significant 
Quantifier × IRI-Perspective interaction for trials with real-word background speech (χ
2
(1) = 
5.02, p = .025), but not trials with novel-word background speech (χ
2
(1) = 0.68, p = .409). As 
shown in the upper right portion of Figure 25, IRI-PerspectiveTaking had opposite effects in only 
some of and some of sentences in the real-word background speech condition, but neither reached 
significance (only some: b = -0.050, SE = 0.03, t = -1.47, p = .153; some: b = 0.035, SE = 0.03, t 
= 1.02, p = .305). 
Two segments after the quantifier, the Quantifier × AQ-Imagination interaction remained 
significant (χ
2
(1) = 7.22, p = .007). As shown in the lower right portion of Figure 25, the context 
effect at the quantifier in only some of sentences was relatively unaffected by AQ-Imagination 
scores (b = 0.028, SE = 0.04, t = 0.80, p = .435); in some of sentences, however, negative context 
effects (faster reading times in lower-bound than upper-bound sentences) were marginally more 
likely to appear in participants with higher AQ-Imagination scores (and thus poorer imagining 
ability) (b = -0.056, SE = 0.04, t = -1.63, p = .098). 
At "the rest", the Quantifier × IRI-PerspectiveTaking interaction reached significance 
(χ
2
(1) = 14.91, p < .001). The Quantifier × Background Condition × IRI-PerspectiveTaking 
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interaction was again significant (χ
2
(1) = 3.93, p = .047), indicating that the above effect was 
mainly driven by a significant Quantifer × IRI-PerspectiveTaking interaction for the real-word 
background condition (χ
2
(1) = 21.06, p < .001), whereas the Quantifier × IRI-PerspectiveTaking 
interaction did not reach significance in the novel-word background condition (χ
2
(1) = 2.17, p = 
.140). As shown in the lower-right portion of Figure 25, the context effect in only some of 
sentences was not significantly moderated by IRI-PerspectiveTaking scores (b = -0.042, SE = 
0.03, t = -1.45, p = .153), but the context effect in some of sentences was (b = 0.061, SE = 0.03, t 
= 2.10, p = .037): participants with greater perspective-taking ability were more likely to show a 
positive effect of context (longer reading times in lower-bounded than upper-bounded contexts), 
and this interaction was strongest in trials with real-word background speech.  
 
3.5.2.3.2. Summary of individual differences analyses 
While the omnibus individual difference analysis revealed no significant effects, the 
exploratory analysis uncovered several effects that may be related to theories of inferencing. At 
the quantifier, working memory as measured by Counting Span scores interacted with the 
context effect for some of sentences, such that only participants with high working memory 
showed longer reading times for "some of" in upper-bounded contexts (the effect predicted by 
context-driven accounts). The Imagination subscale of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient modulated 
context effects in a similar way, albeit later: two segments after "some of", participants with poor 
imagining ability tended to show longer reading times in upper-bounded contexts. Finally, at "the 
rest", the context effect observed in the previous experiment (longer reading times in 
lower-bounded than upper bounded some of contexts) emerged mainly in participants with high 
Perspective-Taking ability (as measured on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index), rather than other 
participants. 
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3.5.3. Discussion 
This experiment tested whether the presence of a concurrent processing load would 
modulate participants' ability to realize scalar inferences online. That prediction was borne out: 
whereas in Experiment 4 participants were able to realize scalar inferences and use that 
information to facilitate integration of "the rest" later in the sentence, in this experiment the 
facilitation effect disappeared. This suggests that the realization of scalar inferences is sensitive 
to the availability of processing resources. This complements the findings of previous research 
that have shown overt, strategic judgments of underinformative sentences to be sensitive to task 
demands (De Neys & Shaeken, 2007; Dieussaert et al., 2011) and time pressure (Chevallier et 
al., 2008; Bott et al., 2012), and extends those findings by further suggesting that it is not just 
strategic evaluation, but also implicit processes related to inferencing, that are affected by 
processing load. 
 
3.5.3.1. The relationship between the secondary task and inferencing  
The precise nature of the influence that the secondary task has on inferencing, however, 
is unclear. The possibility suggested above is that in the presence of a concurrent processing 
load, participants were less able to realize scalar inferences. There are at least three alternative 
explanations, however: 1) participants were less able to recognize the information-structural 
constraints of the different contexts; 2) participants were less able to use the upper-bounded 
interpretation of some of to facilitate access and/or integration of "the rest"; and 3) participants 
realized the inference and were then unable to cancel it in the face of extra processing load. 
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Regarding the first possibility, it should be noted that in the present experiment, the 
secondary task (listening to irrelevant speech) was ongoing throughout the entirety of the reading 
task, including when participants were reading the sentences that established the context as being 
upper- or lower-bounded. Thus, it is possible that scalar inferencing itself was not affected by the 
presence of the concurrent task, but that participants under the load conditions were simply less 
able to recognize the boundedness of the contexts, and thus unable to use contextual information 
to decide whether to inference or not to inference. This alternative seems unlikely, given that 
several effects of Boundedness were observed in the reading times, just no effects that were 
related to inferencing in particular. Nevertheless, this remains an alternative hypothesis that must 
be ruled out empirically in the future. 
The second alternative explanation is that participants did indeed realize inferences in the 
upper-bounded contexts even under concurrent processing load, but the load prevented them 
from using the inference-based information in such a way that would facilitate reading times at 
"the rest" downstream. It is unclear whether concurrent processing load should interfere with 
basic lexical access and integration, but there is empirical evidence that concurrent processing 
load influences individuals' ability to comprehend sentences with increasing numbers of 
propositions, for example (see Caplan & Waters, 1999). Therefore, it is not possible to rule this 
possibility out on the basis of the present data. 
The third possibility is that the equivalence of reading times for "the rest" in both context 
was not due to participants' failing to realize the inference in either context, but due to their 
realizing the inference in both contexts and failing to cancel it in the lower-bounded context. 
Such a finding would be consistent with default accounts of scalar inferencing, if such accounts 
assume that the cancellation of a scalar inference is an effortful process (see further discussion of 
this point in Section 3.6, General Discussion). A potential piece of evidence for this 
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interpretation comes from the comparison between reading times in the some of and only some of 
sentences. One might predict that if the concurrent processing load only influenced the ability to 
realize inferences, then reading times for "the rest" would be slower in both contexts following 
some of (since the inference was not realized in either context) and faster in both contexts 
following only some of (since no pragmatic inference is required to realize the upper-bounded 
interpretation of this phrase; Minai & Fiorentino, 2010). This was not the case; in fact, reading 
times for "the rest" were numerically faster following some of than only some of (b = -0.018, SE 
= 0.01, t = -1.54, p = .136), which is more consistent with the notion that the upper-bounded 
meaning was indeed realized. It should be noted, however, that the comparison between 
segments of some of sentences and segments of the only some of sentences is not straightforward; 
although I have presented inference realization and subsequent facilitation of "the rest" as an 
all-or-nothing phenomenon, it is also possible that the strength of the upper-bounded 
interpretation based on scalar inference differs from that based on semantic composition with 
only, meaning that strong conclusions should not be drawn based on a direct comparison such as 
this. 
In short, it is difficult to conclude on the basis of this experiment whether the presence of 
a concurrent processing load interfered with inferencing itself, or interfered with other processes 
related to the upper-bounded meaning. Nevertheless, the results of this experiment do indicate 
that the addition of a processing load modulates the context-sensitivity of scalar inferencing, and 
that previous findings regarding the influence of processing load on interpretation of 
underinformative sentences may not be just due to offline verification processes. 
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3.5.3.2. Comparing different background speech conditions 
It is also worth noting that, contrary to expectations, the different background speech 
conditions did not elicit qualitatively different results in terms of their influence on scalar 
inferencing. It is likely that both conditions were difficult enough for participants that any 
differences between their effects on scalar inferencing were masked by a floor effect. Recall that 
the original prediction, based on Martin et al. (1988), was that real-word speech would create a 
larger processing load than novel-word speech. The present study differed from that study in at 
least three respects. First, real-word and novel-word background trials were randomly intermixed 
in the present study, whereas Martin and colleagues (1988) used a block design. The present 
study used a randomized design in order to be able to make stronger claims about how different 
background speech conditions might affect inferencing online (in a blocked or 
between-participants design, a difference between background conditions might be due to 
differences in conscious strategies people adopt in different blocks); this, however, could have 
reduced potential differences between the conditions, if listeners normally need several trials to 
retune their processing system for a particular kind of background speech, and the randomization 
could have introduced extra processing costs if participants needed to spend part of every trial 
determining whether the background speech was real or novel. The second difference is that the 
present study used multi-talker recordings for background speech, whereas the previous study 
used single-talker recordings; this was done in order to avoid introducing a potential influence of 
the list-like rhythm of single-talker stimuli on participants' self-paced reading pace, but this 
manipulation may have introduced differences between the present study and the previous study. 
The third difference is that the present study used self-paced reading, whereas participants in the 
previous study read sentences naturally, presented in full; self-paced reading may involve an 
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additional processing component which is not present in natural reading and which may interact 
differently with the background speech conditions. 
It is unclear which condition was actually more difficult in the present study, given that 
novel-word speech caused higher error rates and real-word speech caused higher reading times 
(at least in lower-bounded contexts). This could be an instance of a speed-accuracy trade-off, if 
participants were hurrying to quickly read past the "difficult" real-word conditions. The reading 
time results are difficult to interpret, however; Martin and colleagues' (1988) finding that 
real-word speech was more difficult was based on that condition's influence on comprehension 
accuracy, rather than reading times, and it is not straightforward to predict whether "more 
difficult" background speech would lead to slower or to faster reading times. Qualitatively, 
several participants reported that they found the novel-word speech more distracting, and several 
other participants reported that they found the real-word speech more distracting. 
 
3.5.3.3. The speed of inferencing under concurrent processing load 
Another result from the present experiment that bears mention is the interaction between 
lag time and the context effect at "the rest". Recall that Experiment 4 did not replicate the lag 
time effect that Hartshorne and Snedeker (submitted) report: whereas that study found that 
inferences only facilitated reading times at "the rest" in a long-lag condition, Experiment 4 of the 
present dissertation showed no moderation of the facilitation effect by lag time. In the present 
experiment, however, an effect similar to that described by Hartshorne & Snedeker (submitted) 
was observed in the novel-word background condition: no facilitation expect was observed at 
short lag times, but at long lag times the facilitation effect (shorter reading times for "the rest" in 
upper-bounded rather than lower-bounded contexts) did emerge. This could be interpreted as 
evidence for delayed inferencing in this condition. On the other hand, no facilitation effect 
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emerged at any lag time in the real-word background speech condition. Comparing these results 
to the result from Experiment 4, one might speculate that inferencing could occur rapidly when 
the parser is relatively unburdened (no background speech), at a delay when the parser is 
somewhat burdened (novel-word background speech), and not at all when the parser is even 
more burdened (real-word background speech). Note, however, that this interpretation requires 
the assumption that real-word background speech was more taxing for the parser than 
novel-word background speech; that assumption is supported by the findings of Martin and 
colleagues (1988) and the overall reading time data of the present experiment, but not by the 
accuracy data of the present experiment. As mentioned above, which background speech 
condition was more difficult remains an open question. 
 
3.5.3.4. Individual differences in inferencing under concurrent processing load 
Finally, the present experiment identified several individual-level cognitive factors that 
may be of relevance to scalar inferencing. At the quantifier, there was a trend towards 
participants with higher working memory (as measured by the Counting Span task) showing 
longer reading times in the upper-bounded than the lower-bounded context. This is the effect 
predicted by context-driven accounts of inferencing—i.e., that realizing an inference will elicit a 
processing effort—that was not observed in the previous experiment. One possible interpretation 
of this pattern of effects is that inferencing occurred immediately and effortlessly in the previous 
experiment, where there was no concurrent speech, whereas in the present experiment the 
concurrent task made participants with low working memory unable to realize the inferences 
rapidly, and participants with high working memory only able to realize inferences with 
substantial effort. Some aspects of the data, however, are inconsistent with this account. Firstly, 
working memory did not modulate the context effect at any other points in the sentence; if 
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participants with different amounts of working memory resources differed in their ability to 
realize inferences, then one would expect to observe more, later effects of working memory 
(either as the participants with low working memory caught up with the others and realized the 
inference later, or at "the rest" where high-WM participants might show a facilitation due to 
inference whereas low-WM participants might not). Secondly, in a study by Dieussaert and 
colleauges (2011), it was participants with low working memory (as measured by the Operation 
Span, another working memory test that is not based on reading) whose inferencing was 
modulated by concurrent processing load. It is unclear why Counting Span would show a 
stronger relationship with inferencing and ignoring background speech but Reading Span would 
not; the processing components of these tasks involve different cognitive demands, however, so 
the fact that this effect was not observed in the Reading Span could potentially be informative 
about the nature of the cognitive demands imposed by inferencing in certain contexts. The 
proposal described above also necessitates the assumption that the effect of concurrent 
background speech is not incurred directly on the portion of working memory measured by the 
Counting Span. If it were, that would mean that having less working memory resources is similar 
to having a concurrent background task—in which case one would predict low-span participants 
in Experiment 4 to show a slowdown at this segment like high-span partcipants in the current 
experiment did. 
The other individual difference measure of interest was the Perspective-Taking subscale 
of the Interpersonal Activity Index. Recall that participants in Experiment 4 showed a facilitation 
effect at "the rest" (faster reading times in the upper-bounded context, where the scalar inference 
had been realized, than in the lower-bounded context), but participants in the present experiment 
did not show such a facilitation effect in the group analysis, which suggested that the presence of 
a concurrent processing load interfered with either their ability to realize inferences or their 
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ability to cancel inferences (see above for other possible accounts). In fact, however, participants 
with a high perspective-taking ability did show a trend towards having this facilitation effect. 
This suggests that perspective-taking ability is related to the ability to perform inference-related 
processing in cognitively taxing situations. It remains difficult to tell, however, whether the task 
modulated participants' abilities to realize inferences or to cancel them. In an fMRI study by Sai 
and colleagues (submitted), perspective-taking ability on the IRI was correlated with BOLD 
activations in the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus possibly related to inhibiting inferences. They 
compared even sentences that are congruent with the inference made from noun modified by 
even (e.g., "Even such a quiet sound, he can hear", in which the even-NP triggers an inference 
that the sentence will be about someone's good hearing ability) to even sentences that are 
incongruent with the inference (e.g., "Even such a loud sound, he can hear", in which the 
even-NP triggers an inference that the sentence will be about someone's poor hearing ability), 
and found that participants with higher perspective-taking ability showed the highest activation 
in the latter condition, compared to the former. They concluded that the incongruent sentences 
required inhibition of an inference, and that inhibition was modulated by perspective-taking 
ability. (It is an open question, however, whether participants with higher perspective-taking 
ability showed more activation because they performed this inhibition more, or because it took 
them more effort to perform it.) Perspective-taking ability is also correlated with gray matter 
volume in the anterior cingulate cortex (Banissy et al., 2012), a region involved in conflict 
monitoring and social cognition which has also been implicated in the processing of incongruous 
inferences (Shetreet et al., in press). Under such an account, the relationship between 
perspective-taking and the context effect in the present experiment might be taken as evidence 
that the inference was realized rapidly and by default in all contexts, and only participants with 
high perspective-taking ability were then able to cancel it in lower-bounded contexts (thus 
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leading to the facilitation effect for these participants), whereas participants with low 
perspective-taking ability were unable to do so. On the other hand, whereas Sai and colleagues 
(submitted) implicate the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (the region in which they observed 
correlations with perspective-taking ability) in inference cancellation, Shetreet and colleagues (in 
press) implicate the left inferior frontal gyrus in inference realization. If perspective-taking 
abilities play a role in inference realization rather than inference cancellation, the same pattern of 
results in the present study could be taken as evidence that the inference was realized by all 
participants in Experiment 4, but that in the present experiment it was realized only by 
participants with high perspective-taking ability, and was not realized at all by participants with 
low perspective-taking ability. In short, further investigation is needed to elucidate the 
relationship between perspective-taking ability and the realization of scalar inferences. 
 
3.6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The experiments reported in this chapter yielded three main results. First, the realization 
of scalar inferences was sensitive to the information-structural constraints of the context—such 
that inferences were realized when the meaning they contribute would be discursively relevant, 
and not realized when it would not be. Second, realizing scalar inferences did not elicit directly 
observable processing costs in omnibus analyses. Third, inferencing was sensitive to the 
availability of processing resources, such that the context-sensitivity of inferencing was not 
observed when participants were under a concurrent processing load. 
The present results raise questions for context-based models. While numerous recent 
studies have suggested that inferences are realized at a delay except in special contexts (e.g., 
Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Bott et al., 2012; Hartshorne and Snedeker, submitted), the traditional 
explanation for that finding is that inferencing is effortful and thus the parser avoids inferencing 
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until after it can evaluate whether the extra effort is worthwhile, or at least until after the core 
semantic meaning of the scalar term has already been realized. The context-driven accounts' 
predictions about the delayed realization of scalar inferences are still tenable without evidence 
for processing costs—such accounts assume that the output of semantic composition feeds into 
the inferencing process, and thus even if inferencing itself is effortless it cannot be done until 
after semantic composition is complete—but it is unclear how such accounts could explain the 
context-sensitivity without recourse to processing costs. If inferencing is not effortful, then a new 
explanation for the context-sensitivity would be needed (see Bott et al., 2012, for several 
alternative accounts). Alternatively, inferencing may be effortful but reading times may not be 
sensitive to this effort. If that is the case, future studies must use other methods, such as 
event-related potentials, to test for different instantiations of processing costs. 
 The present study also raises questions for default accounts—specifically, while a default 
model could account for the present findings (by assuming that the inference was effortlessly 
realized at "some of" and then cancelled in the lower-bound context before "the rest"), default 
models owe an account of the nature of inference cancellation and the processes that underlie it. 
Levinson (2000: 49-54) describes two algorithms for determining whether a default inference 
will be cancelled. The first involves checking whether an inference is consistent with the 
previous context or higher-ranked information (e.g., in the statement "some of the students are 
hardworking; in fact, all of them are", the inference "not all of the students are hardworking" is 
inconsistent with the explicit entailment "all of the students are [hardworking]"—in this 
formulation, entailments take precedence over implicatures).
33
 The lower-bounded contexts in 
                                                 
 
33
 Katsos and Cummins (2010: 286) make reference to additional epistemic factors in the context which could cause 
an inference to be cancelled or not realized, such as if a speaker is known to be non-cooperative. 
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the present study would not trigger inference cancellation from this mechanism, since the 
inference does not conflict with information in the sentence or prevent the comprehender from 
completing the task (i.e., the question of "whether any of John's relatives are staying in his 
apartment" is answered even if the answer is "some but not all of them are"). Therefore, the fact 
that the inference was cancelled in lower-bound contexts before "the rest" (as evidenced by 
slower reading times to "the rest" in that context in Experiment 4) would have to be explained 
through the second cancellation mechanism described by Levinson (2000), whereby inferences 
that are irrelevant to the goal of the conversation are discarded. However, Breheny, Katsos, and 
Williams (2006; see also Katsos & Cummins, 2010: 287, 288) assume that inference cancellation 
should involve extra effort, and some experimental evidence also suggests that it does (Feeney et 
al., 2004; Politzer-Ahles et al., 2013). If the processor avoids unnecessary effort, it is unclear 
why it would make the effort to cancel inferences that do not interfere with the comprehension of 
the utterance. As suggested by Levinson (2000: 53), the default model is lacking a full account of 
what about this particular context would cause inference cancellation, and the nature of the 
process through which inferences are cancelled; the results of the present study highlight the 
need for such an account if the default model is to explain how meaning is realized online in the 
contexts tested in this experiment. 
 The present results may be amenable to the constraint-based account proposed by Degen 
and Tanenhaus (2011). Under this account, scalar inferencing is a result of rapid integration of 
multiple constraints, which may facilitate or inhibit the inference. Unlike traditional 
context-driven accounts, this account may predict that inferencing is both context-sensitive and 
potentially rapid and effortless. If numerous constraints strongly facilitate the inference, then 
realizing the inference may not require great effort; on the other hand, if constraints discourage 
the comprehender from making the inference, it may not be realized at all. Such a model would 
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be able to account for seemingly effortless inferencing in contexts like the upper-bound context 
of the present study. This is different from traditional context-driven models, which assume that 
inferencing is always costly and therefore that when it does happen it will be late and effortful. 
Further study would be useful to investigate the predictions of a constraint-based account for this 
type of paradigm. 
 A constraint-based approach may also offer an explanation for the puzzling difference 
between the results of the present experiments and those of the experiment reported by Bergen 
and Grodner (2012). Recall that in that experiment, a reading time slowdown was observed at the 
quantifier in the context that supports scalar inferencing, and it was not due to the sorts of lexical 
confounds that were present in the study by Breheny and colleagues (2006). At face value, the 
results of that experiment seem to contract this one. That experiment, however, used a different 
context manipulation than the present experiment. Experiments using information structure 
(upper- vs. lower-bounding) as a context manipulation have not robustly found evidence for 
directly observable processing costs from inferencing (Lewis & Phillips, 2011; this study), nor 
have experiments using semantic structure (entailment polarity) as the manipulation (Hartshorne 
& Snedeker, submitted), whereas Bergen and Grodner's (2012) study using knowledge of the 
speaker's epistemic state has found such evidence. It is possible that these context manipulations 
facilitate inferencing to greater or lesser extents. In the constraint-based framework, a context 
that facilitates inferencing only to a small extent may lead to a case in which inferencing occurs 
but it is not entirely immediate or effortless. 
 A remaining question concerns the significance of the fact that the context-sensitivity of 
inferencing was eliminated under processing load. As described in the previous section, this 
result may be consistent with any of the processing models described here, depending on 
whether the processing load prevented inferencing itself, or inference cancellation, or the use of 
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inference-based information to assist in lexical access and discourse integration. Further study is 
necessary to elucidate the role of concurrent processing load in the realization of scalar 
inferences. 
 In conclusion, the experiments presented in this chapter raise questions for both 
traditional accounts of inferencing, and suggests that alternative accounts or reformulations of 
these accounts may be worth considering. The results also challenge the field to seek evidence 
for processing costs in new ways. Both of these endeavors have the potential to improve our 
understanding of how comprehenders compose the meaning of utterances in real-time. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS 
The experiments reported here examined the representation processing of inference-based 
meaning using neurolinguistic and psycholinguistic techniques. The first set of experiments 
(Experiments 1-3) was designed to test whether the processing of enriched, scalar 
inference-based meanings is subserved by cognitive and neural mechanisms that are independent 
from those subserving the processing of lexical and compositional semantic meaning. Previous 
electrophysiological studies of this type of meaning had used a paradigm which only allowed for 
the examination of how the scalar inference influenced the processing of later words, and thus 
did not provide opportunities to examine how the scalar inference itself was processed. Using a 
new picture-sentence verification design, the present experiments showed evidence that the 
processing of the scalar inference elicits a unique electrophysiological response at the position of 
the scalar term itself: unlike lexico-semantic and compositional semantic violations, scalar 
implicature-based violations elicited a broad sustained negativity. This ERP pattern may be 
related to revision and reinterpretation of meaning, which was possible in the scalar 
implicature-based violations but not the other violations. These experiments also expanded the 
empirical domain of scalar implicature research by testing Chinese, a language which has 
previously been the focus of only one experimental investigation of scalar implicature (Wu & 
Tan, 2009), whereas the rest of the research on online scalar implicature processing has been 
conducted almost entirely on Indo-European languages. 
While those experiments examined how comprehenders accommodate a meaning that is 
incompatible with the context, the second series of experiments (Experiments 4-5) investigated 
how comprehenders realize that meaning in the first place. These experiments compared reading 
times to scalar quantifiers that received an upper-bounded interpretation to those that received a 
lower-bounded interpretation. The results showed that realizing the upper-bounded interpretation 
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did not elicit any directly observable processing costs. This finding raised the question of why 
certain commonly-reported aspects of scalar inferencing, such as delay and context-sensitivity, 
would emerge if inferencing is not effortful. The results of these experiments challenged 
traditional context-driven accounts, which suppose properties such as delay and 
context-sensitivity are a direct result of the effort required to realize inferences. They may be 
consistent, however, with a constraint-based account that views inferencing as more gradient, 
and thus may be able to account for the possibility that inferencing seems to be effortful in some 
contexts and effortless in others. 
The present experiments have also raised new research questions to be addressed. The 
ERP experiments reported in Chapter 2 provided evidence for the existence of an ERP correlate 
of pragmatic revision, but the precise neural substrates of this effect are still unknown. 
Identifying the neural generators of this effect may further our understanding of the processes 
underlying the revision or inhibition of inference-based meaning. In particular, a deeper 
understanding of the neural and cognitive mechanisms subserving scalar inference processing 
may shed light on the nature of scalar inferencing itself, and the controversial question of 
whether it is a "pragmatic" or "semantic" phenomenon (see the discussion in Section 1.1). 
It also remains to be seen whether this effect is unique to the kind of inferences examined 
in this dissertation, or whether it generalizes to other pragmatic phenomena—if the hypothesis 
that it reflects revision or inhibition of a particular aspect of meaning is correct, then this ERP 
may also appear for similar phenomena, such as standardization implicitures (Garrett & Harnish, 
2007).  
The results of the self-paced reading experiments, along with those of previous self-paced 
reading and eye-tracking experiments, have raised the possibility that scalar inferencing may 
evoke processing costs that are not detectable through self-paced reading times. Thus, future 
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work testing these kinds of phenomena for processing costs using other methods, such as ERPs, 
will be valuable for the field of experimental pragmatics. Another very interesting possibility 
highlighted by recent self-paced reading studies (particularly the comparison between the studies 
reported by Hartshorne & Snedeker, submitted; Bergen & Grodner, 2012; and here) is that 
different contexts differ in the strength of the bias they create for or against inferencing. This 
possibility underscores the need for the field to consider new measures that are sensitive to the 
strength of contextual biases and to the strength of the activations of each interpretation of some 
of, rather than all-or-nothing measures of whether the inference was made or not. Eye-tracking 
(visual world and look-and-listen) may be one such promising method, and has already been 
shown to be an effective tool for investigating scalar inferencing in numerous studies (Huang & 
Snedeker, 2009; Grodner et al., 2010; Panizza et al., 2011; Breheny et al., 2012, in press). 
However, visual world and look-and-listen data need to be aggregated over multiple trials to 
reveal gradient biases, and thus may not be sensitive to differences in bias across individual 
items (although they are sensitive to differences in bias between groups of items). 
Neurolinguistic methods may also be useful if the neural correlates of considering an 
upper-bounded meaning can be identified. 
The present experiments focused exclusively on scalar inferences associated with 
quantifiers such as some of. For reasons described in the first chapter, there are sound 
methodological reasons for choosing this scalar, which is why it has become such a popular case 
for investigation in experimental pragmatics: the different interpretations of some of map onto 
quantifiable alternatives (e.g., all of or not all of) which are easy to map onto discrete 
representations in the real world, which makes it relatively easy to construct distinct conditions 
for experimental analysis. Nonetheless, other linguistic expressions, such as or, have scalar 
inferences associated with them. Furthermore, scalar inferences can be associated with nearly 
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any linguistic expression if the context allows the comprehender to form a post-hoc scale. For 
instance, in a context in which there are several forks, several spoons, and a box, the utterance 
"The woman put a fork into the box" may be understood as meaning "The woman put a fork and 
nothing else into the box", where the and nothing else interpretation is derived through a scalar 
implicature specific to that context. These inferences that are based on a context rather than a 
specific linguistic expression like some of are often referred to as particularized conversational 
implicatures (although accounts based on Relevance Theory assume that all implicatures, 
including those about expressions like some of, are cases of particularized conversational 
implicature; see Noveck & Sperber, 2007; Katsos & Cummins, 2010). It is indeed possible to 
conduct well-controlled investigation of scalar expressions such as or (see, e.g., Breheny et al., 
2006; Chevallier et al., 2008), and of particularized conversational implicatures (Breheny et al., 
in press). Given that scalar implicature does not seem to be a monolithic phenomenon, but rather 
that different scales seem to differ greatly in the strength of the upper-bounded meanings they 
create and the fuzziness of elements on the scale (Doran et al., 2009, 2012; Newstead, 1988), 
much work remains to test whether conclusions made about the speed, effort, and 
context-dependency of inferencing related to some of will extend to other types of inferencing or 
not. 
In summary, the present dissertation has presented several experimental approaches to 
investigating the processing of scalar inferencing, and has shown that the mechanisms 
subserving scalar implicature processing may be more gradient and constraint-based than 
traditional accounts assumed.While a wide variety of contexts and manipulations remains to be 
tested before the field can arrive at a full understanding of the general mechanisms subserving 
scalar inferencing, the neurolinguistic and psycholinguistic approach described in this 
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dissertation presents a way forward in studying how this important aspect of meaning is realized 
and negotiated during the real-time comprehension of natural language. 
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APPENDIX A: POST-ERP QUESTIONNAIRE (CHINESE) 
1、在刚才实验的过程中，您觉得有哪几种句子与图片含义不一致的情况？请举例并说明
（请尽可能列举全面）。 
 
 
2、请看下面的图片和句子。您认为这个句子是否和图片内容相一致？请解释你为什么这
么认为。 
 
“图片里，有的女孩坐在毯子上。” 
 
 
3、在下面的图片当中，请打勾来选择那些图片适合这个句子（可以多选）： 
图片里，有的女孩在招出租车。 
A）  B）  
C）  D）  
E）   
 
 
4、在做实验的过程中，您有没有采用什么策略来决定是要看图的哪个部分？（例如：图
片出现的时候，您预期下面听到的句子可能说的是图的哪个部分？） 
 
 
5、请您认真阅读下面每一个句子，每个句子表达了一个命题，请判断这些命题的真假，
1-假，7代表真。1到 7 分之间表示命题真假程度上的差别。 
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请您认真阅读下面每一个句子，并判断句子听上去是否别扭。请在下面的数字上画圈，1
代表十分别扭，7 代表十分正常。1-7 分之间表示程度上的差别。 
句子 真假（1为假、7为真） 别扭性（1为十分别扭、7为十分
正常） 
有的人有亲兄弟。 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
有的乌龟有贝壳。 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
有的上衣有扣子。 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
有的句子含有词语。 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
有的国旗上印有星星的图案。 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
有的大楼有电梯。 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
有的长颈鹿有脖子。 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
有的楼梯有台阶。 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
有的兔子长了耳朵。 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
有的公园有大树。 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
6、您认为这项实验的目的是什么？ 
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APPENDIX B: POST-ERP QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) 
1. In the experiment, what types of picture-sentence inconsistencies did you notice? Please use 
examples and explain the inconsistency (please be as thorough as possible). 
 
 
2. Please look at the picture and sentence below. Do you think this sentence is consistent with the 
content of the picture? Please explain why you think this way. 
 
"In the picture, some of the girls are sitting on blankets." 
 
 
3. Among the following pictures, please indicate which pictures are consistent with the sentence. 
(You can choose more than one.) 
In the picture, some of the girls are hailing taxis. 
A)  B)  
C)  D)  
E)   
 
 
4. While doing the experiment, did you use any particular strategy to decide which part of the 
picture to pay attention to? (For example: when the picture was shown, did you have any 
expectation about which part of the picture would be mentioned in the following sentence?) 
  
 
5. Please carefully read each of the following sentences. Each sentence expresses a proposition. 
Please evaluate how true the expressions are (1 represents "false", 7 represents "true"). The 
numbers between 1 and 7 represent differences in the extent of truth or falsehood. 
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Please carefully read each of the following sentences and evaluate whether the sentence sounds 
awkward. Please chose one of the numbers below; 1 represents "very awkward", 7 represents 
"very normal", and the numbers in between represent differences in the extent of awkwardness or 
naturalness. 
Sentence Truth (1=false, 7=true) Awkwardness (1=very awkward, 
7=very natural) 
Some people have brothers. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Some turtles have shells. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Some shirts have buttons. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Some sentences have words. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Some flags have stars. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Some buildings have elevators. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Some giraffes have necks. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Some staircases have steps. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Some rabbits have ears. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Some gardens have trees. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
6. What do you think the purpose of this experiment was? 
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APPENDIX C: SELF-PACED READING STIMULI (EXPERIMENTS 4 & 5) 
Critical items 
Item Vignette Comprehension 
question 
Correct 
choice 
Incorrect 
choice 
1 Mary was preparing to throw a party for 
John's relatives. / She asked John 
whether (all of them/any of them) were 
staying in his apartment. / John said that 
(some of them/only some of them) 
were. / He added / that / the rest / would 
be / staying / in a hotel. 
Who was Mary 
throwing a party 
for? 
John's 
relatives 
Her 
co-workers 
2 Bill took out the fancy candles from the 
drawer. / He asked Claire whether (all 
of them/any of them) should be lit for 
dinner. / Claire said that (some of 
them/only some of them) should. / She 
added / that / the rest / would be / 
needed / later. 
What were Bill 
and Claire 
lighting the 
candles for? 
Dinner A birthday 
cake 
3 Susie heard Matthew's friends at the 
door. / She asked him whether (all of 
them/any of them) were going to the 
movie with him. / Matthew said that 
(some of them/only some of them) 
were. / He added / that / the rest / would 
be / too / busy. 
Whose friends 
were at the door? 
Matthew's Susie's 
4 The zookeeper was going to do a 
routine check-up on the lions. / He 
asked Robbie whether (all of them/any 
of them) had been fed that morning. / 
Robbie said that (some of them/only 
some of them) had. / He added / that / 
the rest / would be / fed / in the 
afternoon. 
Who was going 
to check up on 
the lions? 
The 
zookeeper 
Robbie 
5 In the store, Sally was unpacking the 
new shipment of shoes. / She asked 
Tiffany whether (all of them/any of 
them) should be marked on sale. / 
Tiffany said that (some of them/only 
some of them) should. / She added / that 
/ the rest / would be / at / full price. 
What was in the 
shipment? 
Shoes Pants 
6 Mrs. Myers was worried that her 
students weren't ready for the test. / She 
asked the Mr. Robbins whether (all of 
them/any of them) had to take the test. / 
Who was 
worried about 
their students? 
Mrs. Myers Mr. 
Robbins 
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Mr. Robbins said that (some of 
them/only some of them) did. / He 
added / that / the rest / would be / able to 
/ take it / the next weekend. 
7 Trevor was curious about the 
professors' summer breaks. / He asked 
Dr. Johnson whether (all of them/any of 
them) would be going out of town. / Dr. 
Johnson said that (some of them/only 
some of them) would. / He added / that / 
the rest / would be / around / all 
summer. 
What break did 
Trevor ask 
about? 
Summer 
break 
Winter 
break 
8 The local papers were all covering 
Jason's press conference. / Jason asked 
his publicist Sally whether (all of 
them/any of them) would run a 
front-page story. / Sally said that (some 
of them/only some of them) would. / 
She added / that / the rest / would be / 
running / other stories. 
Where were 
some of the 
papers going to 
run the story? 
The front 
page 
The 
editorials 
section 
9 Terry and his coach Rick were 
discussing top runners from the area. / 
Terry asked Rick whether (all of 
them/any of them) would be at the race. 
/ Rick said that (some of them/only 
some of them) would. / He added / that / 
the rest / would be / resting / for the 
championships. 
What's the 
coach's name? 
Rick Terry 
10 Lydia was trying to choose one of the 
kittens from her friend Kim's pet store. / 
She asked Kim if (all of them/any of 
them) had gotten their shots yet. / Kim 
said that (some of them/only some of 
them) had. / She added / that / the rest / 
would be / getting them / later. 
What was the 
mother 
concerned 
about? 
Whether the 
kittens had 
shots 
Whether 
the kittens 
were 
spayed 
11 Justin wanted to find out which of 
Mike's desserts he could eat. / He asked 
Mike whether (all of them/any of them) 
could be made gluten free. / Mike said 
that (some of them/only some of them) 
could. / He added / that / the rest / 
would be / hard to do / that way. 
What can't Justin 
eat? 
Gluten Dairy 
12 Kurt and Brooke were thinking of 
selling their movies at a yard sale. / 
Brooke asked Kurt whether (all of 
them/any of them) were all right to sell. 
/ Kurt said that (some of them/only 
Why couldn't 
Kurt sell some of 
the movies? 
Inappropriate 
for kids 
Too 
unpopular 
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some of them) were. / He added / that / 
the rest / would be / inappropriate / for 
kids. 
13 Jenna and Alex were making cupcakes. 
/ Jenna asked Alex whether (all of 
them/any of them) were ready to be 
frosted. / Alex said that (some of 
them/only some of them) were. / He 
added / that / the rest / would be / ready 
/ soon. 
When would the 
cupcakes be 
ready? 
Soon Not for a 
while 
14 Lyle was driving to meet his friends at 
the restaurant. / He asked Sarah 
whether (all of them/any of them) were 
already at the table. / Sarah said that 
(some of them/only some of them) 
were. / She added / that / the rest / 
would be / there / in five minutes. 
When were the 
rest of the 
friends arriving? 
Five minutes Fifteen 
minutes 
15 The students had prepared for the final 
presentation. / Allie asked Margaret 
whether (all of them/any of them) were 
supposed to present today. / Margaret 
said that (some of them/only some of 
them) were. / She added / that / the rest / 
would be / presenting / on Thursday. 
When would the 
next day of 
presentations 
be? 
Thursday Monday 
16 Darren knew his relatives would come 
for his birthday. / Darren asked his 
mother, Sally, whether (all of them/any 
of them) would be giving him clothes. / 
Sally said that (some of them/only 
some of them) would. / She added / that 
/ the rest / would be / sending him / 
electronics. 
What was 
Darren getting 
presents for? 
Birthday Christmas 
17 Molly was looking at apartments. / She 
asked the agent Sally whether (all of 
them/any of them) would be available 
next month. / Sally said that (some of 
them/only some of them) would. / She 
added / that / the rest / would be / 
available / in August. 
   
18 Ryan had moved to a new town and was 
curious about the radio stations there. / 
He asked John whether (all of them/any 
of them) would play classic rock hits. / 
John said that (some of them/only some 
of them) would. / He added / that / the 
rest / would be / only / country music. 
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19 The rock band was choosing cities to 
visit on their next tour. / They asked 
their manager Mary whether (all of 
them/any of them) would have good 
venues available. / Mary said that 
(some of them/only some of them) 
would. / She added / that / the rest / 
would be / booked / during the tour. 
   
20 Alex was perusing the breakfast cereals 
at the grocery store. / He asked Carrie 
whether (all of them/any of them) had 
high levels of sugar. / Carrie said that 
(some of them/only some of them) did. 
/ She added / that / the rest / would be / 
healthier / but / not as tasty. 
   
21 The kids in the first grade class were 
getting antsy. / Kim asked Mrs. Brady 
whether (all of them/any of them) could 
go outside for recess. / Mrs. Brady said 
that (some of them/only some of them) 
could. / She added / that / the rest / 
would be / staying inside / to do / 
make-up work. 
   
22 The soccer players were all training 
very hard. / Eric asked Jack whether (all 
of them/any of them) would go to the 
tournament. / Jack said that (some of 
them/only some of them) would. / He 
added / that / the rest / would be / 
staying / in town. 
   
23 The clothing store just received a 
shipment of jeans. / Jared asked Erica 
whether (all of them/any of them) 
should be displayed out front. / Erica 
said that (some of them/only some of 
them) should. / She added / that / the 
rest / would be / kept / in the back / for 
now. 
   
24 Mrs. Landman was looking at laptops 
for her grandson. / She asked the 
employee Larry whether (all of 
them/any of them) were easy to carry 
around. / Larry said that (some of 
them/only some of them) were. / He 
added / that / the rest / would be / pretty 
heavy / to carry / to classes. 
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25 Abby was taking her mom to meet her 
roommates. / Her mom asked Abby 
whether (all of them/any of them) 
would be home right now. / Abby said 
that (some of them/only some of them) 
would. / She added / that / the rest / 
would be / at work / or in class. 
   
26 Alexa was looking at the puppies at the 
shelter. / She asked the employee 
Stephen whether (all of them/any of 
them) would grow into large dogs. / 
Stephen said that (some of them/only 
some of them) would. / He added / that / 
the rest / would be / small / when 
full-grown. 
   
27 Eric was preparing to travel in Italy 
with his classmates. / Eric's mom asked 
him whether (all of them/any of them) 
had been to Europe before. / Eric said 
that (some of them/only some of them) 
had. / He added / that / the rest / would 
be / nervous about / traveling abroad. 
   
28 Carrie and Tim were comparing venues 
for their upcoming wedding. / Carrie 
asked Tim whether (all of them/any of 
them) would accommodate so many 
guests. / Tim said that (some of 
them/only some of them) would. / He 
added / that / the rest / would be / 
crowded / with / that many people. 
   
29 Lana was watching episodes of her 
favorite sitcom on her day off. / Ashley 
asked her whether (all of them/any of 
them) lasted less than an hour. / Lana 
said that (some of them/only some of 
them) did. / She added / that / the rest / 
would be / too rushed / that way. 
   
30 Arthur had set up tables for the garage 
sale. / Sarah asked him whether (all of 
them/any of them) would display the 
nice dishes. / Arthur said that (some of 
them/only some of them) would. / He 
added / that / the rest / would be / too / 
unstable. 
   
31 Brian had hired several new people to 
work at his restaurant. / The chef asked 
him whether (all of them/any of them) 
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would work in the kitchen. / Brian said 
that (some of them/only some of them) 
would. / He added / that / the rest / 
would be / servers / in the dining room. 
32 Josh wanted to talk about the new 
movie with his co-workers. / He asked 
his co-worker Seth whether (all of 
them/any of them) had seen the movie 
yet. / Seth said that (some of them/only 
some of them) had. / He added / that / 
the rest / would be / mad / if Josh / gave 
away spoilers. 
   
33 David and Brandon were looking at 
upcoming video games in the 
magazine. / David asked Brandon 
whether (all of them/any of them) 
would have a multiplayer mode. / 
Brandon said that (some of them/only 
some of them) would. / He added / that / 
the rest / would be / single player / only. 
   
34 Andrea was looking at computers in the 
store. / She asked the clerk Tom 
whether (all of them/any of them) came 
with webcams built in. / Tom said that 
(some of them/only some of them) did. 
/ He added / that / the rest / would be / 
able to use / a USB webcam. 
   
35 Molly and Tony were hosting a dinner 
party for Tony's classmates. / Molly 
asked Tony whether (all of them/any of 
them) were allergic to any foods. / Tony 
said that (some of them/only some of 
them) were. / He added / that / the rest / 
would be / able to eat / anything. 
   
36 Max and Aaron were getting ready to 
host prospective students. / Max asked 
Aaron whether (all of them/any of 
them) needed rides from the airport. / 
Aaron said that (some of them/only 
some of them) did. / He added / that / 
the rest / would be / driving / 
themselves. 
   
37 Dr. Jones was scheduling 
end-of-semester meetings. / The 
secretary asked him whether (all of 
them/any of them) would be in the 
afternoon. / Dr. Jones said that (some of 
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them/only some of them) would. / He 
added / that / the rest / would be / early / 
in the morning. 
38 Tracy and Mark were trying to choose a 
restaurant downtown for their rehearsal 
dinner. / Mark asked Tracy whether (all 
of them/any of them) were open on the 
weekends. / Tracy said that (some of 
them/only some of them) were. / She 
added / that / the rest / would be / closed 
/ at that time. 
   
39 Jason and Perry were ordering 
computers for the new lab. / Perry 
asked Jason whether (all of them/any of 
them) would have an Internet 
connection. / Jason said that (some of 
them/only some of them) would. / He 
added / that / the rest / would be / for 
offline work / only. 
   
40 Donna and Martha were discussing the 
rooms of the new house. / Donna asked 
Martha whether (all of them/any of 
them) would need to be wallpapered. / 
Martha said that (some of them/only 
some of them) would. / She added / that 
/ the rest / would be / painted / instead. 
   
41 Brian had just finished checking the 
bikes in Tom's garage. / Tom asked 
Brian whether (all of them/any of them) 
needed to get a tune-up. / Brian said 
that (some of them/only some of them) 
did. / He added / that / the rest / would 
be / fine / for / another few months. 
   
42 Jim and Breanna were thinking of 
inviting their classmates to the movie 
theater. / Jim asked Breanna whether 
(all of them/any of them) were 
interested in artsy movies. / Breanna 
said that (some of them/only some of 
them) were. / She added / that / the rest / 
would be / bored / at those movies. 
   
43 Paul and Deb were trying to decide 
which gym to go to. / Paul asked Deb 
whether (all of them/any of them) had 
discounts for college students. / Deb 
said that (some of them/only some of 
them) did. / She added / that / the rest / 
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would be / at / full price. 
44 Greg was trying to choose which wine 
to order with dinner. / He asked the 
waitress Michelle whether (all of 
them/any of them) would go well with 
fish. / Michelle said that (some of 
them/only some of them) would. / She 
added / that / the rest / would be / too 
sweet / for that. 
   
45 Ed and Hillary were considering 
several universities for grad school. / 
Hillary asked Ed whether (all of 
them/any of them) were very 
competitive in admissions. / Ed said 
that (some of them/only some of them) 
were. / He added / that / the rest / would 
be / easy / to get into. 
   
46 Stan and Marilyn were trying to decide 
what type of tree to plant. / Stan asked 
Marilyn whether (all of them/any of 
them) would grow well in shade. / 
Marilyn said that (some of them/only 
some of them) would. / She added / that 
/ the rest / would be / better off / in full 
sun. 
   
47 Quinn and Chase were thinking about 
going to one of the season's ball games. 
/ Quinn asked Chase whether (all of 
them/any of them) were scheduled for 
the afternoon. / Chase said that (some 
of them/only some of them) were. / He 
added / that / the rest / would be / 
played / at night. 
   
48 Andy and Lisa were moving some 
pieces of furniture. / Lisa asked Andy 
whether (all of them/any of them) 
would fit in his car. / Andy said that 
(some of them/only some of them) 
would. / He added / that / the rest / 
would be / too big / for his car. 
   
 
Filler items 
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Fillers are grouped by typs/conditions. The naming convention for the types of filler trials is as 
follows. The first quantifier (before the hyphen) refers to the quantifier used in the context 
question (segment 2); the second quantifier (after the hyphen) refers to the quantifier used in the 
answer. 
Vignette Comprehension 
question 
Correct 
choice 
Incorrect 
choice 
Filler type: all-some 
The student was concerned about the exams for this 
class. / He asked the teacher whether all of them had 
essay questions. / The teacher said that / some of them 
/ did. / She added / that / he should / prepare carefully 
/ beforehand. 
What was the 
student 
concerned about? 
The exams The final 
project 
Arnold was excited to meet the new students in the 
department. / He asked his professor whether all of 
them were out-of-state. / The professor said that / 
some of them / were. / She added / that / there were 
even / several / international students. 
Were any new 
international 
students coming 
to the 
department? 
Yes No 
Marty was trying to pick an ice cream flavor at the ice 
cream shop. / He asked the worker whether all of 
them were low-fat. / The worker said that / some of 
them / were. / He added / that / his favorite flavor / 
was / rainbow sherbet. 
Who was getting 
ice cream? 
Marty Jim 
Laurie was at the store on Black Friday looking at 
cameras. / She asked the clerk whether all of them 
were on sale. / The clerk said that / some of them / 
were. / He added / that / some / would also / come 
with / a free / memory card. 
What did some 
of the cameras 
come with? 
Memory 
card 
Tote bag 
Luke took the big bag of mushrooms out of the 
refrigerator. / He asked Jean whether all of them were 
going in the salad. / Jean said that / some of them / 
were. / She told Luke / to / pick out / the best ones / 
and give them / to her. 
   
Joshua and Kelly were trying to decide which caf?? to 
go to to do homework. / Joshua asked Kelly whether 
all of them had wireless internet. / Kelly said that / 
some of them / did. / She added / that / what was / 
more important / was whether / the coffee / was good. 
   
Heather was looking at new cars at the dealership. / 
She asked the salesman whether all of them had 
built-in GPS. / The salesman said that / some of them 
/ did. / He added / that / it is / a really convenient / 
feature. 
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Erik and Jonathan were grilling some steaks. / Erik 
asked Jonathan whether all of them should be 
well-done. / Jonathan said that / some of them / 
should. / He added / that / most people / are not / too 
picky. 
   
Bill and Diane had gathered logs for a fire. / Bill 
asked Diane whether all of them were dry enough to 
burn. / Diane said that / some of them / were. / She 
added / that / if they / needed / to gather more / they 
could. 
   
Noah and Eva were playing with toys in the yard. / 
Noah asked Eva whether all of them were waterproof. 
/ Eva said that / some of them / were. / She added / 
that / they could / take them / in the pool. 
   
Doug and Sara were lighting sparklers. / Sara asked 
Doug whether all of them were multi-colored. / Doug 
said that / some of them / were. / He added / that / 
multi-colored / sparklers / are / the most / popular. 
   
Susie and Becky were looking at cottages to rent. / 
Susie asked Becky whether all of them were right on 
the lake. / Becky said that / some of them / were. / She 
added / that / those ones / were / the most / expensive. 
   
Filler type: any-some 
James was curious about Maggie's pet dogs. / He 
asked her whether any of them could do tricks. / 
Maggie said that / some of them / could. / She added / 
that / many of / their tricks / were / quite impressive. 
Who had pet 
dogs? 
Maggie James 
The coach was gathering up the volleyballs after 
practice. / He asked the players whether any of them 
were going flat. / The players said that / some of them 
/ were. / They added / that / the nets / were also / a bit 
low. 
How were the 
volleyball nets? 
Too low Just right 
The teachers were chaperoning the kids on the school 
field trip. / Before leaving, Mr. Johnson asked 
whether any of them had asked to go to the bathroom. 
/ Mrs. Baker said that / some of them / had. / She 
added / that / she / had / to go / too. 
Where were the 
kids? 
A field trip Vacation 
Teresa, a special education teacher, had a new group 
of students this year. / She asked her boss whether 
any of them had classroom assistants. / Her boss said 
that / some of them / did. / She added / that / the 
assistants / were all / highly trained. 
What did Teresa 
teach? 
Special 
education 
Physical 
education 
Grace and Joleen were trying to decide which of their 
friends to ask them to help move. / Joleen asked 
Grace whether any of them had a pickup truck. / 
Grace said that / some of them / did. / She added / that 
   
181 
 
/ they should try / to think of / someone who / was not 
/ very busy. 
Travis and Kim were trying to figure out which 
professor to take English from. / Travis asked Kim 
whether any of them gave study guides before exams. 
/ Kim said that / some of them / did. / She added / that 
/ she cared / more about / which professors / did not 
require / a final paper. 
   
Ian and Christine were trying to decide which yogurt 
shop to go to. / Christine asked Ian whether any of 
them had granola as a topping. / Ian said that / some 
of them / did. / He added / that / he wanted / granola / 
on his yogurt, / too. 
   
Adam and Johanna had been looking at new 
televisions. / Adam asked Johanna whether any of 
them would fit in their TV cabinet. / Johanna said that 
/ some of them / would. / She added / that / they would 
/ also need / to leave / space for / a DVD player. 
   
Lance and Olivia were thinking about visiting one of 
the museums in town. / Olivia asked Lance whether 
any of them had dinosaur exhibits. / Lance said that / 
some of them / did. / She added / that / they could / 
also / look for / a planetarium. 
   
Claire and Andrea were trying to decide which trivia 
team to join. / Claire asked Andrea whether any of 
them were any good. / Andrea said that / some of 
them / were. / She added / that / her old team / had 
won / the championship. 
   
The chef wanted to buy chicken from one of the local 
farms. / She asked her assistant whether any of them 
were certified organic. / The assistant said that / some 
of them / were. / He added / that / organic food / is 
becoming / more popular. 
   
Zach was looking at tomatoes at the farmer's market. / 
He asked his friend whether any of them looked ripe. 
/ His friend said that / some of them / did. / He added / 
that / they should / buy / some basil, / too. 
   
Filler type: all-onlysome 
Ben wanted to learn about South American countries. 
/ He asked Amy whether all of them were 
Spanish-speaking. / Amy said that / only some of 
them / were. / She added / that / many other / 
languages / are spoken / there, / too. 
Which countries 
was Ben 
interested in? 
South 
American 
countries 
Asian 
countries 
The little boy wanted to look at the books in the 
library. / He asked his mom whether all of them were 
picture books. / His mother said that / only some of 
What did the boy 
want from the 
library? 
Books DVDs 
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them / were. / She added / that / the picture books / 
were / in the / kids' section. 
Dan was talking to his roommate Chen about people 
from Hong Kong. / Dan asked Chen whether all of 
them are bilingual in Chinese and English. / Chen 
said that / only some of them / are. / He added / that / 
it depends on / their age / and / education level. 
Where is Dan's 
roommate from? 
Hong Kong Thailand 
Sally was checking out books from the library. / She 
asked the librarian whether all of them were due the 
next month. / The librarian said that / only some of 
them / were. / She added / that / Sally / could check / 
the due dates / online. 
How did the 
librarian say 
Sally could 
check the due 
dates? 
Online By phone 
Jay was trying to choose which sandwich to get at the 
deli. / He asked whether all of them came with a soup. 
/ The cashier said that / only some of them / did. / He 
added / that / the ones / that came / with soup / were 
indicated / on the menu. 
   
Sam was looking at the books on the list for his class. 
/ He asked his friend whether all of them were 
required reading. / His friend said that / only some of 
them / were. / She added / that / Sam / could buy them 
/ cheaper / online. 
   
Sonja and Alex were trying to decide which concert 
to go to. / Alex asked Sonja whether all of them were 
in the evening. / Sonja said that / only some of them / 
were. / She added / that / Alex / could choose / which 
one / to go to. 
   
Lee and Carol wanted to buy one of the hot tubs at the 
store. / Lee asked Carol whether all of them could sit 
eight people. / Carol said that / only some of them / 
could. / She added / that / she did not / foresee / 
needing / eight seats. 
   
Peter and Anne were considering presents for a baby 
shower. / Anne asked Peter whether all of them would 
work for either gender. / Peter said that / only some of 
them / would. / He added / that / she could / make / the 
final choice. 
   
Tyler and Rose wanted to serve ice cream to the 
guests. / Rose asked Tyler whether all of them could 
eat dairy. / Tyler said that / only some of them / could. 
/ He added / that / sorbet / was also / available. 
   
Kylie and Lauren were trying to decide which air 
conditioner to buy. / Lauren asked Kylie whether all 
of them were environmentally friendly. / Kylie said 
that / only some of them / were. / She added / that / 
she cared / more / about / how powerful / they were. 
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Carmen and Maria were picking flowers in the 
garden. / Maria asked Carmen whether all of them 
would last for several days in a vase. / Carmen said 
that / only some of them / would. / She added / that / 
they could / always / pick more. 
   
Filler type: any-onlysome 
The freshman was trying to decide which English 
class to take. / He asked his classmate whether any of 
them were particularly easy. / His classmate said that 
/ only some of them / were. / He added / that / it 
depends on / the teacher. 
What year was 
the student? 
Freshman Sophomore 
The shopper was trying to decide which headphones 
to buy. / He asked the clerk whether any of them were 
sound-cancelling. / The clerk said that / only some of 
them / were. / He added / that / regular headphones / 
would be / just as good. 
Did the clerk 
recommend 
sound-cancelling 
headphones? 
No Yes 
Ellen was looking at the desserts at the buffet. / She 
asked the waiter whether any of them were 
sugar-free. / He said that / only some of them / were. / 
He added / that / the sugar-free / jello / was / really 
good. 
Which dessert 
does the waiter 
recommend? 
Sugar-free 
jello 
Pudding 
Will was trying to decide which tie to wear. / He 
asked Alice whether any of them went well with his 
suit. / She said that / only some of them / did. / She 
added / that / she / especially liked / the one / with / 
blue stripes. 
Which tie did 
Alice like? 
The blue 
striped one 
The red one 
Kristen and Ruth had to use one of the printers in the 
library. / Kristen asked Ruth whether any of them 
could print double-sided. / Ruth said that / only some 
of them / could. / She added / that / there might / be a 
long line / waiting / to use / those. 
   
Grant and Joel were looking at pumpkins in the 
pumpkin patch. / Joel asked Grant whether any of 
them were big enough to carve for Halloween. / Grant 
said that / only some of them / were. / He added / that 
/ it was / a little early / to be thinking / about 
Halloween / anyway. 
   
Joey and Ryan wanted to eat one of the pies their 
mother was baking. / Ryan asked Joey whether any of 
them had chocolate in them. / Joey said that / only 
some of them / did. / He added / that / they / still 
needed / to bake / for a while. 
   
Sylvia and Audrey were trying to decide which color 
nail polish to use. / Sylvia asked Audrey whether any 
of them were sparkly. / Audrey said that / only some 
of them / were. / She added / that / the purple / was / 
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an especially pretty / color. 
Donald and Shirley were looking at the cucumbers in 
the garden. / Donald asked Shirley whether any of 
them were big enough to pick. / Shirley said that / 
only some of them / were. / She added / that / the 
beans / were / in good shape, / though. 
   
Sophie and Jack had to choose which city to visit on 
vacation. / Jack asked Sophie whether any of them 
had a famous aquariu. / Sophie said that / only some 
of them / did. / She added / that / she / also wanted / to 
visit / a botanical garden. 
   
Jasper and Louise were flipping through channels on 
TV. / Louise asked Jasper whether any of them were 
showing a romantic comedy. / Jasper said that / only 
some of them / were. / He added / that / he / would 
prefer / to watch / a nature program. 
   
Neil and Eileen were trying to decide which team to 
support. / Eileen asked Neil whether any of them had 
cute mascots. / Neil said that / only some of them / 
did. / He added / that / he / did not / care much / about 
/ mascots. 
   
Filler type: all-all 
Julie realized she had forgotten to put the chocolates 
in the fridge. / She called her roommate and asked 
whether all of them had melted already. / Her 
roommate said that / all of them / had. / She added / 
that / they / had made / a mess / on the counter. 
Did the 
chocolates melt? 
Yes No 
The secretary was collecting course evaluations. / She 
asked Lisa whether all of the evaluations had been 
completed. / Lisa said that / all of them / had. / She 
added / that / she had left / the pencils / there / for / the 
next section. 
What did Lisa do 
with the pencils? 
Brought 
them back 
Left them 
in the room 
Max and Jim needed to add carrots to their big salad. / 
Max asked Jim whether all of them had been 
chopped. / Jim said that / all of them / had. / He added 
/ that / his hands / ached / from / all the chopping. 
What was Jim 
chopping for the 
salad? 
Carrots Tomatoes 
Sandi didn't want her cats running around during the 
dinner party. / She asked Ryan whether all of them 
had been shut in the upstairs room. / Ryan said that / 
all of them / had. / He added / that / he / had put / the 
litter box / there / as well. 
Why did Sandi 
and Ryan put the 
cats upstairs? 
Dinner 
party 
Going on 
vacation 
Bill and Jorge had to mark the roads the morning of 
the 5K race. / Bill asked Jorge whether all of them had 
been marked. / Jorge said that / all of them / had. / He 
added / that / he / had also / set up / the water stop. 
What race were 
Bill and Jorge 
setting up? 
5k race Marathon 
Jack was trying to choose which version of the What kind of Mac PC 
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software to buy. / He asked the saleswoman whether 
all of them would run on a Mac. / The saleswoman 
said that / all of them / would. / She added / that / 
someone / could / help Jack / install / the software. 
computer did 
Jack want to run 
the software on? 
Nikki was trying to convince Amy to read her favorite 
book series. / Amy asked Nikki whether all of them 
had happy endings. / Nikki said that / all of them / did. 
/ She added / that / the stories / were / very interesting 
/ as well. 
What did Nikki 
like about the 
books? 
The stories The 
illustrations 
Mitch was showing James the photos he had taken the 
other day. / James asked Mitch whether all of them 
had been touched up. / Mitch said that / all of them / 
had. / He added / that / it is / usually necessary / to 
touch up / the lighting / a little. 
What does Mitch 
usually touch up? 
The 
lighting 
The colors 
Terry was trying to choose a watch to buy. / He asked 
the clerk whether all of them had stopwatches. / The 
clerk said that / all of them / did. / He added / that / 
some / had / count-down timers / as well. 
   
Jackie and Rachel were talking about their 
co-workers. / Jackie asked Rachel whether all of them 
really rode their bikes to work. / Rachel said that / all 
of them / did. / She added / that / they were / always 
talking / about their bikes / around / the water cooler. 
   
Johnny's physical therapist had given him new 
exercises to do. / Johnny asked the physical therapist 
whether all of them were really necessary. / The 
physical therapist said that / all of them / were. / She 
added / that / they / would help / build up / his / back 
muscles. 
   
Jon was getting ready to take care of Kelly's cats for 
the weekend. / Jon asked Kelly whether all of them 
were outside cats. / Kelly said that / all of them / were. 
/ She added / that / they still / always came / back in / 
when it was time / for food. 
   
The manager had many forms to sign. / He asked his 
secretary whether all of them were ready yet. / The 
secretary said that / all of them / were. / She added / 
that / they / had to / be finished / before / five o'clock. 
   
Paula wanted to try one of the new brands of cat food 
for her cat. / She asked the pet store employee 
whether all of them were high in protein. / The 
employee said that / all of them / were. / She added / 
that / the chicken-based / flavors / were / very 
popular. 
   
The teacher wanted to borrow his colleague's markers 
for the whiteboard. / He asked his colleague whether 
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all of them worked. / His colleagues said that / all of 
them / did. / He added / that / there were also / more / 
in / the supply closet. 
Carla and Luke wanted to use one of the bright colors 
of paper to print flyers. / Luke asked Carla whether all 
of them were recyclable. / Carla said that / all of them 
/ were. / She added / that / blue / was always / a good 
choice. 
   
Kristy and Jeff had picked strawberries at a farm. / 
Kristy asked Jeff whether all of them were gone. / Jeff 
said that / all of them / were. / He added / that / they / 
had been / delicious. 
   
Tim had watered the plants in the front yard. / His 
mother asked him whether all of them had actually 
needed watering. / Tim said that / all of them / had. / 
He added / that / the heat / was / really tough / on 
plants. 
   
Casey and Jody were washing dishes after dinner. / 
Jody asked Casey whether all of them could go in the 
dishwasher. / Casey said that / all of them / could. / He 
added / that / he / hated / washing dishes / by hand. 
   
Carrie was photocopying articles for her advisor. / 
She asked her advisor whether all of them were worth 
reading. / Her advisor said that / all of them / were. / 
She added / that / Carrie / would enjoy / them. 
   
Karen and Nick were getting the books from the 
reading list for their class. / Karen asked Nick 
whether all of them were in the university bookstore. / 
Nick said that / all of them / were. / He added / that / 
they / had both / new / and used / copies. 
   
Dustin was looking at comics at his friend's house. / 
He asked his friend whether all of them were classic 
editions. / His friend said that / all of them / were. / He 
added / that / they / were in / mint condition. 
   
Rick was sorting through the shoes in his closet. / He 
asked his son whether all of them were out of style. / 
His son said that / all of them / were. / He added / that 
/ everything / his dad owned / was / out of / style. 
   
Richard and Cindy were baking potatoes for dinner. / 
Richard asked Cindy whether all of them were ready. 
/ Cindy said that / all of them / were. / She added / that 
/ the sour cream / was / already / on the table, / too. 
   
Filler type: any-all 
The kids were gathering up the game controllers to 
play video games. / They asked their mom whether 
any of them had batteries. / The mom said that / all of 
What were the 
kids going to 
play? 
Video 
games 
Board 
games 
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them / did. / She added / that / they / could only / play 
for / thirty minutes. 
Anita was trying to choose one of the French 
textbooks. / She asked the clerk whether any of them 
came with CDs. / The clerk said that / all of them / 
did. / She added / that / the CDs / were / very helpful. 
Who did Anita 
ask about the 
books? 
The clerk Her teacher 
Lauren and Sally were trying to decide which mall in 
the city to go to on Saturday. / Lauren asked whether 
any of them had a good food court. / Sally said that / 
all of them / did. / She added / that / one / in particular 
/ had / a great / pretzel stand. 
Who was Sally 
going to the mall 
with? 
Lauren Bethany 
Gary and Dana had picked up some snacks at the gas 
station. / Dana asked Gary whether any of them 
would spoil in the heat. / Gary said that / all of them / 
would. / He added / that / they would / be / home 
soon, / anyway. 
Where did Dana 
and Gary get 
snacks? 
The gas 
station 
The mall 
Derek and Sue were looking at rings at the jewelry 
store. / Derek asked Sue whether any of them caught 
her eye. / Sue said that / all of them / did. / She added 
/ that / she / felt like / a kid / in a / candy store. 
Did Julie like the 
rings? 
Yes No 
Nathan wanted eat one of the sandwiches available in 
the cafeteria. / He asked his coworker whether any of 
them were decent. / His coworker said that / all of 
them / were. / She added / that / the daily special / was 
/ a turkey BLT. 
Where was 
Nathan planning 
on eating? 
The 
cafeteria 
A 
restaurant 
Brad and Liz were looking at baby names in a book. / 
Liz asked Brad whether any of them were had 
historical significance. / He said that / all of them / 
did. / He added / that / some / were / more obscure / 
than / others. 
What were Brad 
and Liz looking 
for names for? 
A baby A pet 
Spencer was thinking about countries where he could 
go to teach English. / He asked his girlfriend whether 
any of them were appealing to her. / She said that / all 
of them / were. / She added / that / she / was really / up 
for / an adventure. 
Why was 
Spencer going 
abroad? 
To teach 
English 
To study 
Jordan was at the bookstore trying to choose a new 
poster to put on her wall. / She asked her roommate 
whether any of them would go with the colors in their 
room. / She said that / all of them / would. / She added 
/ that / she / loved / the Monet print. 
   
Fred and Erin wanted to go running at one of the 
parks in town. / Fred asked Erin whether any of them 
had water fountains. / She said that / all of them / did. 
/ She added / that / East Park / also had / restrooms. 
   
AJ and Ted wanted to try one of the new dishes at 
their favorite restaurant. / Ted asked AJ whether any 
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of them sounded especially good. / AJ said that / all of 
them / did. / He added / that / he / did not know / 
which / to choose. 
Angela was very confused by the homework 
problems. / She asked Tim whether he had 
understood any of them. / Tim said that / he 
understood / all of them. / He added / that / he / would 
not mind / helping her / after class. 
   
Marisa and Colin wanted to buy a new showerhead at 
the hardware store. / Marisa asked Colin whether any 
of them had different pressure settings. / Colin said 
that / all of them / did. / He added / that / they / came 
in / metal / or plastic, / too. 
   
Kate was looking at the cat toys at the pet store. / She 
asked the salesman whether any of them had catnip in 
them. / He said that / all of them / did. / He added / 
that / the toy mice / were / very popular. 
   
Kathryn was trying to choose a picture book to read 
before bed. / She asked her big sister whether any of 
them were about animals. / Her big sister said that / all 
of them / were. / She added / that / her favorite / was / 
about / a dog. 
   
Lara and Joseph were considering which topping to 
get on their pizza. / Joseph asked Lara whether any of 
them would go well with green peppers. / Lara said 
that / all of them / would. / She added / that / she / felt 
like / mushrooms, / too. 
   
Heath and Steven were looking at new video game 
systems. / Steven asked Heath whether any of them 
were better than his old system. / Heath said that / all 
of them / were. / He added / that / the real issue / was / 
which one / had / the best games. 
   
Brendan and Everett had to pick which towels to 
bring to the beach. / Brendan asked Everett whether 
any of them were extra long. / Everett said that / all of 
them / were. / He added / that / they / should bring / a 
few / extras. 
   
Ernest and Nancy were trying to decide which buffet 
to go to. / Nancy asked Ernest whether any of them 
had a student discount. / Ernest said that / all of them / 
did. / He added / that / they / should choose / the one / 
that / was closest. 
   
Lola and Danny had picked up some avocados at the 
store. / Danny asked Lola whether any of them were 
ripe enough to eat. / Lola said that / all of them / were. 
/ She added / that / they / should make / guacamole. 
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Gabby was trying to decide which flavor of pudding 
to make for dessert. / She asked her father whether 
any of them sounded good to him. / He said that / all 
of them / did. / He added / that / he / would be / 
happiest / with / tapioca. 
   
Adrienne and Maddie wanted to take the canoe out on 
one of the lakes near their house. / Maddie asked 
Adrienne whether any of them had snapping turtles. / 
Adrienne said that / all of them / did. / She added / that 
/ they would / be safe / in the canoe / regardless. 
   
Melissa wanted soft serve from one of the local ice 
cream shops. / She asked her mother whether any of 
them had sprinkles. / Her mother said that / all of 
them / did. / She added / that / she / liked / sprinkles, / 
too. 
   
Nico and has friends were trying to decide which of 
their cars to take to the concert. / Nico asked whether 
any of them had air conditioning. / His friend Pat said 
that / all of them / did. / He added / that / his own car / 
was / low / on gas. 
   
Filler type: noquantifier-otherquantifiers 
Stephanie loved the stones in Jim's rock collection. / 
She asked him whether they were from nearby. / Jim 
said that / many of them / were. / He added / that / the 
rest / he had / gotten / while traveling. 
What did Jim 
have a collection 
of? 
Stamps Rocks 
Anthony was thinking of joining his friend Tad's 
intramural soccer team. / Anthony asked Tad whether 
the players were very experienced. / Tad said that / 
many of them / were. / He added / that / the rest / were 
new / but / had already / improved a lot. 
How were the 
new players in 
the team doing? 
They had 
improved. 
They had 
made no 
progress. 
Jake and Charlie were talking about the bars in town. 
/ Charlie asked whether they had happy hours. / Jake 
said that / many of them / did. / He added / that / the 
rest / had / various / other specials. 
   
Joe was on a college tour. / He asked the tour guide 
Gorden whether the classes there were 
discussion-based. / Gordon said that / many of them / 
were. / He added / that / the rest / were / labs or 
lectures, / but / very interesting. 
   
Hillary was visiting a college and was interested in 
the restaurants in town. / She asked an older student 
whether they used local suppliers. / The student said 
that / many of them / did. / He added / that / the rest / 
were / big chains. 
   
Jason and Jackie had a lot of library books to return. / 
Jackie asked whether they were renewable. / Jason 
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said that / many of them / were. / He added / that / the 
rest / had / to be returned / right away, / though. 
Mark wanted to download songs from the band he 
had just heard. / He asked Alex whether their songs 
were on iTunes. / Alex said that / none of them / were. 
/ He added / that / they / were all / on Youtube. 
Where could 
Mark hear the 
band's songs? 
Youtube iTunes 
Jackson was looking at sneakers in the shoe store. / 
He asked the clerk which brand made shoes with 
Velcro. / The clerk said that / none of them / did. / He 
added / that / Velcro / had gone / out of style. 
Does the clerk 
think Velcro is 
popular 
nowadays? 
No Yes 
Jan and Marcia were looking at blenders. / Marcia 
asked Jan whether they could make ice cream. / Jan 
said that / none of them / could. / She added / that / she 
/ was trying / to avoid / dairy, / anyway. 
   
Nell was talking with her old soccer teammate, 
Emma, at the reunion. / She asked Emma whether her 
kids played soccer. / Ella said that / none of them / 
did. / She added / that / they / were on / the swim 
team. 
   
Cassie and Rich were looking at apples at the grocery 
store. / Cassie asked Rich whether the apples in this 
aisle were organic. / Rich said that / none of them / 
were. / He added / that / there was / an organic / aisle / 
around / the corner. 
   
John was looking at cell phones in the store. / He 
asked the clerk which ones had voice recognition. / 
The clerk said that / none of them / did. / He added / 
that / only / smart phones / have that. 
What kinds of 
phones did the 
clerk say have 
voice 
recognition? 
Smart 
phones 
All phones 
Michelle and her classmates wanted to take a group 
photo after dinner. / She asked her classmate Kenny 
who had a camera. / Kenny said that / none of them / 
did. / He added / that / they / would have / other 
chances / later. 
Were the 
students able to 
take a picture? 
No Yes 
Maureen and Bonnie wanted to go to one of the 
nearby beaches. / Maureen asked Bonnie whether 
they would have sharks. / Bonnie said that / none of 
them / would. / She added / that / shark attacks / are / 
profoundly rare, / anyway. 
   
Curtis and Joanne were looking at chandeliers. / 
Joanne asked Curtis whether they needed special 
lightbulbs. / Curtis said that / none of them / did. / He 
added / that / they / were / just like / normal lamps. 
   
Alice and Kara were planting oak trees. / Alice asked 
Kara whether they would need to be pruned regularly. 
/ Kara said that / none of them / would. / She added / 
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that / they / were very / low maintenance. 
Gabe and Marcus were hanging out after the first day 
of class. / Marcus asked Gabe whether the girls in his 
classes were single. / Gabe said that / none of them / 
were. / He added / that / he wouldn't / introduce / any 
girls / to Marcus, / anyway. 
   
Damian wanted a jacket with elbow patches. / He 
asked his father which stores in town sold jackets like 
that. / His father said that / none of them / did. / He 
added / that / he / could / order one / online. 
   
Beth and Emily were trying to decide which bar to go 
to. / Beth asked Emily whether the bars downtown 
were open until 2:00. / Emily said that / several of 
them / were. / She added / that / the rest / closed / at 
1:00. 
Are there bars 
open after 
midnight? 
Yes No 
Ella was looking at the spices in the spice rack. / She 
asked Trey whether they were used in Indian food. / 
Trey said that / several of them / were. / He added / 
that / the rest / were / used in / other types / of food. 
What was Ella 
looking at? 
Spices Drinks 
Phil and Monica were looking at houses with the 
realtor. / Phil asked the realtor whether these houses 
had home security systems. / The realtor said that / 
several of them / did. / She added / that / the rest / 
could / have them / installed. 
   
Shannon and Joan were perusing the power tools in 
the garage. / Joan asked Shannon whether they were 
under warranty. / Shannon said that / several of them / 
were. / She added / that / the rest / were / too old. 
   
Hannah and Crystal wanted to buy wine glasses at the 
yard sale. / Crystal asked Hannah whether they were 
from a matched set. / Hannah said that / several of 
them / were. / She added / that / the rest / were / 
unique. 
   
Geoff and Marion were trying to decide which island 
to visit. / Geoff asked Marion whether they were 
close enough for a day trip. / Marion said that / 
several of them / were. / She added / that / the rest / 
were / a bit / farther away. 
   
Teresa had shared a cookie recipe with Greg. / She 
asked Greg whether the cookies had turned out all 
right. / Greg said that / most of them / had. / He added 
/ that / the rest / had gotten / a little / burnt. 
What happened 
to some of the 
cookies? 
They got 
burnt. 
They 
broke. 
Scott was getting ready to order new software in the 
library. / He asked the technician whether the 
computers were compatible. / The technician said that 
/ most of them / were. / He added / that / the rest / 
What was Scott 
ordering for the 
library? 
Software Books 
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would / have to be / upgraded / first. 
Elaine and Cliff were at a wedding reception. / Elaine 
asked Cliff whether the drinks there were 
non-alcoholic. / Cliff said that / most of them / were. / 
He added / that / the rest / were / alcoholic. 
   
Jerry and Sheila wanted to bring gum on the airplane. 
/ Sheila asked Jerry whether the ones at the newsstand 
were sugar-free. / Jerry said that / most of them / 
were. / He added / that / the rest / did not / look / very 
good. 
   
Gerry and his son were at the amusement park. / 
Gerry asked the attendant whether the rides had 
height limits. / The attendant said that / most of them / 
did. / He added / that / the rest / were still / fun. 
   
Alan and Frank wanted to visit the museum. / Alan 
asked Frank whether the new exhibits were open to 
the public. / Frank said that / most of them / were. / He 
added / that / the rest / would be / open / soon. 
   
Amy was impressed by the other squash players in the 
club she was joining. / She asked another player 
whether they had had coaching. / The player said that 
/ a few of them / had. / She added / that / the rest / had 
just / picked it up / over time. 
What club was 
Amy joining? 
Squash 
club 
Chess club 
Joshua felt that the computers in the library were too 
slow. / He asked Seth whether the computers ran 
slowly for him too. / Seth said that / a few of them / 
did. / He added / that / the rest / he / had not tried / yet. 
Where were 
Joshua and Seth 
testing 
computers? 
The library The student 
union 
Dylan and Janelle were going to look at apartments. / 
Janelle asked Dylan whether the units downtown had 
washing machines. / Dylan said that / a few of them / 
did. / He added / that / the rest / were / near / the 
laundromat. 
   
Jeremy and Brett were planning a hike. / Jeremy 
asked Brett whether the trails on this side of town 
were hilly. / Brett said that / a few of them / were. / He 
added / that / the rest / were / poorly maintained, / 
though. 
   
Colleen and Edward wanted to go bowling. / Edward 
asked Colleen whether the bowling alleys in town had 
weeknight specials. / Colleen said that / a few of them 
/ did. / She added / that / the rest / had / better food. 
   
Liza and Beverly had just picked their classes. / Liza 
asked Beverly whether her classes had labs. / Beverly 
said that / a few of them / did. / She added / that / the 
rest / were / language / classes. 
   
The professors were discussing some students' Who had given Students Job 
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presentations. / Dr. Smith asked Dr. Rivera whether 
the presentations had too many animations. / Dr. 
Rivera said that / two of them / did. / He added / that / 
the rest / were / all right. 
presentations? applicants 
Glenn and Leah were planning to go to one of the 
concerts in town. / Glenn asked Leah whether they 
would have a light show. / Leah said that / two of 
them / did. / She added / that / the rest / were / more / 
low-key. 
Who was Glenn 
going to a 
concert with? 
Leah Marty 
Natalie and Dean wanted to take a train on their 
vacation. / Natalie asked Dean whether they would 
have dining cars. / Dean said that / two of them / did. / 
He added / that / the rest / were / commuter trains. 
   
Tess and Wayne were shopping for a new camera. / 
Tess asked Wayne whether the models in this store 
had telephoto lenses. / Wayne said that / three of them 
/ did. / He added / that / the rest / were / 
point-and-clicks. 
   
Chelsea and Wyatt were talking about going to a 
movie. / Wyatt asked Chelsea whether the movies in 
the theater were in 3-D. / Chelsea said that / three of 
them / were. / She added / that / the rest / were / 
normal. 
Where did they 
want to see a 
movie? 
In the 
theater 
At home 
Josie and Christian were looking at the chickens in 
the coop. / Josie asked Christian whether the chickens 
were old enough to lay eggs. / Christian said that / 
three of them / were. / He added / that / the rest / 
would be / ready / soon. 
   
Jessie and Caleb were getting ready to go to 
orientation. / Caleb asked Jessie whether the 
workshops at orientation were mandatory. / Jessie 
said that / two of them / were. / She added / that / the 
rest / were / optional / but / recommended. 
   
Chad and Tori wanted to adopt a dog. / Chad asked 
Tori whether the dogs at the pound were fixed. / Tori 
said that / three of them / were. / She added / that / the 
rest / weren't / old enough / yet. 
   
Drew and Giles were in the computer lab. / Giles 
asked Drew whether the documents had printed 
correctly. / Drew said that / four of them / had. / He 
added / that / the rest / had gotten / jammed. 
What had 
happened to the 
documents? 
Got 
jammed 
Out of 
paper 
Mandy and Shelby wanted to go out to eat. / Mandy 
asked Shelby whether the restaurants downtown 
served brunch. / Shelby said that / four of them / did. / 
She added / that / the rest / had / great / breakfast / 
options. 
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Damon was doing laundry. / He asked his mother 
whether the shirts could go in the dryer. / His mother 
said that / four of them / could. / She added / that / the 
rest / should be / hung up / to dry. 
   
Ethan and Connor had just seen a big crash in the bike 
race. / Ethan asked Connor whether those riders were 
still in the race. / Connor said that / four of them / 
were. / He added / that / the rest / had / dropped out. 
   
 
Practice items 
Vignette Comprehension 
question 
Correct 
choice 
Incorrect 
choice 
Janice wanted to go for a bike ride on the weekend. / 
Her friend Cathering was going to go with her. / 
They decided / to go / on Saturday. / On Saturday / 
they / packed up / a picnic lunch / and set out. 
When did Janice 
and Catherine go 
biking? 
Saturday Sunday 
Johnny and Rich were supposed to bring dessert to 
the party. / They decided to bring ice cream, but 
couldn't choose a flavor. / Rich's favorite flavor / 
was / cookies and cream. / Johnny's / favorite flavor, 
/ however, / was / rocky road. 
What were Johnny 
and Rich bringing 
to the party? 
Dessert Appetizers 
Peter and Sam were both dog lovers. / Peter asked 
Sam what his favorite breed was. / Sam said / his 
favorite was / beagles. / He added / that / they made 
/ great / house pets. 
   
Clint and Ted were in the same chemistry class. / 
Clint asked Ted when their final was. / Ted said that 
/ it was / next Wednesday. / He added / that / there 
was / a final paper / due / on Friday, / also. 
   
Jeff and Mark had to turn in their class project on 
Monday. / Jeff asked Marke to send him his part by 
Saturday night. / Mark nodded / and said that / he 
would. / He added / that / he would / proofread it / 
first. 
   
The dinosaurs went extinct 65 million years ago. / 
Scientists are still not sure what caused the 
extinction. / Some believe / it was caused by / a 
meteor. / Others believe / it was / due to / volcanic 
activity / or a / sudden drop in / sea level. 
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APPENDIX D: STROOP TASK STIMULI 
Word reading Color naming Incongruent 
YELLOW XXXX RED 
BLUE XXXX RED 
BLUE XXXX YELLOW 
RED XXXX BLUE 
RED XXXX GREEN 
BLUE XXXX GREEN 
BLUE XXXX YELLOW 
BLUE XXXX RED 
BLUE XXXX YELLOW 
RED XXXX BLUE 
BLUE XXXX RED 
RED XXXX BLUE 
YELLOW XXXX BLUE 
YELLOW XXXX GREEN 
GREEN XXXX BLUE 
BLUE XXXX GREEN 
GREEN XXXX BLUE 
BLUE XXXX GREEN 
RED XXXX BLUE 
BLUE XXXX YELLOW 
BLUE XXXX RED 
RED XXXX YELLOW 
YELLOW XXXX BLUE 
GREEN XXXX BLUE 
YELLOW XXXX BLUE 
YELLOW XXXX GREEN 
BLUE XXXX YELLOW 
BLUE XXXX RED 
GREEN XXXX RED 
RED XXXX GREEN 
YELLOW XXXX RED 
BLUE XXXX RED 
BLUE XXXX RED 
BLUE XXXX RED 
YELLOW XXXX BLUE 
YELLOW XXXX BLUE 
GREEN XXXX YELLOW 
GREEN XXXX YELLOW 
RED XXXX GREEN 
RED XXXX BLUE 
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RED XXXX YELLOW 
BLUE XXXX RED 
BLUE XXXX YELLOW 
YELLOW XXXX GREEN 
BLUE XXXX RED 
YELLOW XXXX GREEN 
YELLOW XXXX BLUE 
GREEN XXXX YELLOW 
YELLOW XXXX GREEN 
YELLOW XXXX GREEN 
GREEN XXXX YELLOW 
RED XXXX GREEN 
YELLOW XXXX GREEN 
GREEN XXXX RED 
RED XXXX GREEN 
YELLOW XXXX BLUE 
BLUE XXXX GREEN 
RED XXXX YELLOW 
GREEN XXXX RED 
YELLOW XXXX RED 
RED XXXX YELLOW 
YELLOW XXXX BLUE 
GREEN XXXX YELLOW 
GREEN XXXX BLUE 
YELLOW XXXX GREEN 
BLUE XXXX YELLOW 
GREEN XXXX RED 
GREEN XXXX BLUE 
YELLOW XXXX BLUE 
GREEN XXXX RED 
RED XXXX BLUE 
GREEN XXXX RED 
BLUE XXXX GREEN 
YELLOW XXXX BLUE 
GREEN XXXX RED 
RED XXXX GREEN 
BLUE XXXX GREEN 
GREEN XXXX YELLOW 
RED XXXX GREEN 
YELLOW XXXX GREEN 
RED XXXX GREEN 
GREEN XXXX BLUE 
GREEN XXXX YELLOW 
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BLUE XXXX GREEN 
RED XXXX YELLOW 
GREEN XXXX BLUE 
RED XXXX YELLOW 
GREEN XXXX RED 
RED XXXX GREEN 
RED XXXX YELLOW 
BLUE XXXX RED 
YELLOW XXXX RED 
RED XXXX GREEN 
GREEN XXXX BLUE 
RED XXXX YELLOW 
YELLOW XXXX RED 
RED XXXX YELLOW 
YELLOW XXXX BLUE 
GREEN XXXX RED 
GREEN XXXX YELLOW 
 
 
 
 
 
198 
 
APPENDIX E: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics for the individual difference measures, both aggregated across experiments 
and broken down by experiment. These descriptives were conducted prior to any transformations 
and normalizations described in the text. Further information on each of these measures is as 
follows: 
 Stroop: This is the size of the Stroop effect (completion time for the Incongruent color 
naming set minus completion time for the Congruent color naming set). The unit of 
measurement is seconds. 
 AQ measures: These are the scores on the five Autism-Spectrum Quotient subscales. 
Each scale has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 10. 
 IRI measures: These are scores on the four Interpersonal Reactivity Index subscales. 
Each scale has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 28. 
 Truth rating: This is the average truth rating participants gave to underinformative 
sentences; the minimum rating on this scale is 1 (very untrue) and the maximum is 7 
(very true). 
 Reading Span and Counting Span measures: Recall is the percentage of trials recalled 
correctly. This measure was not used in the data analyses reported in the text, but is 
reported here because it is on a meaningful scale. The analyses reported in the text were 
based on composite scores (see the text for explanation of how composite scores were 
computed), and because the raw scores were sphered in order to calculate composite 
scores, the composite scores by necessity roughly approximate a standard normal 
distribution. 
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 Flanker: This is the size of the flanker effect (response time for Incongruent trials minus 
response time for Congruent trials). The unit of measurement is milliseconds, and the 
effect is not a raw mean difference but is a regression coefficient (see the text for more 
details about the regression model used to calculate flanker effects). Note that for the 
analyses presented in the text, reaction times were transformed via reflected reciprocal 
prior to computing flanker effects; here the flanker effects are reported based on raw 
reaction times instead, in order to show the effects on a more meaningful scale. 
 
200 
 
 
M
ea
n
 
M
ed
ia
n
 
S
D
 
R
a
n
g
e 
S
k
ew
n
es
s 
Experiments 4 & 5 
S
tr
o
o
p
 
1
7
.7
9
 
1
6
.6
5
 
7
.9
9
 
-0
.3
7
–
4
0
.3
9
 
0
.7
2
 
A
Q
 S
o
ci
a
l 
S
k
il
l 
2
.4
4
 
2
 
2
.3
9
 
0
–
9
 
1
.0
5
 
A
Q
 A
tt
en
ti
o
n
 S
w
it
ch
in
g
 
4
.8
2
 
5
 
1
.8
1
 
1
–
9
 
0
.1
3
 
A
Q
 A
tt
en
ti
o
n
 t
o
 D
et
a
il
 
5
.8
9
 
6
 
2
.2
3
 
0
–
1
0
 
-0
.2
7
 
A
Q
 C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
 
2
.1
2
 
2
 
1
.7
1
 
0
–
6
 
0
.5
8
 
A
Q
 I
m
a
g
in
a
ti
o
n
 
2
.4
5
 
2
 
1
.6
 
0
–
8
 
0
.9
1
 
IR
I 
P
er
sp
ec
ti
v
e
 
1
5
.9
7
 
1
6
 
4
.2
 
4
–
2
4
 
-0
.5
5
 
IR
I 
F
a
n
ta
sy
 
1
9
.8
8
 
2
1
 
5
.2
5
 
6
–
2
8
 
-0
.7
1
 
IR
I 
E
m
p
a
th
y
 
2
0
.9
7
 
2
1
.5
 
4
.6
5
 
6
–
2
7
 
-0
.8
4
 
IR
I 
D
is
tr
es
s 
1
1
.6
5
 
1
1
.5
 
4
.6
7
 
2
–
2
2
 
0
.4
8
 
T
ru
th
 R
a
ti
n
g
 
4
.9
7
 
6
.1
 
2
.2
5
 
1
–
7
 
-0
.6
1
 
R
ea
d
in
g
 S
p
a
n
 (
R
ec
a
ll
) 
6
4
.6
2
 
6
7
.5
 
1
9
.9
 
0
–
9
7
.9
1
 
-1
.2
5
 
R
ea
d
in
g
 S
p
a
n
 (
C
o
m
p
o
si
te
) 
0
 
0
.1
3
 
0
.7
8
 
-3
.0
8
–
1
.2
9
 
-0
.9
8
 
C
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 S
p
a
n
 (
R
ec
a
ll
) 
6
1
.2
4
 
6
2
.1
7
 
1
6
.7
6
 
8
.8
9
–
9
6
.4
4
 
-0
.5
8
 
C
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 S
p
a
n
 (
C
o
m
p
o
si
te
) 
0
 
0
.1
4
 
0
.8
 
-2
.3
7
–
1
.4
5
 
-1
.0
9
 
F
la
n
k
er
 
1
0
8
.5
6
 
1
0
9
.1
6
 
4
6
.7
6
 
-3
2
.7
7
–
2
6
9
.2
1
 
0
.2
2
 
 
 
201 
 
 
M
ea
n
 
M
ed
ia
n
 
S
D
 
R
a
n
g
e 
S
k
ew
n
es
s 
Experiment 4 
S
tr
o
o
p
 
1
7
.4
 
1
6
.5
9
 
6
.7
8
 
8
.7
5
–
3
4
.1
7
 
1
.1
 
A
Q
 S
o
ci
a
l 
S
k
il
l 
1
.9
6
 
1
.5
 
1
.6
7
 
0
–
6
 
0
.5
6
 
A
Q
 A
tt
en
ti
o
n
 S
w
it
ch
in
g
 
4
.7
1
 
4
 
2
.0
2
 
1
–
9
 
0
.3
3
 
A
Q
 A
tt
en
ti
o
n
 t
o
 D
e
ta
il
 
5
.8
2
 
6
 
2
.0
9
 
2
–
1
0
 
-0
.1
7
 
A
Q
 C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
 
1
.8
2
 
1
 
1
.5
6
 
0
–
6
 
1
.2
4
 
A
Q
 I
m
a
g
in
a
ti
o
n
 
2
.3
2
 
2
 
1
.4
4
 
0
–
5
 
0
.5
2
 
IR
I 
P
er
sp
ec
ti
v
e
 
1
5
.2
5
 
1
4
.5
 
3
.4
6
 
8
–
2
2
 
0
.0
4
 
IR
I 
F
a
n
ta
sy
 
1
9
.8
9
 
2
0
.5
 
4
.7
8
 
1
1
–
2
8
 
-0
.2
5
 
IR
I 
E
m
p
a
th
y
 
2
0
.3
2
 
2
0
.5
 
4
.6
 
9
–
2
7
 
-0
.3
2
 
IR
I 
D
is
tr
es
s 
1
1
.2
5
 
1
1
 
3
.9
9
 
4
–
1
9
 
-0
.0
6
 
T
ru
th
 R
a
ti
n
g
 
4
.7
3
 
4
.8
 
2
.4
5
 
1
–
7
 
-0
.4
3
 
R
ea
d
in
g
 S
p
a
n
 (
R
ec
a
ll
) 
7
0
.0
2
 
7
0
.6
9
 
1
5
.1
6
 
4
1
.5
3
–
9
7
.9
2
 
-0
.0
7
 
R
ea
d
in
g
 S
p
a
n
 (
C
o
m
p
o
si
te
) 
0
.0
9
 
0
.2
9
 
0
.6
7
 
-1
.1
1
–
1
.1
9
 
-0
.1
 
C
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 S
p
a
n
 (
R
ec
a
ll
) 
6
4
.8
2
 
6
5
.7
2
 
1
6
.8
4
 
2
0
–
9
6
.4
4
 
-0
.6
 
C
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 S
p
a
n
 (
C
o
m
p
o
si
te
) 
0
 
0
.1
 
0
.8
2
 
-2
.1
–
1
.2
1
 
-0
.6
 
F
la
n
k
er
 
1
0
6
.0
8
 
1
0
5
.0
1
 
5
2
.3
5
 
2
5
.6
5
–
2
6
9
.2
1
 
0
.8
9
 
 
 
202 
 
 
M
ea
n
 
M
ed
ia
n
 
S
D
 
R
a
n
g
e 
S
k
ew
n
es
s 
Experiment 5 
 
M
ea
n
 
M
ed
ia
n
 
S
D
 
R
an
g
e 
S
k
ew
n
es
s 
S
tr
o
o
p
 
1
8
.0
8
 
1
6
.8
4
 
8
.8
5
 
-0
.3
7
–
4
0
.3
9
 
0
.5
2
 
A
Q
 S
o
ci
a
l 
S
k
il
l 
2
.8
6
 
2
 
2
.7
8
 
0
–
9
 
0
.8
1
 
A
Q
 A
tt
en
ti
o
n
 S
w
it
ch
in
g
 
4
.8
9
 
5
 
1
.7
 
1
–
8
 
-0
.0
7
 
A
Q
 A
tt
en
ti
o
n
 t
o
 D
et
a
il
 
5
.9
7
 
6
 
2
.3
9
 
0
–
1
0
 
-0
.3
5
 
A
Q
 C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
 
2
.4
1
 
2
 
1
.7
7
 
0
–
6
 
0
.1
5
 
A
Q
 I
m
a
g
in
a
ti
o
n
 
2
.5
9
 
2
 
1
.7
2
 
0
–
8
 
0
.9
7
 
IR
I 
P
er
sp
ec
ti
v
e
 
1
6
.8
1
 
1
7
 
4
.2
8
 
4
–
2
4
 
-0
.8
1
 
IR
I 
F
a
n
ta
sy
 
1
9
.8
4
 
2
1
 
5
.7
1
 
6
–
2
7
 
-0
.8
5
 
IR
I 
E
m
p
a
th
y
 
2
1
.4
3
 
2
3
 
4
.7
5
 
6
–
2
7
 
-1
.1
8
 
IR
I 
D
is
tr
es
s 
1
1
.6
8
 
1
3
 
4
.9
3
 
2
–
2
2
 
-0
.0
5
 
T
ru
th
 R
a
ti
n
g
 
5
.0
9
 
6
.2
 
2
.1
2
 
1
–
7
 
-0
.6
7
 
R
ea
d
in
g
 S
p
a
n
 (
R
ec
a
ll
) 
6
1
.2
7
 
6
5
.6
9
 
2
2
.1
8
 
0
–
8
8
.8
9
 
-1
.3
5
 
R
ea
d
in
g
 S
p
a
n
 (
C
o
m
p
o
si
te
) 
-0
.0
7
 
0
.0
8
 
0
.8
7
 
-3
.0
8
–
1
.2
9
 
-1
.1
3
 
C
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 S
p
a
n
 (
R
ec
a
ll
) 
5
8
.6
9
 
6
0
.2
8
 
1
6
.6
5
 
8
.8
9
–
9
0
.2
2
 
-0
.6
3
 
C
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 S
p
a
n
 (
C
o
m
p
o
si
te
) 
0
.0
2
 
0
.1
5
 
0
.8
1
 
-2
.3
7
–
1
.4
5
 
-1
.4
7
 
 
 
203 
 
APPENDIX F: BACKGROUND SPEECH STIMULI 
Real words 
 
Monday 
traffic 
stronger 
economic 
value 
go 
delegate 
rugby 
years 
consumer 
scheduled 
off 
eminent 
detours 
open 
overtime 
him 
confirm 
gained 
against 
impressive 
bill 
appointment 
extremely 
agreed 
only 
breakfast 
appeal 
behind 
cookies 
house 
ever 
class 
visited 
news 
hall 
eighteenth 
cutting 
commissions 
officer's 
exhibition 
companies 
special 
science 
half 
boyfriend 
driving 
residents 
delivered 
today 
weather 
fold 
wind 
dinner 
center 
renovate 
artists 
ago 
unit 
city 
traditions 
are 
historians 
later 
given 
quarterfinal 
races 
urged 
work 
know 
construction 
cross-town 
after 
shredded 
recycled 
daisy 
children 
presentation 
never 
scored 
young 
unanimous 
sketches 
sun 
site 
other 
unexpectedly 
attempt 
began 
developer 
nobody 
contains 
exceptional 
warmly 
payment 
windy 
ruined 
recovered 
writing 
dark 
official 
highway 
night 
race 
goals 
out 
themed 
light 
neighbour 
pretty 
she 
starters 
take 
action 
freeze 
finally 
when 
everyone 
involved 
sunrise 
told 
aluminum 
bond 
expected 
flowers 
nursery 
maternity 
goal 
students 
wrapped 
Kansas 
we're 
capsule 
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team 
usually 
daily 
photocopy 
took 
local 
paintings 
options 
fast 
hope 
winter 
percent 
streets 
hours 
rainfall 
soccer 
mothers 
street 
community 
close 
move 
early 
into 
approved 
lodge 
including 
educational 
friends 
has 
back 
state 
for 
war 
will 
warm 
regional 
three 
neighborhoods 
championship 
process 
products 
elementary 
newspaper 
going 
searching 
aims 
tissue 
concert 
served 
plan 
station 
European 
day 
thought 
Chinese 
persistently 
present 
finding 
old 
twilight 
committee 
costumed 
westbound 
attracted 
trick-or-treat 
candidates 
positive 
increasing 
six 
earthquake 
nowadays 
being 
seems 
more 
entirely 
warmth 
used 
said 
cheese 
month 
many 
advised 
all 
shined 
raid 
intersection 
unions 
several 
fifths 
looking 
almost 
spaces 
hurricane 
shirtless 
could 
newsprint 
of 
got 
lot 
mentioned 
green 
five 
speech 
traveler 
entire 
civil 
asked 
teammate 
famous 
their 
meet 
pellets 
vacant 
life 
away 
outcry 
completely 
coffee 
started 
homecoming 
what 
edge 
opera 
redevelopment 
place 
collect 
visit 
following 
art 
cover 
roundabout 
valleys 
time 
concerns 
monetary 
side 
ground 
Mister 
tremendous 
went 
new 
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macaroni 
lanes 
recommend 
noticed 
university 
shut 
Sally 
urban 
called 
caused 
influence 
currently 
get 
shoofly 
encourage 
which 
faulty 
cloak 
throughout 
bloomed 
expressing 
unable 
residential 
March 
convenient 
nearly 
seven 
immediately 
capital 
court 
requires 
now 
programming 
small 
first 
recommendation 
younger 
will 
amount 
should 
coaches 
political 
homecoming 
disputing 
recently 
already 
difficult 
bridge 
program 
November 
again 
product 
surgery 
always 
universe 
climate 
car 
set 
opponent 
cold 
need 
progress 
gave 
fiberfill 
board 
reform 
quietly 
remains 
great 
accurate 
banks 
even 
minutes 
begin 
travel 
forever 
money 
reason 
October 
schools 
this 
and 
additional 
hear 
came 
among 
shop 
confess 
will 
win 
found 
lane 
printing 
homecoming 
location 
will 
gallery 
man 
problems 
considered 
severe 
porch 
make 
latest 
giving 
good 
previous 
opened 
from 
succeed 
society 
average 
without 
line 
seek 
plastic 
integrity 
force 
turn 
welcome 
instead 
swim 
courthouse 
seeking 
next 
party 
eastbound 
market 
campus 
take 
corroboration 
predicting 
buildings 
involve 
saw 
can 
soldiers 
generally 
approached 
strange 
area 
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game 
project 
bed 
football 
quarter 
didn't 
important 
with 
room 
paper 
traffic 
making 
classrooms 
medieval 
having 
characters 
brother 
were 
ways 
like 
eight 
agreements 
steps 
along 
featured 
picture 
week 
busy 
crossed 
much 
find 
long 
agreement 
equations 
important 
focus 
there 
hard 
places 
succeeded 
installed 
technicians 
train 
urging 
his 
varsity 
acquired 
Tuesday 
its 
over 
parents 
sold 
mystery 
least 
members 
woman 
trade 
play 
takes 
solution 
Missouri 
earlier 
promises 
will 
field 
through 
Friday 
middle 
advance 
claim 
person 
locations 
queen 
voter 
needs 
blew 
planning 
had 
best 
library 
government 
pray 
unmarked 
press 
big 
thought 
mid-1900s 
exciting 
afternoon 
right 
parking 
finished 
fight 
four 
television 
boy 
they 
spite 
high 
made 
fine 
international 
events 
hood 
still 
will 
recent 
rivals 
approving 
order 
than 
clear 
paperboard 
cider 
nine 
come 
century 
slipped 
have 
one 
significant 
any 
debate 
square 
produce 
success 
required 
wasn't 
past 
commissioners 
o'clock 
support 
dated 
will 
robin 
become 
moved 
rivalry 
tradition 
little 
higher 
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that 
well 
loans 
sleeping 
stolen 
charming 
bag 
part 
easiest 
hike 
invited 
council 
just 
museum 
closely 
player 
energy 
home 
each 
didn't 
public 
parallel 
central 
includes 
school 
parade 
announced 
coach 
important 
supermarket 
recycling 
late-October 
during 
technical 
grand-parent's 
built 
yet 
north 
jackets 
producing 
introduced 
most 
around 
transported 
few 
improvements 
about 
better 
lost 
leave 
season 
job 
homecoming 
been 
copy 
although 
actual 
getting 
changes 
defensively 
will 
increased 
until 
left 
last 
very 
obliged 
doughnuts 
western 
meetings 
people 
crowning 
birth 
played 
various 
strong 
quite 
win 
hits 
rebuilding 
every 
group 
watch 
ten 
voting 
tied 
supporters 
scheming 
tenth 
nephew 
mixed 
student 
damage 
onto 
decided 
production 
specialist 
easy 
homecoming 
our 
year 
older 
two-year-old 
mischief 
then 
twice 
family's 
burial 
items 
town 
will 
club 
killed 
main 
case 
determined 
ski 
problem 
settlement 
election 
village 
soon 
needed 
teacher 
materials 
scabbard 
ballast 
mastiff 
tomahawk 
suburban 
emanation 
platypus 
felicity 
competent 
neptune 
platform 
emigration 
tapestry 
velveteen 
sturgeon 
bungalow 
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glisten 
grimace 
abdomen 
nectar 
herbivore 
frontier 
sovereign 
padlock 
sailboat 
classroom 
rattlesnake 
drainpipe 
cornfield 
stopwatch 
mousetrap 
bathrobe 
handgun 
newspaper 
videotape 
sandstorm 
airplane 
nosedive 
seatbelt 
hometown 
teacup 
backbone 
daydream 
headache 
toothpaste 
bubblegum 
paintbrush 
cellphone 
beefsteak 
flagpole 
treetop 
doorknob 
basketball 
hairspray 
chainsaw 
spacecraft 
forklift 
whiplash 
grapefruit 
earthquake 
frostbite 
truckload 
shoebox 
codename 
reindeer 
flashbulb 
postcard 
worldview 
folklore 
walkman 
fingertip 
beanstalk 
milkshake 
humankind 
breakfast 
ashtray 
cutthroat 
thunderbolt 
heartburn 
tombstone 
earplug 
standpoint 
southwest 
landlord 
payroll 
tailgate 
hogwash 
dashboard 
crackpot 
passport 
bottleneck 
honeymoon 
eggplant 
jailbird 
doughnut 
sugarcane 
storefront 
rainbow 
brainchild 
rollerblade 
hamstring 
windfall 
turncoat 
bootleg 
bookworm 
armpit 
hallmark 
warpath 
bombshell 
pineapple 
bandwagon 
doghouse 
bedrock 
peppermint 
sherbet 
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sunkay 
trammick 
strenger 
tecopomic 
zaluke 
vo 
gelegote 
sugby 
kears 
tonsamer 
beduted 
oss 
ummifent 
dapours 
ipent 
opersime 
lim 
gonsirm 
gined 
pʌgets 
limtressive 
fiss 
sottoimpment 
dexgreesely 
hegreef 
pownzie 
kressfast 
aggeaf 
tee-pined 
noosies 
dauf 
iveck 
sliss 
kuzzitted 
zoof 
kell 
sate beenth 
gittick 
tiggissions 
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luffickers 
jexquitition 
gambanies 
skemmle 
tiants 
kaff 
loytremp 
scriping 
cressipents 
seloovered 
moofay 
plecker 
tolk 
slint 
lissle 
manter 
senosate 
kustists 
seefo 
byune-mit 
liffy 
tromitions 
frass 
huspories 
yaker 
slissen 
warfer linel 
yajes 
wurged 
ferk 
klow 
spink 
sunkriction 
kosspow 
afkit 
sneffid 
befikled 
faipy 
milren 
reskimpation 
gepper 
skappid 
nup 
ucrisafous 
sletchid 
spone 
geep 
ahthick 
mundebekt 
magint 
bofan 
kromeleper 
bomuddy 
suftark 
kovarkinal 
grengly 
plactent 
zovty 
lendack 
provovvered 
vugern 
krawble 
zafissel 
zeemay 
gige 
jerrip 
jollid 
prouk 
thoked 
zipe 
glaybour 
riggip 
hosh 
stoofels 
klipe 
spaction 
griesel 
fopally 
gemmed 
keffry-kunn 
binkolled 
lupripe 
glolk 
adoofameer 
klonnit 
pextected 
kluffers 
burspery 
tagrenity 
jopal 
tubrents 
gulloped 
sankoon 
kreer 
sapkool 
trome 
blupally 
klagey 
voco-tobby 
koop 
flople 
saimpings 
smopkins 
plusk 
zope 
fintle 
terpenk 
treefs 
scowper 
fainrall 
kosser 
thommers 
treef 
makkonity 
slose 
voose 
larley 
tagone 
sarooved 
chodge 
clinsooding 
capsamational 
dreffs 
sazz 
bock 
fleek 
froo 
clorp 
leewo 
rama 
geerinal 
pleef 
begoroods 
panctionpip 
rospess 
krompus 
ploctement 
skoozvaver 
goptink 
ferchunt 
smase 
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smickle 
sonkert 
verked 
palmin 
musion 
purowegan 
vok 
potht 
supese 
poskispently 
seevent 
kinding 
drog 
kwipight 
mikippity 
soctumed 
bowstwend 
taracted 
kroperdeet 
dankifets 
soppessive 
ombreasing 
hidgel 
gerdnack 
nupalaise 
leemick 
freems 
klore 
tensipely 
marwith 
jumie 
hinghud 
treamnug 
prieldlisk 
scringhud 
stropror 
mellcond 
fampror 
tarknane 
vaithaib 
plarmbip 
sooftarg 
eronkie 
mourdgid 
dacklarch 
brumphom 
fliffloune 
fextcralk 
fubrol 
nangak 
glormpeb 
fudral 
segrask 
speeldorp 
plewnofe 
pliptond 
siblusp 
gorbux 
dirser 
stacha 
niehan 
higpoy 
veyjun 
daketrel 
lirgtorg 
chawmord 
brolchon 
foshtule 
slepbort 
pisknert 
sumemirt 
himepron 
spowtenk 
tritferd 
chudhake 
kerdhaif 
shisebisp 
lidefalb 
malshplich 
frokeskeer 
thichprip 
cradefodge 
slentgoost 
plourtrenk 
spreljeash 
plachsork 
cralytroud 
prundgrall 
grenfelgraple 
gorbnom 
dirnoy 
stadaw 
nieyeg 
higtig 
veylod 
dakeblar 
lirgfoll 
chawpraw 
brolsare 
foshstit 
slepnorn 
piskforb 
sumesnel 
himestib 
spowfler 
tritfeep 
chudleem 
kerdplip 
shiseferk 
lidesleg 
malshhaist 
frokelaip 
thichtagar 
cradethean 
slentfrand 
plourmarpy 
sprelplard 
plachtronk 
cralypreed 
prundchish 
grenfelslempor 
nomux 
noyser 
dawcha 
yeghan 
tigpoy 
lodjun 
blartrel 
folltorg 
prawmord 
sarechon 
stittule 
nornbort 
forbnert 
snelmirt 
stibpron 
flertenk 
feepferd 
leemhake 
pliphaif 
ferkbisp 
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slegfalb 
haistplich 
laipskeer 
tagarprilb 
theanfodge 
frandgoost 
marpytrenk 
plardjeash 
tronksork 
preedtroud 
chishgrall 
slemporgraple 
nomgorb 
noydir 
dawsta 
yegnie 
tighig 
lodvey 
blardake 
folllirg 
prawchaw 
sarebrol 
stitfosh 
nornslep 
forbpisk 
snelsume 
stibhime 
flerspow 
feeptrit 
leemchud 
plipkerd 
ferkshise 
sleglide 
haistmalsh 
laipfroke 
tagarthich 
theancrade 
frandslent 
marpyplour 
plardsprel 
tronkplach 
preedcraly 
chishprund 
slemporgrenfel 
uxgorb 
serdir 
chasta 
hannie 
poyhig 
junvey 
treldake 
torglirg 
mordchaw 
chonbrol 
tulefosh 
bortslep 
nertpisk 
mirtsume 
pronhime 
tenkspow 
ferdtrit 
hakechud 
haifkerd 
bispshise 
falblide 
plichmalsh 
skeerfroke 
prilbthich 
fodgecrade 
goostslent 
trenkplour 
jeashsprel 
sorkplach 
troudcraly 
grallprund 
graplegrenfel 
uxnom 
sernoy 
chadaw 
hanyeg 
poytig 
junlod 
trelblar 
torgfoll 
mordpraw 
chonsare 
tulestit 
bortnorn 
nertforb 
mirtsnel 
pronstib 
tenkfler 
ferdfeep 
hakeleem 
haifplip 
bispferk 
falbsleg 
plichhaist 
skeerlaip 
prilbtagar 
fodgethean 
goostfrand 
trenkmarpy 
jeashplard 
sorktronk 
troudpreed 
grallchish 
grapleslempor 
glid 
pyleg 
otlat 
ock 
hed 
spale 
lant 
elt 
reaken 
midbith 
rint 
uit 
ong 
rog 
pring 
ress 
ird 
oon 
ane 
ip 
gerflibble 
eld 
oard 
tage 
troke 
tyle 
lemind 
ront 
rewnie 
prock 
haft 
ther 
tring 
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ealt 
crod 
rass 
ber 
hing 
ast 
pebug 
elon 
hape 
stide 
paxe 
yapple 
orse 
rame 
rop 
creen 
chool 
netap 
spea 
hild 
nake 
acken 
oach 
erm 
snut 
trett 
tecar 
sook 
kenk 
senk 
fint 
godie 
nank 
yube 
surt 
varn 
rost 
fote 
isel 
mimp 
houb 
slig 
aren 
hade 
argle 
drope 
lorse 
yean 
bafe 
onch 
plort 
trug 
prew 
nable 
torb 
solt 
lork 
hane 
eart 
feag 
trone 
flet 
blenk 
slorm 
marel 
phenk 
gath 
plest 
nume 
shenk 
smey 
mople 
steg 
taple 
gine 
morsh 
negle 
moit 
lote 
morch 
sife 
brup 
lorp 
proke 
mertesh 
sorge 
fenth 
nork 
meast 
vome 
dast 
baprel 
vogtist 
yitfane 
nilkad 
blapdum 
glospum 
forpmerk 
pridnusk 
treepshorm 
merbtarn 
flimhan 
fopshreen 
jerglem 
filbreng 
greldem 
gredmanch 
fipslen 
larfbast 
hasemisk 
prinkow 
falphort 
hargpilt 
deneskine 
frageclest 
brimesheme 
flainchenk 
slapetrosh 
jaiseclim 
bramabome 
brindnorg 
brendfreem 
flebarganch 
fomclem 
fiskpap 
detwose 
lupfrant 
pabhest 
daltimp 
blashlask 
fleptrud 
pristrem 
feshmorp 
feskprap 
fingtesh 
panchdrep 
sompgome 
flindun 
fleepidge 
wodsmid 
drinbist 
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bremnate 
shempabe 
lindshlipe 
hadgemest 
premtrest 
plintnench 
flampsirk 
slerthosh 
ploudtomp 
marpebarme 
trepfreme 
blembemurt 
greembleem 
gurffarnard 
plemberb 
nopgesh 
blunfard 
sabrund 
nolbem 
gortfabe 
mibshrene 
beskteb 
poultibe 
chemplenk 
slibnawt 
floskush 
frintren 
poskmerd 
tregnasp 
yongfobe 
jushbime 
prilbick 
frennunk 
firtmeeg 
sepblosh 
blengbim 
maffbraim 
plenshorte 
slompresh 
flimpnisk 
fappimose 
shustmoush 
moograiste 
prabefupe 
nerlanch 
slenkaslesh 
depwub 
barmdeg 
mernsem 
molshap 
bompnaw 
brelren 
garmsen 
herngoum 
jornfrem 
kirtlade 
larnmard 
mergsebe 
nipetreb 
thipsern 
quendort 
nelstrop 
spordret 
terpwafe 
wertyape 
brastparn 
drepegane 
framstrad 
gramesoge 
streadneb 
yortslare 
horpraste 
lermtraist 
marskplarn 
plertdarpe 
slarnprebe 
tromfreest 
flortbraime 
chelftarg 
lasknane 
blambip 
vandgid 
sarnkie 
trosthaib 
reafloune 
phaingak 
fentcralk 
prabrol 
dwamphom 
molklarch 
sprewnofe 
mieldral 
larmpeb 
brugrask 
nilldorp 
trablusp 
tooptond 
rewhab 
bermnug 
rellcond 
chaldlisk 
vad 
mip 
flosh 
dit 
dool 
dask 
dess 
bep 
mape 
geg 
fosht 
blun 
nace 
jep 
dap 
gade 
gax 
tind 
yat 
bine 
brote 
koid 
grod 
nerge 
sket 
plote 
stulpe 
dran 
neam 
thod 
blimb 
derg 
mese 
lotch 
ropp 
gorples 
trush 
sloke 
slar 
lansh 
214 
 
yurge 
reen 
launt 
nouve 
possle 
crope 
flent 
dype 
hib 
oast 
weaf 
komot 
drupe 
nend 
fope 
hing 
ove 
sheam 
byue 
gome 
corf 
loag 
pice 
noute 
pler 
bory 
dight 
slee 
yock 
stemp 
yeant 
wiss 
temba 
stam 
haddle 
foth 
shurd 
deide 
beal 
ost 
mub 
blace 
flime 
plet 
rop 
nace 
yeant 
